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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a description and analysis of the relation-
ship between political structure and the urban development of
Rome in the last century. Within the century, there have been
four political ideological moments, the Liberal Monarchy, the
Fascist period, the Democratic Republic and the current Center-
Left government. Three cases have been examined: the Liberal Era
of the first 75 years, the making of the 1962 Master Plan, and
the Center-Left Housing Policies. Each of these cases analyzes
relationships between the ideological currents and political
structure of the period, and the development of the city at that
time. Of particular importance are the roles of city planning,
private development, and public housing. These activities have
played major parts in the shaping of the form of the city.
In conclusion, the overt forms of the government of the
country and of Rome have not had direct effects on the form of
Rome's growth. In the last century, there have been many changes
in the development patterns that the city has taken, but these
have been matched by a great deal of continuity -- in methods of
planning, regulating and developing. The sources of these con-
tinuities stem from the ideological concertion of law and govern-
mental power, and the economic structure of the Italian society,
which has changed little in the century. The organizational
structure of the country has been modified, however, concentrat-
ing much control over resources in public sector agencies, in-
stead of in private holdings. The lack of direct correlations
between political structure and spatial structure does not imply
that there is no relationship, rather the contrary. The form of
Rome has been determined by forces which, at least in Italy,
politics only partly controls, the allocation and use of resources.
Thesis Supervisors: Paolo Ceccarelli, Department of Urban Studies
Antonio Di Mambro, Department of Architecture
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1E-verview _________
"There is nothing strange in the fact that there
were dragons in these parts during the Middle Ages.
(The peasants and Giulia used to say: 'A long time
ago, more than a hundred years, long before the
brigands...') Nor would it be strange if dragons
were to appear again today before the startled eyes
of the people. Anything is possible, where the
ancient dieties of the shepherds, the ram and the lamb,
run every day over the familiar paths, and there is no
definite boundary line between the world of human beings
and that of animals or even monsters. There are a great
many creatures at Gagliano who have a dual nature. A
middle aged peasant woman, married and having children,
with nothing out of the ordinary about her appearance,
was the daughter of a cow. So the village said, and
she herself confirmed it. The older people clearly
remembered her cow mother, who followed her everywhere
when she was a child, mooing to her and licking her
with a rough tongue. This did not alter the fact that
she had also a human mother, who had been dead for many
years. No one saw any contradiction in this dual birth,
and the woman herself, whom I knew personally, lived
quietly and happily, like both her mothers, for all her
animal heredity."
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Levi may as well have been discussing the development of
Rome or the Italian Government when he wrote these words.
There have always been dragons making Italian cities, particular-
ly Rome. And this has been nothing strange. Economic forces
have controlled the city and the government of the country
since the city was founded. Similarly, the city planning pro-
fession has always had two mothers, economics and its own con-
cept of purpose. And until recently, no one has seen any con-
tradiction in this either. Italy is a country of tradition,
and Rome is a city of greater tradition.
It was only in the Fascist era that the Dragon and the
Cow broke their leashes, and became forces out of control.
The massacre of Rome by Mussolini and the postwar rape of the
countryside around Rome by the capitalist economy brought
about an urban crisis not represented by fiscal or economic
measures. The causes of the crisis have been implicitly
political, in Mussolini's desire for grandezza, and in the
Christian-Democrat's allowance of a return to laissez-faire
principles.
This thesis is a response to that situation. It is an
analysis of the development of Rome in terms of the political
developments of the last century. To understand the basis of
the developments of the city since 1922, however, a context
is necessary, and this context began in 1870, when Rome was
declared the capital of a new Italian State, re-unified for
3
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the first time since the Roman Empire. With the entrance into
Rome by the troops of Italy, the Bersaglieri, Rome became a
capital of a secular state, and no longer a feudal capital
under the direction of the Papacy. The ideology of the new
State, Liberalism, has maintained itself through the current
time, accepting massive dislocations to both the left and
right.
In the century of history, the population of Rome has
grown from under 250,000 to over ten times that amount, not
a lot nor very different from the rates of growth of other
major cities or capitals in the same period. The growth in
land area associated with the new population is not extra-
ordinary either. But the forces which have caused this growth
are particular to Italy. Rome has had little industrial base.
Its employment base has been limited to government bureaucracies
and support services, and as such has been under the explicit
control of the central government of Italy. The political
transitions of the State government, and their direct impli-
cation on the city lend a credibility to the assumption that
the development of the city has been a response to political
forces, perhaps more so than other comparable cities.
The shape of the city is clearly related to the forms
of Italian economic structure, social structure, and the
organizational structure of Italian government. These types
of relationships have been documented in both theory and case
analysis by a host of urban theorists, including Harvey,
5
Benevolo, Lynch, Donnison, Castells, Isard, Hoyt, Burgess,
Geddes, and many others. The question of the relation between
city form or urban development, and political structure is
only an emerging body of theory however. Benevolo claims
a relationship, in his preface to "The Origins of Modern Town
Planning:"
"Town planning, on the other hand, cut adrift from
political discussion tended to become increasingly a
purely technical matter at the service of established
powers. This did not mean, however, that it became
politically neutral; on the contrary, it fell within
the sphere of influence of the new conservative ideology
which was evolving during these years, of Bonapartism
in France, of the reforming Tory groups in England and
of Bismarkian imperialism in Germany.. .For progressive
tendencies of modern planning can be practically realized
only if they make contact once more with those political
forces which tend towards a similar general transformation
of society." (Benevolo, 1967, p. xii)
Similarly, in Sutcliffe's analysis of the development of
Paris and Weinberg's analysis of London, the roles of city
planners are put into a political context, and Che growth of
the cities are considered as resulting from not only the
aesthetic ideologies of the day, but the real and influential
political and economic structures of the societies which
housed and inhabited the cities. Italian studies of Rome,
Insolera's "Roma Moderna," and Quaroni's "Imagine di Roma,"
both dwell on these themes, although the American and British
literature about Rome tends to forget or ignore the political
correlations. Fried's text on Rome, "Planning the Eternal City,"
although substantially concerned with the direct implications
of politics in the postwar era, clearly is discussing party
politics, and not the deeper political structure of Rome and
Italy.
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The difficulties of looking for correlations between
politics, political structure and spatial structure are
rooted in the fact that both are structures in evolution.
Through periods of political chaos and.transition, Rome's
population and housing stock continued to grow. In periods
of steady growth, the political systems have continued to
evolve, changing perhaps as much in mid-stream as between
era's. The Liberal-Reform era of Giolitti, in the Monarchy,
the ideological transition of Fascism after the alliance
with Germany, and the final implementation of the democratic
constitution, proclaimed in 1948, but delayed until the
1970's were all major political events, each occurring mid-
stream in a political period.
Time and delay are further confounding factors. The
development of an area of town or the implementation of a
policy take years, even decades, and the elapsed time affords
political changes. And yet commitments of previous govern-
ments are honored. Thirty years for the completion of the
Ministry of Justice, twenty years for the public housing
programs (of both 1903 and 1962) to mature and produce results,
meant that actions affecting growth at one period, were de-
cisions of a previous time. The changes have been incremental,
building upon the previous fabrics; of streets, laws, practices,
regulatory mechanisms, aesthetics, education, class, and de-
cisions. There has been no immediate transformation of urban
growth patterns. The changes have all involved adapting the
7
fabrics already partially woven, and allowing the fabrics to
adapt and clothe new political structures and ideologies.
For these reasons, this study looks at three cases, each
characterizing an era, spanning the entire century. The cases
are not strictly parallel; each is described and analyzed in
the terms of reference of the political and cultural moment
in which it existed. The first case is the 75 years of Liberal-
ism, from the unification through Fascism. In the chapter, the
important aspects are the application of the Liberal ideology,
through the planning profession, to the growth of the city. By
and large, the profession was working in a contradictory ideology,
pointed out by Benevolo, believing in a scientific or politi-
cal neutrality, but clearly working under the sphere of influence
of the new conservative ideology.
The next chapter examines the post-war era, which political-
ly was characterized by a new openness, an anti-Fascist ideology,
and a public and bureaucratic belief in democratic principles.
The growing awareness of the planning profession, however,
to the conservative essence of the Italian political structure
put many influential planners into the Left, seeing the only
chances for changes in planning accomplishments arising out
of a new, Socialist structured Italv. The frustrations in
achieving effective land use controls and re-instituting
public intervention as a planning tool supported this contention.
The last case analyzes the housing and planning policies
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which emerged from the Center-Left coalition between the
Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party, and points out
not the changes in urban development patterns caused by
a Socialist policy, but the struggle inherent in the Italian
system between the rival concepts of societal organization,
and the struggle between political power and economic power.
Insolera (1972, p. 352) clearly wraps up the condition:
"Thus the problem of housing, together with employment,
has come to assume top priority during the past century.
But the Italian government's policy in confronting these
problems has, surprisingly enough, remained almost
unchanged, irrespective of changes in regime. The ruling
class in Italy has always been completely conservative
in its attitude toward housing, and consequently its hous-
ing policies have been based on conservative standards.
It is logical, therefore, that official policy should have
fallen far short of attaining any of the needed object-
ives, even judged from a purely quantitative point of
view. Given a doubling of population, increased urban-
ization, and internal migrations, a dynamic policy would
have been required, certainly not one intent on main-
taining the status quo both of the economy and the power
structure."
9"Dcpo la Romta degli inperatori,
.dopo la Poue dei Papi,
v.erra la Romta del popolo"
- Garibaldi
i "Pienmntesi e Papalini, nronarchici,~
fascisti e denrocratici hanno senipre
Sfinito aol trovarsi d' accordo su unm
ponto, un punto solo, nra p2U i che
i sufficiente a caratterizzare oanto
a 2 anni di politica del paese:
55%Me 6a ala conservazianie."
i Ludovico Quarani.
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Introduction
This chapter is the first to look in detail into
the ddvelopment of Rome and Italian politics. It begins with
the conquest of Rome by the House of Savoy, the culmination
of a 22 year struggle for the unification of Italy. With
this victory was the birth of modern city planning, born into
a classic Liberal State. Although Liberalism could be stu-
died outside of Italy, Italy cannot be studied without under-
standing the nature of the Liberal State.
A reaction to the position of absolute despotism and
feudalism, Liberalism had its basis and its birth in the
City; its actions are clearest in cities and in the transi-
tions forced onto cities--both their physical form and inha-
bitants. Similarly, city planning and city growth in 19th
century Rome cannot be understood without a-clear picture of
the political and economic ideology which formed the basis
of all actions--personal, institutional and physical. The
growth of both Fascism in the twentieth century and Italian
Socialism in the late nineteenth century were reactions to
the contradictions inherent in the Liberal State. Both of
these ideologies failed, however, to come to grips with the
conflicts that were recorded in the form of Rome. Nor did
they address directly the issues peculiar to the processes
by which the conflicts were transformed into the artifacts
of spatial structure.
The first fifty years of Rome's history as the capital
11
Italy demonstrates this situation extremely well. The rela-
tionship between the power of the State, the role of city
planning, the process of expanding the city, the ultimate
form of the city, and the people and families who were to
inhabit the city changed little. The complex of relationships
remained constant--not identical but, in essence, the same.
In an effort to illustrate this point, this chapter examines
the birth of the role of city planning in Rome: seeing, all
of a sudden, a role which is expected to mediate between all
constituency interests. The planner is asked to become a
judge, and he is asked (through committees) to adjudicate
the intentions of the State, the owners of capital, the lan-
ded aristocracy, and the people, at least in relation to
issues of city form.
To accomplish this task, a series of ideologies are
borrowed from centers of Liberalism--Paris and London--and
are used to rationalize actions and decisions. In the end,
as will be seen, the planner is not capable of making the
necessary judgements. Not that he is incapable, but rather
that the situation is not adjudicable by an individual or
committee. In Marxist thought, it has become the inevita-
ble--a class struggle: in Liberal terms, the planner is to
blame for not allocating resources and power appropriately,
such that everyone benefits to the proper degree. The con-
tradiction in the Liberal approach should be apparent. It
must be remembered, however, that the role of planning has
been created out of a Liberal ideology and thus the ideology
12
fits the role. Conflicts in the role are mirrored by con-
tradictions in the ideology.
After a description of the history of the position of
planning in Rome from 1860 until 1946, the chapter pre-
sents a detailed analysis of the ideologies behind city
planning and then describes how the Liberal ideology relates
to the process of making the city, which was largely
accomplished without the help of public city planners.
Ernesto Nathan Antonio GramsciErnesto Nathan Antonio ra sci
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Before 1870, Rome housed a feudal society dominated by
the Church. The popes were rulers, moral leaders, land-
owners, and benefactors of the Italian cities, towns and
country--in particular, Rome.
While industrialization and modern city planning had
been established in the major cities of Europe by 1860, Rome
remained isolated until it was conquered by Garibaldi, the
Bersaglieri, and the House of Savoy. It was at this point
that the new royal government--ostensibly of the people--
with a parliament, constitution and limited suffrage, began
to shape the growth of Rome.
New roles of planning became applicable in Rome.
Before the liberation from the Church, city planning was
limited to the Pope deciding what to build next. Private
families were uncontrolled in their actions on their pri-
vate land. There was only one public power in the city.
After liberation, the roles became more complex due to the
multiplicity of powers. Instead of the feudal lords,
there were landowners; bankers from Vienna, Paris, London,
Milan, Florence and other places; citizens; companies; the
Government; the Government bureaucracy; the military; and,
of course, the Church, which has remained through today a
powerful force, although now lightly cloaked. Planning was
given a public instead of private position.
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Piedmontese planners and architects came to Rome with
the new government. They were related to Northern European
political ideologies more closely as investments from North-
ern Italy and European capitals began pouring into Rome,
hoping to take advantage of the anticipated growth caused
by the decision to locate the capital of unified Italy
there. With investments came advice, more planners, and
values. Hausmann even came to Rome and sketched a plan for
the new government (Kostov ) which suggested that the new
city be located on Monte Mario, slightly northeast of the
old center, because the old medievel city with its cramped
quarters, he thought, could not possibly provide the sort of
environment for people or growth that a modern capital of a
major European state demanded. Needless to say, he was pro-
bably well treated, but was sent back to Paris. The idea was
again revived in 1957, when the Asse Attrezzato was proposed,
but has so far met the same fate.
With the values of nineteenth century liberalism came
the enlightened concepts of quality of life in cities, atti-
tudes towards curing poverty and poor living quarters,
ruthless and financially based concepts of urban land
development and, above all, the belief in laissez-faire
economics:
"The political class of the new Italy was largely
united behind policies of economic laissez-faire,
social conservatism, and anti-clericalism."(Fried,
1963, p. 121)*
*What we now call social conservatism was then called
Liberalism. Current Liberalism is based more upon the con-
cept of a welfare state, unheard of in 1900.
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Marxism had been developing in the north as a reaction
against the new bourgeois industrial cities and states;
Kropotkin's anarchist theory was based on observations of
city conditions as well. Marxists and socialists, however,
turned their efforts to economic and political theory and,
with the exception of Engels, did not directly address
issues of city form until the 1950s. Roman planning theory
and practice and private city growth were thus born out of
and into a Liberal milieu which was to last until 1922,
probably through the Fascist epoch, and arguably exists
today.
Giacomo Matteotti
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The Public Role of Planning
When the troops of Italy entered Rome through
angelo's Porta Pia on September 20, 1870, Rome's small popu-
lation of 240,000 was about to witness a rapid transformation.
In less than 50 years, another 500,000 persons would arrive
in the city, and it would become difficult to find a person
who could be called a "native" of Rome. The population
increase was caused by the location of the central government
in Rome. At first ministries located temporarily in convents
and seminaries confiscated from the Church; eventually
they relocated in their own buildings. New residential
areas--many formerly villas, others large tracts of land
jointly or singularly owned-were built up as residential
and service areas. In conjunction, new streets, railroads,
tramways, bridges, sewers, aquaducts and other urban infra-
structures were built. Little industry located in Rome until
the 1920s, and then it located on the fringe of the city,
towards the sea.
City planners were called upon to fulfill two roles in
the rapidly growing city. The Government was ready to in-
vest in the urban infrastructure. It was necessary to pro-
vide habitable environments for the ministries and the
employees of the ministries, and those in charge of pro-
viding services needed advice on additions to and changes in
the City's form. The organization of the physical growth of
18
the city caused directly by the public agencies was one
role. Another was to restrain and organize the private
development enterprises to match the public decisions. Only
ten days after the capitulation of the City, the provisional
city administration appointed a commission chaired by
Alessandro Viviani to prepare the first master plan for the
city (Kostov , p. 43; Insolera, p. 12). The infant planning
process was swept aside by the peremptory development
started by Monsignor Francesco Saverio DeMerode in 1863.*
While Viviani's commission was busy preparing the first
plan, DeMerode was busy befriending members of the new govern-
ment. He owned or controlled land stretching from Santa
Maria Maggiore across the Stazione Termini, almost to the
edge of the Villa Borghese. In 1863, he had begun to build
housing, located a railroad station at the Baths of
Diocletian, and had located two military establishments,
one near the station and the other at Castro Pretorio, the
ancient Roman army camp which was then owned by Jesuits.
His development made sense as a package: the Pope's winter
quarters were at the Quirinale, close by; the Army was to
serve as protection, using access granted from the new rail
link; and the station provided transportation and was protec-
ted by the military presence. People would surely be willing
to live near such a symbolically central, accessible, pro-
tected area.
*DeMerode was a prominent member of the Roman Clergy and
had been Minister of the Army for the Vatican from 1860-1864.
19
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The change in government didn't disturb DeMerode at all.
Since most of his holdings were not directly owned by the
Church but were mortgaged to a Florence bank and were in
turn supported by London, Frankfort and Vienna capital, his
lands were protected from confiscation (Insolera, pp. 12 &
13).* Before the change in government, DeMerode had drawn
plans to connect his development--including the new station--
to the old center of Rome with a new road, conceived of in
somewhat of the Regent Street tradition and to be called
Via DeMerode.
With the conquest, the Quirinale was taken over for the
official residence of the Chief of State, King Vittorio
Emanuele II, who also bought the Villa Ada. The road from
Porta Pia, entered by the troops and passing by the Quirinale
and near the Stazione Termini, was renamed Via XX Settembre
in honor of the battle that marked the completion of the
unification of Italy. While the commission of planners was
contemplating where to locate ministries, DeMerode obtained
a commitment from the Ministry of Finance to locate on a
choice parcel of land he offered them on Via XX Settembre
near the station. The military base at Castro Pretoria was
taken over by Italian troops, as the Pope's rented armies
had been sent home to France, Algeria, and other places
(Armstrong, Seton-Watson, Insolera). Viviani then decided
*The Government's policy of confiscation of Church land
did not apply to land which was mortgaged to Piedmontese or
European banks. They were the financial support for the
Italian Government, which for the first decade had borrowed
heavily.
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to locate all the ministries along Via XX Settembre. His
success was minimal; all but three chose loca-
tions elsewhere, despite the support for a government center
by the Parliament and, in particular, Quintino Sella,
Minister of Finance (Insolera, p. 17). The planning profes-
sion and Rome's official city planners even at the beginning
were not able to control the various central government
agencies, which established in the first state acts requiring
City Master Plans, that state agencies were not obliged to
follow the plans, and the plans be approved by the State
Minister of Public Works.
With these comments in hand, DeMerode then obtained the
support of the City Council with the help of the moral lea-
der of anti-clericalism in Rome, Luigi Pianciani.*
Pianciani introduced into the Council the motion to fully
support DeMerode's development plans (Insolera, p. 19).
With one change--the renaming of Via DeMerode as Via
Nazionale--the Council, with one exceptionvoted to approve
the plans and asked Viviani to begin the exploration of
extensions of Via Nazionale into and through the built-up
area.
At the same time that DeMerode was busy, so were four
other developers. Three were developing plans near DeMerode's
proposals and one, a collection of proprietors, was lobbying
for a new development across the Tiber, in the Prati di
Castello area. This situation presented a dilemma for the
*The Conte Luigi Pianciani was the Mayor of Rome from
1872 until 1874.
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committee working on the Master Plan, which was to be pre-
sented to the City Council in 1873, although not approved
by the State. The dilemma concerned the direction of -growth
that the new city was to take. Possibly one among all the
reasons that DeMerode's plan met with such substantial
support, aside from the obvious scale and locational advan-
tages, was that the plans encouraged a growth away--geogra-
phically and symbolically--from St. Peters and the Vatican.
For a new state based on anti-clericalism, this was an
important gesture. The Pope was still residing "in exile"
in the Vatican--still in the throes of suffering from the
loss of Church land and his temporal power over Italy. This
situation was not resolved until Mussolini negotiated the
Lateran Treaties and Concordat in 1929, which established
the Vatican as an independent state and resolved other
Church-State issues.
The question of restraint of private development initia-
tives, continuously a problem in Rome, was somewhat easier
in the 1870s than in the post-World War II period. For any
development of a residential area to be successful in the
19th , a local employment base was necessary. Since
the major employment source was the State Government, the
State at least could control the general development trends
through decisions as to locations of the new ministries.
These were ministry decisions, though, not planning commis-
sion decisions. New developments also needed city expen-
ditures to connect them by bridges and roads, and to con-
24
struct water and sewer service. Like Los Angeles, Rome is
dependent upon water from surrounding hills brought in by
aquaduct. Restraint of development was thus accomplished
by withholding investment. This power, however, was never
in the hands of Rome's city planners.
For this reason, when the group of proprietors of the
Prati wanted to develop their 65 hectares, the problem arose
of how to connect this development across the Tiber to Rome
and what to use as an employment base. They hired an archi-
tect--Cipolla--to prepare a plan for the area and included
a large park--Piazza Cavour--and a site for the future
Palazzo di Giustizia, to be connected on axis by a new
bridge. A portion of their plans, together with the
"palazzuccio" and Ponte Cavour, was included in Viviani's
1873 plan, although the bridge wasn't begun until 1892
(Insolera, p. 23).
The first plan prepared by Viviani was presented
in June 1871, but attacked by various sectors, each of whom
produced their own versions to the public in November. At
the request of the Council, Viviani's commission took these
plans, prepared a revision incorporating certain ideas, and
presented this to the Council in 1873, along with ten pri-
vately prepared alternative plans. Another commission was
established to make a decision which in this case, was
Viviani's plan. It contained, the commission noted, three
projects "declared individually to be in the public interest
and already under construction"(Kostov, p. 43). These
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included the Esquiline development, the residential area
near Castro Pretorio (but not the fort), and Via Nazionale,
all belonging to DeMerode.
The 1873 plan contained space for approximately 75,000
new residents on the main side of the Tiber and another 35,000
across the Tiber in the Prati di Castello and along Cole
di Rienzo (Insolera, p. 26). This area was to be connected
via two new bridges, the Ponte Cavour and the Ponte Umberto
I. The plan was never approved by the State, however, and,
probably as a result of the depression of 1867 and the near
bankruptcy of the new Italy, no funds were voted for its
implementation.
The role of the government was to support the private
sector, within the bounds of what could be called the public
interest. Without developers and foreign capital there would
be no one to build the new city; government planners had to
mediate between these interests and the interests of the
State. City planning power was minimal; it was caught
between fiercely independent ministries and ruthless indivi-
duals like DeMerode, or other real estate interests, often
backed by the Vatican and by Piedmontese and European banks.
The bridge, Ponte Umberto I, leading to the Palace of
Justice, was not built until 1892-95 and the Palace itself
was not finished until 1910. Land in the Prati, however,
increased tenfold in value between 1873 and 1883 as a result
of the inclusion of the area in the plan (Insolera, p. 32).
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City Planning Ideology
In the first fifty years after the unification, planning
and architectural styles changed considerably--from neoclas-
sicism through a period of heavy wedding cake into the sparse
cleanliness of the early modern movement. Much of the ideo-
logy behind these styles did not vary from a common theme--
that of making the city fit and beautiful. Neither did the
means employed by the public planning sector change,
including:
- the clearance of new streets in the tradition of
Haussmann (Paris) or Sir John Soane (London);
- the laying out of new residential quarters for the
in-migrating State bureaucracy; and
- the design and selection of locations for public
improvements, transportation, bridges, electricity, and
new roads.
Dominant and recessive professional ideologies continued
their attempt to mediate between private real estate pres-
sures, not unlike the DeMerode events of 1860-1874 and the
various political and ideological positions proclaimed through
governmental decisions and assertions.
Modern Rome was a conservative place in the sense that
traditional ideas, methods and ideologies were preserved
long after their inception. Work for the State Government
always seems to have trailed behind what could be called
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the cutting edge of the profession. Milanese futurism of
1900-1914 never reached Rome; Parisian and London aesthe-
tics were imported with long delays and the modifications
carried by bankers and capital. Only under Fascism was there
an attempt to reduce the cultural lag.
Pope Sixtus V and his predecessors in the 16'th century
had already built the network of baroque roads directly
connecting the five major churches in Rome. Soane produced
plans for the construction of Regent Street in London in
1812. Haussmann had begun his Parisian work in 1853. The
proposals of 1873 to construct 13 kilometers of boulevards
and connecting roads through the old center of Rome were
this time in the name of the people; and the people deserved
a beautiful city, even if the concepts of beauty and method
had roots 61 years earlier.
The 1873 and 1883 Master Plans were based upon an ideo-
logy best labeled as the "Illuminated City." The ideology
incorporated a non-class-conscious philosophy based upon
class-embedded attitudes. Good enough living conditions
would make the city healthy and its citizens healthy indi-
viduals, capable of contributing to the betterment of
society. The pre-occupations of the profession were rational
and aesthetic--a concentration on physical improvements in
the older regions of the city, and the enforcement of light
and air standards of the middle classes on new construction.
These ideas, imported from Paris (Sutcliffe, pp. 20-40), were
to manifest themselves for over three-quarters of a century.
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New roads seemed to always have two explicit purposes--
the connection of two areas and the demolition of squalid
housing areas. Implicit, however, was the contribution of
these actions to the private real estate sector, assembling
larger parcels of land,and improving the imagery and marketa-
bility of central Rome. With the new housing construction
and new bureaucracy jobs, no one, it was thought, should have
to live in crowded, damp, dark and generally poor housing.
The concept of new roads also accommodated the development
of mass transportation technology in 1880--horse drawn
trolleys--electric trolleys by 1890, buses and, finally,
automobiles (Kostov, Piante di Roma).
One of the best examples of the Illuminated City ideology
occurred between 1873 and 1885 with the redevelopment of the
Ghetto. The Ghetto was formalized by Pope Pio IV in 1555
as the Jewish quarter. The 1873 Master Plan included the
clearance of a part of the Ghetto in order that more light
and air could reach the remaining houses. There was a
City Council debate on the project, which involved the expro-
priation of land between the Tiber and Via del Portico
d'Ottavia, and its sale to the Banca Tiberina. The bank
would then rebuild a residential and commercial building
on the large plot of land. Before the motion was approved,
a councillor brought up the subject of the 4,000 people
who were going to be displaced. The consensus of the
Council was that there was ample room for them in the new
expanding areas of town, in the Pration the Esquiline, or
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in the south. There were lots of jobs and plenty of new
housing available; besides, the old area was unfit for
habitation (Kostov, p. 16, d'Arrigo).
The practice of. cutting roads through built-up areas
had roots with Pope Gulio II. In 1503, he was elected Pope
and proceeded with the demolition necessary for the con-
struction of a new straight road, Via Giulia, running from
the Ponte Duca d'Aosta to the Ponte Sisto. The road was
a gesture of the new Pope's power in Rome and was used to
restructure the area, with new baroque neighborhood
piazzas, churches and an improved symbolic connection to
the Vatican.
The new and widened roads proposed in the 1873, 1883,
1909 and 1931 Master Plans can all be seen as the result of
similar forces as that which built Via Giulia. The fact
that the type of action survived many architectural/planning
styles, as well as the transition from Feudalism to a
Constitutional Monarchy to Fascism and beyond suggests non-
political rationales behind the action, and no direct rela-
tionship to political economic systems. What is striking
about the new streets, however, is the chance they gave
architects to practice the aesthetics of the day.
The Illuminated City also manifested itself in new con-
struction. New building types appeared in the expansion
areas,with sources in aesthetics, planning ideology, but
most likely related to the first urban middle class to inha-
bit Rome. Up until the 19th century, there had been three
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types of building structures in the City:
Large Villas for nobles or clergy on large tracts of land
at the fringes of the City--e.g., Villa Ada, Borghese,
Doria-Pamphili, Ludovisi;
Urban Palazzi with little extra land and a courtyard,
usually within the control of one family--e.g., Palazzi
Massima, Farnese, Spada, Quirinale, Colonna; and
The dense, medieval building fabric--multi-story, multi-
unit buildings, often with courts. The fabric included
dwellings, work space and streets, with all types of
spaces used by artisans and craftsmen for work as well as
well as living. Existing areas of this fabric are in
the Ghetto and the Via Monserrato areas.
The new Illuminated City developments for government
bureaucrats were designed as housing alone and not as housing
and employment. At the risk of oversimplifying, the new
developments were of two types--apartment buildings with
large open courtyards, as can be seen in the Piazza Mazzini
or Castro Pretoria, or smaller villini, which were individual
houses or apartment buildings isolated on separate lots
with air space all around them. These can be seen in Monte
Sacro, the Parioli and Gianicolo.
Concepts of Garden Cities followed the Illuminated City,
which had guided planning standards of Roman building for
thirty years. It came to Rome by way of Milan, as did most
design ideologies (Isaacs). It had been an English reaction
to the intense growth incurred by London in the early 19th
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century, its population swelling from 2 to 4 million
between 1850 and 1900 (Weinberg). In Rome, the
Garden City ideology was little more than the logical exten-
sion of the Illuminated City, but considered in a more
utopian context. The Illuminated City was a reactive ideo-
logy to an environment which appalled bourgeois senses;
something had to be done. The Garden City, however, appealed
to senses of "how it should be" or "how it could be." As
applied, however, the Garden City concept was never accom-
panied by the concept of a greenbelt: stopping peripheral
growth and making ideal size surrounding cities.
Garden Cities came in two varieties but, like purchased
culture, came in small packages. One consisted of tree-
lined boulevards in the middle of new residential areas.
This type, as can be seen in photos of the Piazza Mazzini
proposals, meant the addition of more trees to the Illumina-
ted City building form--the open courtyard apartment building.
The other type of Garden City was the development of villini,
often located a little away from the city proper and with
curvy, naturalistic roads instead of formal boulevards.
This was perhaps more the image of what Howard had in mind.
Only two developments in Rome were to be explicitly labeled
Garden Cities--Garbatella and Monte Sacro, the Citta Giardino
Aniene--both public housing projects.
Monte Sacro was the result of a competition by the public
housing agency. The terms of the competition seem to have
been that architects were to locate an ideal site in Rome and
wAU,
1Garden City capetiticn Entry 3/4Mbnte Sacro2 2F2azza Vex.ona Housing Types
36
design an ideal citta giardino (d'Arrigo, Insolera, Casabella,
Urbanistica 28/29). The winning entry had chosen a tract
of land located on a hill forming a bend in the Aniene River,
a tributary of the Tiber. The development was begun in 1919
and continued until the mid-1950s. The idea of the citta
giardino* epitomized at Monte Sacro was not fully realized
until the Fascist epoch, in which it was seen as one aspect
of the "science" of urban affairs, and suited the middle-
class aspirations of the period.
The concept of the Garden City applied to public housing
was entirely consistent with the Liberal mode of thinking
and the ideology behind the demolition of crowded areas.
The movement of persons and families from poor conditions
into an ideal setting would, by definition, remove all
environmental prejudices from their character and they would
become "improved" people, able to fit into the still growing
bourgeois society. This was associated with the fact that
the upper and upper-middle classes in Rome have historically
preferred to live closer to the center of town in higher
density housing. The ideal exemplified in the Garden City
was an "ideal for others." This concept was explicitly
stated by the Fascists, both in regard to ideal middle-class
environments and to rationalize the construction of the
borgate and the various new towns, two of which were located
near Rome--Aprilia and Sabaudia.
*Often, the English "Garden City" is left untranslated
in Italian articles.
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The borgate* developments of 1,500to 5,000 planned
population in the Roman countryside were to the 1930s what
the Illuminated City and Garden City were to their epochs.
They appealed to the modern movement and its ideological
backers. They were discussed as if they would be the answer
to central Rome's overcrowding, and therefore I dub them the
"modern cities."
f The modern movement ideology confirmed for Fascism what
the city beautiful, Illuminated City and Garden City con-
firmed for the Liberal State: that a better society could
be made by improving the inhabited environment. Fascism went
beyond expecting only the environment to accomplish this.,
The order implicit in the State hierarchy and muscle of the
blackshirts peremptorily accomplished the "improvement" of
the Italian society. There is ample evidence in American,
British and French press (see ff.) suggesting a general
pleasure in seeing a new stability, cleanliness, order, and
improved regularity of- the Italian train system. These
reactions clearly ignored (perhaps as in Iran yesterday)
the ugliness and brutality of the regime. The quality of
the society was perceived and evaluated primarily in terms
of the built environment. Like the earlier concepts of
improving society through the improvement of the government,
the converse also is seen here.
*Borgata is translated roughly as settlement, hamlet,
Or village; borgate is its plural form.
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These themes are examined again in the next section,
which takes us back to 1860 to look at some of the impacts
of the Liberal ideology on public sector behavior, on city
growth, and on public opinion. The concluding section then
examines the themes as applied within the frames of reference
of Fascism. It is clear that until 1943, when the Fascist
State fell victim to the political and economic crisis of
the War, that professional planners and architects were
operating in an isolated world. Their ideologies and actions
were based upon the naive and self-limiting philosophies
of Liberalism and scientificism.
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The Liberal Ideology and
City Making
Background
Political ideologies which serve as myths underlying a
culture are notoriously difficult to pin down: especially
non-socialist ideologies in countries such as Italy, which
have not undergone a revolution that bred ideologies
before the revolution. The high points of Western ideolo-
gical clarity since 1800 have come from the left and from
early democracies. Liberal theory arose in Europe as a for-
mal organization of the "enlightened" reaction to the injus-
tices of absolute monarchies and feudalism, and the failings
of those societies to deal with the growing dis-equalization
of wealth, income and power in society. The largest body
of ideological writing about democratic or bourgeois theory
came just before and after the French and American revolu-
tions, and continually from England, which has undergone a
steady rate of change, with the "old society" (nobility)
sharing power in the upper and middle-class echelons with a
new industrialist, banking and merchant class (Weinberg).
The unification of Italy was not a revolution and gener-
ated little political theory. It was in many respects the
diplomatic product of Cavour associated with the conquest
of the territory we. now associate with "Italy" by the House
of Savoy, the Piedmontese. IThe ideology expressed by the
new state was based upon a conjunction of Nationalism,
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Monarchism, Anti-Clericalism, and Liberalism, including con-
cepts of continued nobility, a growing bourgeois class, some
equalization and limited electoral democracy. The sources
of the ideologies were England and predominately France,
which financed the effort and first decade of the new coun-
try (Seton-Watson, pp. 3-40). The carriers were Garibaldi,
Mazzini, Cavour and the (French dominated) House of Savoy.
Neither of the first two believed wholeheartedly in the type
of regime established, nor in the "giving" of the new state
to the Piedmontese King,. Vittorio Emanuele II. But Cavour's
diplomacy proved stronger than Garibaldi's idealism. The
House of Savoy was well-established in Europe, married to
the family of Napolean III, and possessed the financial
ties, military organization, political connections, and
industrial potential necessary to maintain European support
for the new nation?
Investment in the country from the monetary centers--
the capital markets of London and the Paris Bourse--brought
Liberal values and contradictions. These can be seen in
the economic policies of the Italian government, the formal
design references in Roman building and planning, the types
of buildings, the demolition and clearance policies, and the
public housing program developed under Giolitti's administra-
tion by Luzzatti in 1903. These programs and policies all
developed with a dual orientation--the support of private
enterprise and the achievement of a public good.
In Rome, private enterprise needed little extra support
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on top of the State's laissez-faire policies. The growth of
the City, the downtown land assembly and redevelopment
process, the clearance/street cutting procedure, and the
lack of direct property taxation were sufficient for a
healthy private sector. Making the public good better,
though, was a more complicated intention and highlighted
the contradictions of the set of Liberal beliefs.
/First, there was a belief in a common, public good in
which policies, programs and actions accrued benefits to
all citizens' The belief in private enterprise supported
this concept, as did the physical improvement of the public
environment in the city. State investment in new urban
infrastructure was considered as one aspect. For instance,
the laying of electrical lines in the city was considered
an improvement for the entire population, despite the fact
that a proportion of residents could not afford the electri-
cal service or the necessary appliances. Similarly, clea-
rance programs and new construction were also improvements
in the public good.
The concept of the public good was, in a broader sense,
the definition of society. The rebuilding of areas of town
with modern buildings, apartments, running water, sewers,
etc., within modern architectural and planning aesthetics
was regarded as the improvement of "the town." "The town"
was thus "read" in physical terms, but improvements were
assumed to be received by society. The distinction between
physical structure and social structure was not made by
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Liberals--land ownership still meant social position and
voting rights. To improve one was de facto to improve the
other.
Kropotkin writing in 1897 also points out the confusion
of these aspects of urban character in a related way. He
comments that many theorists--in particular, Germans--confuse
the "state" with "society," and similarly confuse "the
state" with "government." His concept of what "the state"
was parallels current and Marxist concepts of the city or
community.
"The state idea means something quite different from
the idea of government. It not only includes the exis-
tence of a power situated above society, but also of a
terratorial concentration as well as the concentration
of many functions of the life of societies in the hands
of a few." (Kropotkin, 1897, p. 10)
This confusion of definitions existed in Italy, where
social conditions were discussed in physical terms and power
was discussed only in terms of the formal shape of government.
For instance, another Liberal concept of public good
which existed at the time was the concept of an elected
legislative authority. Popularly elected governments, it
was thought, were a useful tool in defining a public good,
because the assembly would be comprised of the public.
Aside from the small number of eligible voters--3 per cent
in 1873--the elected bodies carried very little real power,
most of it remaining within the direct control of the King.
There were two national assemblies--one elected and one
appointed--and all legislation, including city Master Plans,
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needed the approval of all three to become law. The King,
on the other hand, could still issue orders without the
support of the legislature or, if he wished, dismiss the
parliamentary cabinet, its members and the elected assembly.
World War I was entered over the protests of the elected
assembly; Mussolini was asked by the King to form a
government over the protests of the assembly.
City government was not dissimilar. The Prefect was an
appointed person who conveyed the power of the King in each
province. He had the power to dismiss any City Council or
Mayor at will, and approve or disapprove city resolutions,
decisions, and commitments. Elected government thus func-
tioned within tight restrictions and was allowed to proceed,
as long as it pleased the higher authority. In a crude anal-
ogy the populace had about as much power through their
elected governments as did the tenants of the public housing
projects (Fried, 1963; d'Arrigo; Hearder & Waley; Coppap
Seton-Watson).
Since the beginning of construction of workers' housing
in England, the residential unit had been replacing the
home/workplace necessary for the livelihood of artisans,
craftsmen and small shopkeepers. This transition was to
continue for the next hundred years, eventually causing
the rapid decline of the artisan and small businessman from
the center of Rome. Today, we call a descendant of this
process "gentrification" or, in the case of Rome,
"Pariolization--inhabitants intermezzo"!.(Ronchi). Hardest
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hit by this transition were those who could not afford the
new market housing. The Liberal-Reform era of Giolitti
recognized not the problem of separation of home and work-
place, but the need for public, subsidized housing.
To the credit of the Liberal-Reform movement, it was
realized that improvements to infrastructure and the entire
city were not being received by everyone. Public housing is
perhaps the closest the Liberal ideology comes to recognizing
a class society*. The public housing program was designed
to reduce the inequity slightly. The program rested on a
method of public redistribution of resources such that those
resources actually redistributed remained within the owner-
ship of the public sector, effecting no redistribution of
powers of decision. While other forms of personal capital
could be used as a means of production (of further income),
public housing could not. It was a non-marketable, non-
transferable resources, and even its distribution was out
of the hands of the eventual recipients. Even public
housing, it will be seen, was used in support of private
enterprise.
In current terms, the political mood of the half-century
preceding Fascism could be characterized as a balance between
center and center-slightly-left but democratic politics.
The farthest to the left that the government went was the
Liberal-Reform era guided by Giolitti from 1892-1914, in
which a few socialist programs were adopted (Hearder &
Waley; Seton-Watson). In Rome, the height of Liberal-
*The ideology of public housing is still inherently..
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Reformism was the administration of Ernesto Nathan from 1907
to 1913. The mood in Rome was not related closely to the
industrial struggles of Northern Europe, Milan or Turin,
where socialism was a stronger movement.
Rome remained a non-industrial city. While France and
England were struggling to correct the urban and political
effects of industrialization, Italy was split between
revising the Feudal agricultural structure of the South and
resolving the industrial struggles of the North. Rome sat
in between these two extremes with few major problems,
allowing the continuation of 19th century Liberalism.
The revolutionary Socialism of Gramsci, Togliatti, and
others gained little support from the Liberal middle classes
of Rome or the Church and Monarchy supporters in the rural,
agricultural South.
The Roman Liberals grew and flourished. What makes them
special is not what post-War Americans thought made Italy
special--i.e., the "peculiar Italian culture"--but the unique
circumstances of a major European country with vast geogra-
phic and economic inequalities* within, with a prevailing
major retarding factor for political and economic development--
(cont.)Liberal and contradictory. It assumes a de facto
improvement of social conditions resulting from the imposi-
tion of a middle-class environment on the chosen lower-class
residents.
*The largest inequalities were between the South and the
North. Incomes in the South were generally half to two-thirds
the incomes in the North, reflecting not only a lower stan-
dard of living, but an agricultural economy. A futile
attempt to remedy the situation following the conquest of
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies failed in the 1860s. Upon
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the Church--and with a recent background of Feudalism,
mixed (like a separating fondue) with industrial capitalism.
Liberalism can be more clearly understood by looking at its
two major urban types of actions: the clearance, and public
housing programs.
Clearance
The clearance of the Ghetto, already discussed, was the
clearest example of an action of the 1870s with these dual
intentions. Public good was achieved through the introduc-
tion of light, air and sanitary improvements; the private
sector--in this case, the Banca Tiberina--was to gain by the
new ownership and redevelopment of the cleared site.
Assumed explicitly (but perhaps not implicitly) was
that all members of society would benefit to some degree
from the action. Thus the improvement of the Ghetto or the
construction of new quarters to better standards would pro-
vide benefits to all. This was just not the case. While
residents on the remaining side of Via del Portico d'Ottavia
had the benefit of more light and air to their windows,
their fruit, vegetables and fish would rot faster in the
summer sun, and the displaced would be forced to find other
(cont.)gaining control of the territory, the House of
Savoy confiscated most of the Church holdings of large
farms. Unable to raise other forms of capital to repay
State bondholders when the Paris Bourse collapsed in 1867,
the government sold many of these farms to what was to
become a new class of absentee landlords, thus continuing
the "latifondo" system. Carlo Levi, Antonio Gramsci, Elio
Vittorini, and Bertolucci have all clearly described the
conditions of poverty, economic exploitation,and discrimina-
tion which have characterized the South. Today, despite
numerous post-War programs, incomes in the South remain
significantly below average.
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residences in the city or other locations for their small
businesses. Taking the latter first, small businesses were
and are notoriously difficult if at all possible to relocate
because of the small local constituencies necessary for
their survival. Lisa Ronchi makes this point in discussing
gentrification in the post-War era in the Campo Marzio
district.
New housing was an equally difficult task. The residents
often could not afford the new developing districts. There
was no room and no community support for new artisans' quar-
ters, nor were there family resources to buy or rent both
home and work places. Above all, the poor residents were
more than likely to be illiterate and could not find a
government bureaucracy job. These people were forced to
move in with neighbors or leave for the fringe of the city
and build their own residences on what appeared open or
unowned land, often in the shadow of some old ruin. In
the Giolitti period, there were growing references to "the
problem of the barracche," squatter housing on the fringe
of town. The problem of the barracche was twofold. It
represented a growing potential political force of uncer-
tain persuasion that the center of Italian government was
unwilling to have so close to the government headquarters,
as well as a constraint on the use of that land for private
development in a city rapidly growing outwards.
The habit of clearing new streets, particularly the
areas of urban barracche, continued from the early act in
28
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the Ghetto until the fall of Fascism. There were even
proposals in the early fifties for further clearance for
street construction. In the 1873 Master Plan there were
over 13 linear kilometers of demolition for proposed new
roads through the built-up areas. The 1883 Plan followed
suit with only ten kilometers, including many of the same
proposals--there had been little accomplished in the first
ten years. These road incisions, or insertions, had long
traditions behind them in Northern Europe--in style, in
purpose and in means of implementation.
The purposes included connection, as in London's Regent
Street, which connected the Regents Park to Buckingham
Palace by a road which avoided the rough or unpleasant areas
of Soho and Marylebone (Weinberg, Benevolo, 1963). Connec-
tions could be for state powers such as the Pope or the
Italian government, or for the private sector, to make newly
developing areas more accessible and therefore more valuable.
They could be symbolic, as in the 1936 (and 1873) planned
(and executed) Via Conciliazione, which symbolically recon-
nected the Vatican with the Government of Italy (at Piazza
Venezia) after the Lateran Treaties had been signed.
Political purposes of clearing routes through crowded
areas had precedents in Paris, where certain districts were
known to be susceptible to revolutionary sentiments and
because the tight, complex networks of streets were unable
to be patrolled (Sutcliffe). Symbolic cuttings of new streets
for emphasizing a new regime or the power and feats of an
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existing regime were also seen in Paris.
Another class of purposes for cutting new streets and
widening and straightening old ones was rationality and
and technological improvement. Developing systems of trans-
portation--especially the light rail trolley--needed large
turning radii and wider roads and later the automobile
presented its demands. But above all, health advances were
dear to the heart of the Liberal ideology as purposes.
Rome had been plagued by diseases in the 19th century, the
most recent being an outbreak of cholera in 1868 which left
8,489 persons dead (Quaroni, 1976, p. 281). Advances in
rational approaches to medicine in the 19th century pointed
to the needs for sanitary sewers, fresh water systems, and
an end to the open sewers and dampness that characterized
the older, crowded medieval sections of towns. This was
a new era, in which the government was increasingly run by
the middle classes, who could not escape their duties and
flee to country estates and villas for the duration of a
plague. This forced a for improvement of city condi-
tions. Improvement, though, usually meant the clearance
of the residential areas of the poor. Similar trends could
be seen in the United States, London, Paris and most
European cities.
The style and means of demolition also had precedents
in Europe and depended upon the financial means, power and
financial desires of the body which was actually pursuing
the policy. Haussmann operated with an intent to be fiscally
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independent and claimed to be able to support the acquisi-
tion of property and construction of streets by the subse-
quent sale of the higher value property.
The architectural consistency of new buildings along
new roads depended upon the degree of control which the
implementing power had. Pope Giulio II was assured the
absolute straightness of Via Giulia by virtue of his posi-
tion as supreme authority, Haussmann by zoning regulations
and Soane in London by the direct construction of important
stretches of Regent Street. Roman clearance, except under
Fascism, employed little architectural consistency. The
fragmented nature of the Italian government and the lack of
regulatory power of the city planning agencies, as well as
the dependence upon the State for funds, meant that there
was not a unified style, character, architecture or overall
order to all of the Roman experiments. New roads were often
offered as competitions not just to the design, but often
to directions and locations. Such events as the proposals
for the extension of Via Nazionale, the location of Corso
Vittorio Emanuele II or Via dei Fori Imperiali are examples.
The tradition was continued through the Giolittian age.
The 1909 Master Plan prepared by the Liberal-Reform govern-
ment of Ernesto Nathan still included 7.8 kilometers of
proposed clearance (measured from Kostov, p. 46). In fact
one of Nathan's four electoral promises was to improve
public hygiene.
Clearance and road building were also major occupations
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of Roman planners under Fascism. Clear discussions of the
purposes of the projects from the time are difficult to read
directly because of the censorship and enforced bias of
the Fascist regime; however, a number of things come to
light from an analysis of the foreign press, local first-
and secondhand acounts (Quaroni, Pineschi), and factual
reporting on the events.
First, the programs were rationalized as either promo-
ting the image of grandeur which Mussolini set about crea-
ting for his Rome, the world capital of the new Fascist
empire. Grandeur, or "grandezza," demanded precision,
cleanliness, social order, and new wide modern roads on
whi'ch military parades could be held and the Romans could
be proud of admiration from the rest of the world. The
rest of the world--at least the British and American press--
did, in fact, admire this grandeur and considered it an
improvement to the city and society of Rome.* Consider the
following quote from a Sunday New York Times article from
March 19, 1933, entitled "Mussolini Builds a Rome of the
Caesars":
"'There are two problems in one,' Mussolini said in
explanation of the tremendous difficulties encountered
*If one of the myths of the 19th century was assuming
that improvements to the physical environment would de facto
improve the social environment, a child of that myth was still
in existence in the third decade of the 20th century--i.e.,
that improvements to the physical fabric were reflections or
manifestations of an improvement in social quality. It is
reminiscent of the urban renewal rhetoric of the 1960s.
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in creating the Rome of today; 'one is dictated by neces-
sity, the other by the greatness of Rome. The Rome of
antiquity and of medeival times had to be freed from
the excrescences of houses and shops which had grown
over them during the centuries. Today vast crowded
sections, which but a year ago were teeming with people,
have been transformed into spacious housing in which
disinterred temples are set off in their ancient beauty.'
This is Mussolini's original idea--he will not have his
finds hidden...He wants modern business life to mingle
with ancient memories. The people who were deprived of
their homes by his operations had to be housed in another
quarter of-the city. This necessity has inspired the
building of the twentieth-century Rome now in progress.
or from the Atlantic Monthly of 1928:
"No visitor who has travelled through Italy recently
can deny the reality of the material change and improve-
ment that Fascism has wrought, whatever prejudice he
may feel against its methods or doubts as to its spiri-
tual results. It is true that at present the effect most
apparent is the growing efficiency of the public services
of all kinds, and is not yet so marked in the economic
condition of all people and their standard of living...
it is obvious that, in a long sighted view, the recon-
struction of the State foundation is an essential
preliminary to an expansion of the industrial super-
structure."(Hart).
or from the National Geographic of March 1937:
"This isolation program is remarkable. Old ruins are
more imposing if surrounded by parks and squares instead
of slums. Il Duce may by inference point and say,
'That's what you once were; I'll make you great again.'
"Streets even in the old quarters are clean. Where
dark stone tenements are demolished for parks and
squares, former inhabitants move to gigantic apartment
houses on the edge of the Roman countryside. I visited
one, the home of 500 poor families, imposing, yet simply
built within and furnished usually with humble, long-used
tables, chairs and beds. Two rooms rent for about
$9.50 monthly, four for $20.000.
"Italian upper and middle classes, who staff growing
apartment bureaus, dwell usually in ultramodern apart-
ments, five or six stories with elevator, outside the
'old city' walls."(Patric).
Or from the Architectural Forum of October 1930:
"Mussolini and his lieutenants have made a marvelous
change in Italy. Everything there is under the juris-
diction of a most intelligent leadership. Everything
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is regulated. Everybody is at work. Tips have been
abolished everywhere, replaced by a 10 per cent service
charge. No beggars. Very little short-changing. Few
street cars, but lots of buses, such as there should be
in New York and are not." (Murchison, "Rome After
Thirty Years")
or from the RIBA Journal of March 1934:
"I wish that people in this country, where we are so
much concerned with slum clearance, could see the scale
on which slum clearance has been carried out in Rome,
could see what has been done in the clearance of the
capital of Italy from the accretions of centuries, and
the way light and air have been let in. I wish that we
and all the authorities who have to deal with the prob-
lems of rehousing the populations of our great cities
could see the illustrations of what has been done in
Rome, how the population has been re-housed and how
great new suburbs have sprung up."
The history of Mussolini's clearance program that went
unwritten until the 1960s was the political motivation be-
hind much of the clearance, which culminated in what Insolera
labels "the clearance of il Granarone area for no purpose
whatsoever" (Insolera, 1962, p. 131). Mussolini and his
architects and planners* used the rhetoric of preservation
of historic monuments, uncovering of archeological ruins,
technology, and grandeur to rid central Rome of many of
what he considered politically and socially undesirable
groups.**
*Bini, Piacentini, Munoz, Spaccarelli, Foschini,
Terragni, et al.
**The expulsion of individuals was achieved through
jailing, exile, or murder supported by an extra-judicial
body, "The Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State,"
not responsible to the governmental court system, which
itself was not in favor of political prisoners or exile.
It was created ad hoc by the Exceptional Laws of 1926.
(Gramsci, Letters, p. 131.)
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A large portion of the areas from which residents were
cleared, for instance, was close in proximity to Mussolini's
new offices at Piazza Venezia. One of these cases was the
clearing of the coal suppliers from the ground floor of
the Teatro Marcello.
"In the case of the Theatre of Marcellus, for instance,
formerly smothered by modern constructions and so con-
cealed that its classical character was practically
lost, the first thing that was done was to reopen the
lower arches, which had been used as coal shops, and
to bring the neighboring ground down to its ancient
level. And if the superstructure of the historic
Savelli-Orsini Palace made it impossible to bring the
cavea--four fifths of which remain intact--into
view.. ."(Calza)
Thus the home of the nobles (once the Pierleone family)
inside the Theatro was left, while the artisans and merchants
at its base were removed. The before and after pictures
tell what Fascist propaganda did not--the marginal visual
impact of the change. Architect for the project was Alberto
Calza-Bini, who purportedly had the same respect for trees
that the Romans did (N.Y. Times, March 1933): if only he'd
had the same respect for people.
It is clear that in each of the cases for clearance
there is not a simple or single motive for the action. At
each point in the history, the action needed the active
support of a large enough constituency to back the necessary
expense of expropriation, to deal with the complaints/
protests of those to be re-housed, and to find the private
development support and interest to redevelop an area. The
gathering of the constituency was and is a political process,
UlCO
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undeniably, and in the process various explanations and
rationales for an action existed.
It can thus be seen how the action of demolition and
clearance for new streets, even many of the same streets,*
continued from 1860 until 1940, a period of time encompas-
sing three political regimes. What seems constant is the
explicit references to the Liberal ideology for support--
from the public, from the professional class, and from the
government bureaucracies involved. The difference is in
the implicit intentions, if anywhere.
Public Housing and Fascist Urbanism
Public housing, like the street openings, was also
a product of a Liberal and particularly Liberal-Reformist
political ideology. The actions of the housing programs
were seen as in the public interest or good and were con-
sistent with, and supported by, both the conservative and
Liberal sectors of society. The intense housing activity
of Mussolini's Fascist government, as well as the completion
of Garbatella and Monte Sacro, confirms this theory. The
question remains whether the intentions of the pre-Fascists
who supported the earlier developments were similar to those
of the Fascists. To look at these issues, I have chosen to
review briefly three early housing projects of the public
housing agency, IACP (Istituto Autonomo per le Case Popolare),
*The clearance of the Mausoleum of Augustus and the Via
Conciliazione, had already been proposed in Master Plans
of 1873, 1883, or 1909.
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San Saba, Garbatella and Monte Sacro, as well as the Fascist
housing program of new towns and borgate. The intention of
this section is not a detailed review of the efforts, but
to understand the ideological positions and circumstances
of the actions.
San Saba was a small development begun in Ernesto
Nathan's first year as mayor, 1907. What is important about
the development is its location. San Saba was located on
a tract of land in what was called the zona archaelogica,
the archeological zone that was an expanding triangle ori-
ginating in the Roman Forum and opening to the South. At
the time of its construction, it was 1 and 1/2 kilometers
from the built-up area of the city and, as can be noted by
looking at the growth of the city and the 1909 Master Plan,
real estate interest at the time was on the other side of
Rome,.(Urbanistica 28/29, p. 28). The location was deter-
mined by the cheapness of the land and the assumption that
with the development to the south of Rome in a district zoned
in 1883 as non-buildable land, the concentration of poor
persons of questionable character would not adversely affect
established real estate interests. It was, however, near the
growing industrial area of Testaccio, where, presumably,
residents could find work.
The development of San Saba can be seen as a compromise
between the Liberal-Reformists supporting the concept of
public housing and the more conservative propertied classes
who sought to minimize the impact of the development on their
6AV
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land and resource control interests. This hypothesis is con-
firmed in the next two major IACP projects. Garbatella
(begun in 1918), a working class development, was located two
kilometers south of San Saba. Monte Sacro, however, proves
a much richer case to examine. It was begun in 1919 on an
extremely attractive site--a hillside surrounded by the
Aniene--with a clear view over a wide expanse of agricultural
or open land. The site was outside the boundaries of the -
1909 Master Plan (prepared by Nathan's Liberal-Reform admini-
stration), making its development illegal.* How was it selec-
ted? The administration of Ernesto Nathan--founded on the
basis of a coalition of radicals, socialists, and republicans
(Insolera, p. 85)--had been overthrown in 1913 by what was
called the blocco contro Nathan, a group of Roman nobles
and real estate interests led by Luigi Federzoni, future
Fascist Minister of the Interior, and Luigi Medici del
Vascello, proprietor of 142,000 square meters, or 16 per cent
of the land inside the 1883 Master Plan. One of Nathan's
electoral programs had been to put a limit on the possible
speculation of land through a transfer tax. Needless to say,
this was not in the interests of Medici or the other seven
*By Italian law, the only areas of cities that are consi-
dered buildable are those areas for which plans have been
included in the Master Plan. In successive future years, it
will be seen that with every change in administration fol-
lowing a Master Plan, both private and public agency develop-
ments will be located outside or in contradiction to the
plan. On the one hand, this can be considered as exhibiting
the new strength and change of the position of the new ad-
ministration. On the other, state agencies are immune from
local Master Plans.
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proprietors of 55 per cent of the land inside the 1883
Plan.* The 1909 Plan was perhaps Nathan's major impact on th
the City. It introduced for the first time in the history of
Rome's Master Plans a distinction of building types within
"development areas." It included almost twice the area of
the previous plan, with areas included before owners peti-
tioned the city for inclusion. It was also the first plan
drawn on a contour map. In 1916, after Nathan's downfall,
Gustavo Giovannoni was appointed to a commission to study
revisions to the 1909 Master Plan, more in line with the
property-owning forces controlling the government of Rome,
now under the Prince, Don Prospero Colonna. Giovannoni,
already in the service of both the Rome government and the
Rome real estate crowd, was to win the Monte Sacro competi-
tion with his plans for the Citta Giardino Aniene. The lo-
cation outside the Master Plan was no accident. The City
was obligated to pay for roads and a bridge for access to
the proposed development of 500 villini from the City.
At the foot of the bridge on land owned by the original
owner, not IACP, were built all the commercial services
necessary for the residents, "...tying the development to
the rest of Rome." The services included a church, schools,
shops, a public park, post office, etc. (Insolera, pp.
*These included Medici (The Societa Gianicolo), Societa
Italiana per il Commercio degli Immobili, Societa Italiana
per le Imprese Fondarie, Vittorio Bondi, Societa Generale
Immobiliare, Eredi Weil Weis, Banca d'Italia, Istituto
Romano Beni Stabili (Insolera, p. 87).
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107-110). Giovannoni and the IACP thus put together a
development which served the purposes of speculators,
proprietors, and members of the city administration inter-
ested in the abolition of the Master Plan, as well as its
future inhabitants.
The location of Monte Sacro two kilometers from the City
and the construction of the bridge by the City increased the
in-between real estate values dramatically. As in San Saba
and the pattern of center city road building, the action of
Monte Sacro fit the Liberal myth of being able to serve at
the same time both the interests of the poor, who were to
receive the housing, and the rich, who were to benefit form
the real estate investment. What becomes clear, however,
is how both groups do not benefit equally, or necessarily
equitably.
By the time Monte Sacro was finished in 1925, the Fascists
had reordanized the IACP and re-allocated the housing to
middle-class bureaucrats, the social group which supported
the rise of Fascism and which Fascism therefore supported.
The development process of Monte Sacro, in violation of the
Master Plan but built by a public agency and leveraging
public funds for the construction of infrastructure needed
for other private development, highlights the hegemony of
Rome's property-owning class over development decisions.
With the installation of Fascism and the replacement of
Rome's elected mayor with an appointed governor this posi-
tion was to be strengthened. Liberalism continued to exist
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in the rhetoric of Fascism and the public rationale behind
their actions, but it was clearly more lip service than
reality.
Mussolini's central city clearance programs for roads as
well as historic monuments, well underway by 1925, were pro-
ducing an increasing overcrowding in those "low rent" areas
not demolished or awaiting demolition. This in itself pre-
sented a threat of a social problem for the Fascists. 1926
can be considered a turning point for Fascism. Until then,
a limited opposition in Parliament had been tolerated, while
beating and castor oil were used frequently for political
persuasion. In special cases, murder was nedessary. Such
was the case for the Socialist Deputy and party secretary
Matteotti, who was abducted while walking to work, secretly
murdered, and his body taken to the countryside and dumped.
Matteotti had just produced an elegant expose of what the
Fascists had not done or achieved in the way of economic
improvement in the country (Matteotti, 1924). In 1926, the
legal immunity of members of the Italian Parliament was
eliminated and the opposing deputies, particularly Commu-
nists--including PCI chief Antonio Gramsci--were arrested.
After 1926, not only was anti-Fascist action eliminated, but
all social, technical, professional and union organizations
were gradually converted into Fascist organizations. In
1932--ten years after the rise of Fascism--the professional
architects institute, Sindacato Nazionale Architetti, became
the Sindacato Nazionale Fascisti Architetti (Architettura,
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Rivista d'Arte e di Storia; Organo del Sindacato..., 1925-
1932).
The development of Garbatella continued throughout. The
units were redesignated as alberghi collettivi, or collec-
tive hotels, and were used to temporarily house some of the
overcrowded or homeless city population in collective living
environments. Garbatella and other temporary solutions were
used until the new towns, such as Aprilia and Sabaudia,
located in the filled pontine marshes, were completed and the
borgate policies of 1928 and 1936 established.
One of the peculiar aspects of the transition into Fascism
in the 1920s was the continuity of institutions and their
slow transformation. It was not, in the conventional sense
of the word, a revolution*, and was similar to the rise of the
Piedmontese to the control of all of Italy, and the after-
math of WWII and the fall of Fascism. Italy had been in a
state of governmental and social chaos since the breakup of
the Giolitti coalition in 1914. The economic devastation
caused by World War I, together with Italy's loss of 680,000
lives, the growing socialist-sponsored industrial disputes,
and governmental instability (there had been seven prime
ministers in the eight year interim including, among others,
Giolitti again for a year in 1920-21) all contributed to the
chaos. The institutions and the professions continued in the
best of the Italian tradition to operate throughout the
*This type of transition, or rather this type of continu-
ity, of the bureaucracy and other institutions of society
is a particular characteristic of the Italian society, state,
and government.
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crisis period.
After 1922, the support given by the Fascist government
to the arts--including architecture and urbanism--encouraged
professionals to continue their work and even gave an added
incentive. Mussolini, wanting to create a new grandeur for
Rome as magnificent as that of Augustus, encouraged connec-
tions to the leading developments of design ideology in
Europe, America and the Turkish Near East. For the period
of Fascism, there was a review in Urbanistica of current
events in most countries, and a particular interest in
events of the USSR.*
Public housing, or at least mass housing, social housing
or government supported housing, was by now a tradition in
Northern Europe, as well as having roots in Italy. The
policy was altered but continued through the contribution
of funds for middle-class housing. This was accomplished
through grants to developers, on a per room basis, and the
reorganization of IACP into two organizations--IACP and
INCIS,**with the latter specifically established to provide
housing for government employees. INCIS, the cash grant
system, as well as general support for the macchia d'olio
expansion of Rome by private developers and public policy
*Although a conflicting political ideology separated the
two countries, Mussolini was not a rigid ideologist. He
had been editor of Avanti, the Socialist paper, until 1914,
and a leading figure in that party. The Fascist profes-
sion's interest in the Soviet Union, especially Miliutiun,
is no doubt related to the similarities between the two
countries--both had and believed in a strong centralized
government and earlier, both hated Imperial Russia due to
its alliance with France.
**Istituto Nazionale Case Impiegati Statali.
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(the 1923 decree specifically allowing housing development
anywhere, inside or outside the Master Plan boundaries) can
be considered as a continuation of the Liberal (slightly
conservative) trend in providing government assistance for
the middle classes. The professional attempt to change the
Macchia d'Olia was supported only symbolically--through the
borgate and new town policies.
Northern influences such as minimum standards (case
minimi), rational land sub-division (lottizzazione razio-
nale), land use zoning, architectural functionalism, and the
aesthetic of modernism were all well-reported in the Italian
press and became part of the professional ideology. In
urbanism, the concept of decentralization and limiting the
size of urban connurbations was also brought to Italy. Its
roots were in the reactions to the massiveness of the older
industrial cities such as London, which had over 2 million
inhabitants in 1920, and included ideas of greenbelts,
limited growth, garden cities, and regional land use planning.
The Italians used the concept as a rationale to support their
development of new towns and borgate, often located at the
whim of Mussolini or other bureaucrats in out of the way
places. Two new towns--Aprilia and Sabaudia--were built
some 20 kilometers from Rome and by 1936, 10 borgate had
been started around Rome. In 1934, Dott. Arch. Luigi
Piccinato was to write an article entitled "The Urbanistic
Significance of the New Town, Sabaudia," in which he refers
to the decentralization of Italian cities:
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"Le citta giardino degli inglesi, i centri industriali
della Germania, le citta lineari degli Spagnoli, sono
tappe e prima passi della nuova politica urbanistica
tesa al decentramento urbano." (Urbanistica, 1934)
("The garden city of the English, the industrial center
of Germany, the inner city of the Spanish, are stopping
places and first steps of the new urban politics, the
urban decentralization.)
The concept of decentralization and the continued work
of IACP, which was to become (by 1940) the Istituto Fascista
Autonomo Per le Case Popolari di Roma highlighted the con-
tradictions inherent in the rhetoric and policies of the
government. At the same time as the 1923 decree, the 1931
Master Plan and other building support programs advocated
continued outward growth of the city, the new towns, cities
and borgate were being built under the auspices of "decen-
tralization." In 1935, the IACP began a series of 14 housing
developments three to eight kilometers from Rome. Certain,
but not all, of these were within the confines of the 1931
Master Plan.
The borgate were designed as the epitome of the ideology
of liberalism and the modern movement. They were designed
to be communities of between 1,500 and 5,000 persons, housed
in minimum dwellings of 2 to 3 rooms, no more than 2 stories
high, and located in open landscape, where these families
"of irregular composition" could regenerate themselves
through contact with nature, working in agricultural occupa-
tions, and living in modern buildings which had all the modern
conveniences--running water, heat, toilets, kitchens, and
electricity. The designs of these developments were clean,
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simple, healthy, hygienic and reflected European precedents
from Germany, the Netherlands and England (Pineschi). The
buildings were consistent with the Fascist rhetoric of the
day. They were strong and indestructible, as Italy was sup-
posed to be, and "autonomous," meaning that they were built
without imported materials or steel, a current necessity as
a result of the 1936 trade sanctions and Mussolini's demands
that Italy become self-sufficient. They were presented
proudly in the press, inside and outside of Italy, as the
work of a matured housing agency headed by one of Rome's
better architects, Alberto Calza-Bini.
These "modern cities" were, however, a continuation of
the ideologies seen in the development of Monte Sacro and
San Saba. On the one hand, they were a benevolent gift to
the poor of a good unavailable to them otherwise--a new clean
house at a price they could afford--if employed. Added to
that, they had the benefit of living in a modern style,
artistic community with a few facilities, such as a dopo-
lavoro, or after-work Fascist social club.
On the other hand, the projects, of which Tiburtino III
is one, were in the active service of the property owning
and new bureaucratic middle classes who controlled the state
and the government. The developments provided a means to
continue to clear areas in town to make way for further
concentration of wealth and land appreciation. They allowed
the continuation of the policy of "liberating" historic
monuments, such as the mausoleum of Augustus and the Teatro
215 Fascist Clearance
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Marcello, a feat which the rest of the world applauded.
They allowed the continuation of the political clearance
of Rome, already described, and they removed the apparent
source of petty crime from the city, a solution considered
noble and hence an improvement in the culture.
The above description of the program is partial, but
it has been presented in this manner to stress two things--
the manner by which it was received by the foreign nations
and the manner by which it was presented by the Italian
government and formally considered by the professional
organizations. This manner was and is entirely consistent
with the Liberal ideology which predominated in Italian
politics and culture from the 1860s onward.
Through 1940, the same can be said of housing as of
clearance--that the actions were similar to the historical
tradition, but the intents varied. Particularly different
about the borgate was the political motive behind their
construction and the implementation, which was not in the
hands of either the IACP or the designers.
Construction began on Tiburtino III in 1936 and its
population reached a peak in the early forties. It contained
at most 5,000 rooms in 2,000 units (Urbanistica 28/29).
By 1943, however, there were approximately 15,000 persons
who had been put there to live by the Fascists. People
were picked up from areas to be cleared in trucks and driven
out to the developments and left there (Pineschi, interview).
The developments were located in parts of the agro romana,
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which were on the opposite side of Rome as the new indus-
trial developments (the zona al Mare). There was no public
transit access provided to most of the borgate; from
Tiburtino III it was necessary to walk over three kilometers
to the Stazione Tiburtino, a circumferential rail station
where buses or trolleys could be taken to the central sta-
tion, Stazione Termini, where transit was available to
either the industrial area in the west towards the sea or
to central Rome. This transit service between stations
ran from dawn until dusk only (Piante di Roma, Pineschi,
Insolera).
Accessibility of the borgate prevented most residents
from possible industrial employment, and the ownership
pattern of the surrounding agricultural area prevented
their possible employment on farms or their possible self-
employment in farming. The land and open space inside the
borgate was paved and non-farmable. In addition to the
lack of possible employment or involvement in gainful
occupations, the borgate were controlled by the military.
Next to Tiburtino III, as well as the others, was a military
post; in most cases, one of a series of circumferential
forts built following the unification. In each of the forts
was a watch tower, with a clear view over the entire develop-
ment. These towers are still in existence today. It was
these characteristics of the borgate which have prompted
Insolera and others to call them concentration camps, but
only after the fall of Fascism allowed such statements.
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Consider the followingstatement made to the City Council
in 1929 by the Governor, Prince Francesco Boncompagni Lu-
dovisi:
"...families of irregular composition, with
low moral characters and backgrounds... .on
land belonging to the government, situated in
open country, and not visible from main roads,
where they could be allowed to build their own
dwellings with materials left over from the
demolitions. In such a manner, it could be
possible to inexpensively build real, true
rural settlements (borgate) with populations
of between 1000 and 1500, under the control of
a station of the Carabinieri and the voluntary
national security police (Milizia Volontaria
per la Sicurezza Nazionale).
(Insolera, p. 107)
The contradictions in the history of the development, ideol-
ogy, intentions, and urban policy reflected by these borgate
are extraordinary. The questions which remain unanswered
are what the awareness of the profession was towards their
conceptualization, development and construction. Did they
believe the borgate were really effective in urban decentral-
ization? Were the leaders such as Bini, head of IACP, or
Giuseppe Nicolosi, the architect of Tiburtino III, aware of
their use as concentration camps? Did they support this
notion, or did they believe in the image put forth in the
press of the time, and remain unaware of their use and the
political motives behind their development. This seems un-
likely. A more reasonable theory (giving as much credit as
possible to the Liberalism of the profession) is that the in-
volved professionals were confronted with a situation which
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demanded that they participate in the Fascist state, and
that their part as architects was to design and locate in
the best possible manner concepts that had been developed
and decided by those in Italy's highly centralized and
heirarchical government, the questioning of which was for-
bidden. The scientificity of the modern movement, still
heavily related to the Liberalism of the past century, was
to convince them that the best could be made by a better
design.
Supporting this latter notion is a little evidence in the
form plans for the Tiburtino III region which show the
area to the northeast (just outside) as a designated
industrial zone. Also, it should be noted that from the
1931 Master Plan onwards, the forts have been designated as
open space -- public park land. This designation shows on
the 1931 plan, on the revision to that and on the 1962 plan
and its subsequent revisions. The forts are still in use
as military establishments. In November 1978 there was an
article in the Rome daily, L'Unita, which presented a fur-
ther proposal for their conversion to parks, and listed the
military uses of each, some of which were still secret.
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Introduction
Introduction
This chapter reviews the events of the post-war period
leading up to the Center-Left government coalition esta-
blished at the national level in 1963. In the period,
Roman planners struggled to draw and approved a new Master
Plan for the City, to replace the plan drawn in six months
in 1930 and approved by the King Vittorio-Emanuele III
in 1931. The struggle proved to be inextricably tied to the
reconstruction and subsequent economic boom of the period,
and to the political battles occurring between the Left,
Center, and Right. These battles were to influence the mem-
bers of the various planning staffs commissioned by the
State and City, their resolutions and outputs, as well as
the day to day activities which continuously thwarted
planners' efforts and intentions.
The fact that political parties took positions on the
plan proposals, on behalf of their constituencies and
following their own beliefs and philosophical positions, is
not in itself striking or abnormal. Rather, the degree to
which the planning struggle was impacted by the other
national political battles, conflicts and crusades is impor-
tant. Without understanding the context in which city
planning was being reconstituted, an evaluation of that
effort is impossible, and an understanding of the effects
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of the Center-Left political transition on city planning
in the post-1963 period is precluded. (The fact that, for
instance, it was consistently the Left who advocated a real
role for city planning, while the forces controlling the
government--Center and Right--supported such a role in
theory but not in practice, could be held as at least one
reason why the planning profession has become associated
with the Left.
More significant, perhaps, was the effort by planners
outside the city planning bureaucracy to have the traditional
roles of planners reinstituted under the control of the
city government. These roles, described in the previous
chapter, consisted of regulating city growth and inter-
vening in that growth through public investment. The ques-
tion raised in this period was, in essence, very simple:
On whose behalf was the intervention and regulation to take
place? With the aid of the Left (and, of course, a new
analysis of the structure of society, different from the
Liberal model) came a new type of definition of public good
and public purpose. No longer was the concept associated
only with the spatial structure of society or the corporate
or properties interests. A consideration given for people,
classes, and separate constitutencies and can be seen in
the purposes, policies, and plans supported by the Left;
this new concern was mirrored as well in the urban research
which developed in the 1960s and has culminated in new
models of urban affairs, described by such authors as David
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Harvey, Manuel Castells or, in Italy, by Quaroni, DeCarlo,
Benevolo, Ceccarelli, Cederna, and others.
The urban problems of the period--the lack of services,
ugly growth, savage land speculators, the disregard for
law--in general, problems of planning in Rome must be
understood in this light. To criticize the lack of regu-
lation or the inability of planners to stop the illegal
development is an unfair criticism, because those in the
profession and in the planning bureaucracies were not in
positions which had any power over these events. The
Christian-Democrat policies and actions of the period were
calculatedly conceived to minimize these roles. If blame
must be placed, for instance, for the state of Rome today,
it must be placed with the Christian-Democrats. The city
planning profession did not have a mandate which would
allow it to take credit for the successes and yet it
has been blamed for the failures. The "powers of decision"
were not theirs to exercise.
For this reason,/this chapter has shifted its emphasis
from an analysis of the development of the city, as was
the theme of the last chapter, to an analysis of the acti-
vities of the profession, which were very minimally involved
in the development of the city, which continued on its own
momentum and was supported by the economic policies of the
State Government. These national trends and events are
summarized in the first two sections of the chapter, and
should give the reader a glimpse of the national, ideological
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and legal contexts in which planning was expected to occur.
The third section deals specifically with the events leading
up to the approval of a new Master Plan in 1962.
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Problems of Reconstruction
Rome was liberated from its German occupation by
Partisans and the Allied military forces in June of 1944.
For almost a year the official government of Italy, under
Badoglio and King Vittorio Emanuele III, had been in exile
in Brindisi. During this interim, although chaos reigned
in the countryside, with a multitude of independent police
forces and military allegiances (Lewis), there was a con-
tinuity in local government administration (Hughes, p. 191).
The Allied military occupation force which "controlled"
Rome was dependent upon the bureaucracy to distribute
foodstuffs; operate services such as the trams and buses,
sewers, electric systems and telephone lines; and to regu-
late the sales of contraband Allied supplies. Also, the
jails needed to be maintained. D.y to day life continued.
As seems to have been Allied policy, a civilian govern-
ment was established as soon as possible in order to sym-
bolize the Allied peace-keeping mission, not U.S. and
English imperialism. Six days after the expulsion of the
Nazis, Prince Doria-Pamphili was appointed Mayor, replacing
a military commander and a string of eight appointed gover-
nors who had served under Fascism.
The most immediate problem faced by the new government
was the crisis of people: people without food, shelter, or
means of support. In 1938, there were over 1,290,000 legal
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residents of Rome; by 1944, hundreds of thousands were
counted as homeless. The more ordinary problems of city
planning, schools, universities, parks, day care centers
and urban investment were to wait at least until the formal
re-institution of civilian national government in 1947.
In the meantime, the U.S. and Britain had spent over $1
billion dollars (1946) in the country through the military
aid program. The United Nations Agency, UNRRA*, was to con-
tribute an additional $409 million the same year. Between
1944 and 1946, the bulk of aid and reconstruction programs
was comprised of food, medicines, and chemicals such as DDT,
which would eliminate the malaria-carrying mosquitoes which
had plagued Southern Italy since the beginning of time.**
The military aid was designed to "prevent 'disease and
unrest' behind our lines,"(Herter). The UNRRA aid, however,
which began flowing to the country after 1945, had wider
intentions; 60 per cent was earmarked for industrial and
agricultural rehabilitation, including more land reclamation--
fuel, transport machinery, fertilizer, insecticides, live-
stock, grain and housing. Only 40 per cent went directly
to food.*** The stated intents of the program, as can be
*The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Admini-
stration was established by the U.N. and given 75 per cent
of its funding by the U.S. Government.
**Mussolini's solution to the malaria problem was to
fill in marshes in urban areas and to outlaw fishing in the
rural South, as fish ate mosquito eggs. It wasn't particua
larly effective. (Levi)
***A substantial amount of this aid was returned to
the U.S., as most supplies were then purchased from the U.S.
and shipped by U.S. companies.
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seen in the following quote, suggest that it was nothing but
a program to increase political stability under American
economic hegemony in the world:
"The third significant phase of this operation,vhich
can be evaluated only in part at this time, deals with
the social consequences of such a large-scale effort to
relieve human suffering. Historically speaking, there
can be no denial of the fact that misery breeds social
unrest and anarchy; that anarchy in turn, particularly
in areas which are'important in the economy of the world,
seriously retards any return to normal peaceful pursuits
and normal economic progress." (Herter, p. 106) (emphasis
added)
A gradual stability returned to Italian Government in
1948, when the Christian Democrats were elected with the
first absolute parliamentary majority ever existent in the
history of the country. The adoption of a republican form
of government in 1947 expelled the King Umberto II, and his
father, the ex-King Vittorio Emanuele III (who had directed
Mussolini to form a cabinet 25 years previously) and established
in place a President to be elected every seven years and
two houses of Parliament, both elected every four years.
A cabinet composed of Ministers would continue to run the
government, headed by a Prime Minister, a system much like
a cross between Britain and France.
With the war now three years into the past, the immediate
panic of emergency relief began to turn into the day to day
processes of reconstruction. Italy had lost one third of
her national wealth in the crisis and processes of agricul-
tural reform, industrial investment, social welfare, housing
construction, and city rebuilding all placed demands on
scarce resources, which were augmented by substantial
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allotments of U.S. Marshall Aid funds.
The next two sub-sections present an overview of the
activities in housing and planning regulation in Rome in
this period. It should be noted how in both the most
important decisions taken tended to be those requiring little
capital and depending instead upon regulation and incentive
provisions reducing private costs but not incurring govern-
mental allocations of funds.
Housing in Rome
Between 1948 and 1952 a series of acts were passed in
parliament to increase the quantity of housing on the mar-
ket. These acts had major consequences in Rome. IACP, the
public housing authority, was given the responsibility of
rebuilding their properties, many of which had been destroyed
in the war. The majority of IACP housing were the Fascist
borgate, 60 per cent of which had been destroyed.
A new national housing agency, INA-Casa, was created in
1949 under the Ministry of Employment to begin a program
designed to increase employment and provide housing. In
Rome between 1951 and 1961, INA-Casa built 110,953 rooms, or
a total of 5 per cent of the new construction in that
period (Insolera, p. 191; Berlinger and Della Seta, p. 98).
In 1952, however,they were responsible for 25 per cent of
new units available. The contribution of INA-Casa is much
greater than sheer numbers, as their selection of architects
and innovative charter led to the development of housing types
which are not recognized as or considered "public." Their
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housing is among the best in the new Rome. Quaroni, one of
the INA-Casa architects, gives much credit for this to
Arnaldo Foschini, an architect and former professor (of
Quaroni's) at the University of Rome who was appointed as
director of the program.
Two other housing authorities, UNRRA-Casas and INCIS
(housing for government employees), contributed only 7,000
rooms combined (Urbanistica, 1958, p. 84). In the same
period, over 900,000 people migrated to Rome and over 2
million rooms were built (Fried, 1973, p. 81)* Public
sector housing in numbers was relatively insignificant;
however, as in the past its location was important. The
new projects were located usually a short distance from the
City, and the infrastructure (sewers, electricity, water and
transit service) provided the type of environment necessary
to support massive private development along the arteries
leading to these developments, as well as on tracts of land
adjacent to them.**
Before 1950, new construction was slow. Except for IACP,
few new public projects were started. In response to the
growing demand, the private sector had built 250,000 rooms.***
*Population statistics in Rome vary depending upon
whether illegal immigrants are counted.
**See Tiburtino IV and Tuscolano; Poodry and King;
and following discussion.
***In Italian statistics, rooms (vani) is the most
prevalent data unit for housing. Most apartments in Italy
are built for large families and have between 4 and 6 vani,
although the national average is approximately 3.5 vani
per house.
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Housing had become the same problem for Rome that it had
been in previous ages; there were massive areas of squatter
housing on the edges of town, in what has come to be called
the periphery. In 1951, 6.6 per cent of the population was
living in barracche, and another 21.9 per cent were families
sharing apartments, due to the general lack of available
units (Insolera, p. 189).
The squatter housing was bad for one reason more than
what is obvious in a developed, industrialized Western
nation. It was the power base, in Rome, of the Partito
Comunista Italiano, the PCI. By "bad" I do not mean an
absolute bad, but a bad in the value structure of the
Christian-Democratic Italian power structure and their
ally, the USA, which was just entering the McCarthy period.
The solution to the "communist problem" was (and still is!)
to buy it away. Enough money, through economic progress and
upward social mobility, would divide the working class,
offering middle class material achievements, and eliminate
communism.*Amendola, a current moderate PCI leader talks of
a continuing "expansion of the middle classes, who press on
the working class with their social advancement-oriented
behavior." (Amendola, 1977)
*See Cantril's "The Poverty of Despair" for a classic
text which portrays Italian Communists as only the poor,
jobless, and/or homeless. It misrepresents issues and
constitutencies, but presents the falacious image adhered
to by the USand DC party clearly and precisely.
93
The national attempt at a solution to the housing prob-
lem was to enact a series of laws--the Tupini and Aldiso
Laws of 1949--which provided tax and interest subsidies for
the private and cooperative housing development, similar to
the Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae and State Housing Finance
Agency programs in the USA. The laws spawned a massive
expansion of private housing at the periphery of cities,
particularly Rome, where an additional 1.5 million rooms
were built by 1958. A quarter of these rooms were built
in contradiction to the 1931 Master Plan, still in effect.
The problem of the barracche still persisted, with over
50,000 people then living in squatter housing (Insolera,
p. 189).
The Tupini and Aldiso Laws, for the first time in Italian
history, provided development support through a system un-
connected to either the local city government or to selected
geographical areas. The incentives were abatements on State
taxes, and hence the entire program was administered outside
of the city's jurisdiction. Previous development incentive
strategies had been managed in the city government, as in
the case of infrastructure construction, which provided a
development incentive, but was always tied to a geographic
location. The Tupini and Aldiso incentives relied upon land
use regulation to guide and direct growth. In the United
States, this is less of a problem, as the local zoning ordi-
nances are, for all practical purposes, abided by and there
is always the police power of the authority to enforce the
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regulation. In Italy, the situation is different and
warrants a clearer description of the planning context
before a full understanding can be developed.
Governmental Planning
Planning the governmental sponsored urban interven-
tions of the immediate post-War period were based upon the
legal structure of the new government, the 1942 Legge
Urbanistica, other laws dating as far back as 1860, as
well as the attitudes of government agencies, the planning
profession and the public towards law, regulation, and the
appropriate behavior of the public sector. This last point
was explicitly political and separated the Left from the
Right and Center, with the Left believing in a new type
of strong role for the public sector, in the protection of
individual rights and opportunities regardless of class or
income. The Center believed that a respite from Fascism
and the relaxation of controls over the private sector would
allow individual freedoms to grow on their own. Regardless
of political affiliation, the Italian people were happy to
be rid of the oppression of Fascism, and expressed this,
among other ways, by the active disregard of any form of
public control. Even the government bureaucrats and police
forces, in positions which were supposed to enforce regu-
lations, were reticent to do so.*
*This section is based upon the following sources:
Angotti, Insolera, Fried, 1973, 1963, Ceccarelli, Urbanistica
28/29, Berlinguer and Della Seta, Della Seta, Casabella 438.
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The planning profession, still very closely tied to
architectural and engineering education, underwent a meta-
morphosis in which most all positions were taken by younger,
anti-Fascist people who had not participated in the Fascist
building programs. New positions and commissions went to
people like Ludivico Quaroni, Mario Fiorintino, Carlo
Aymonino, Mario Ridolfi, Luigi Piccinato, DeRenzi, Foschini
and others. Bruno Zevi was to return from the United States
to run the architectural journal, Architettura, bringing with
him the new organic concepts of Wright. The previous genera-
tion of designers and planners were issued out of the pro-
fession, out of the journals, out of the professional organi-
zations, and out of positions of responsibility in govern-
ment. With the change were the new ideologies of Neo-realism
and Rationalism, both responding to issues and situations
of the time.
Regardless of political position,* planners were com-
mitted to the use of regulation to control the growth of
Rome, particularly to arrest the macchia d'olio pattern of
growth which had become ugly, fiscally expensive, and was
not conducive to the just, equitable, and even possible
provision of urban services. The Master Plan of 1931 was
*The National Institute of Urbanism, INU, staffed the
planning office of Rome for a short period after the
liberation. It could be assumed that they were largely
sympathetic to the Left, because they left the office in
1947, when the Left was expelled from the government by
the Christian-Democrats.
Via Tiburtina3.3
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no help in achieving this goal, although the 1942 Legge
Urbanistica was.
'Like the current period of scarce resources, the post-
War period needed regulatory powers to achieve a fair dis-
tribution of resources> as indiscriminate policies of
Fascism or expensive over-provision of services was not
affordable. It was in this mood that the profession began
the struggle for a new Master Plan for Rome, based upon
democratic principles, the 1942 Legge Urbanistica, the cur-
rent legal and operational status of city governments, and
the popular attitudes towards regulation and government.
Underlying these foundations was the general level of poli-
tical awareness which had emerged after Fascism, and the
political struggles between the Left, the Right, and the
Christian-Democrats who by 1948 had complete control of
the State government. This chapter deals with each of these
issues before examining the 16 year struggle for a new
Master Plan and planning process for Rome. If an understan-
ding of these issues was not necessary for an understanding
of planning in Rome, their descriptions would not take up
so much room.
The 1942 Legge Urbanistica was designed to work under
the form of intergovernmental organization in effect at
the time of its writing. This form was established in 1860
when the Piedmontese annexed the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, and
was written into the Constitution. The form was altered
in the 1947 Constitution, although not effectively changed
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until the 1970s. The transition is examined in some depth
in the next section. The previous form was based upon a
concept of the State as the ultimate authority and respon-
sible entity for the administration of cities. The State
was divided into a series of 92 provinces, each of which
was controlled by a Prefect, who was appointed by the King,
and under the Minister of the Interior. In 1948, the Pre-
fects remained, although their power was slightly less
exercised, in reaction to the overuse of the position by
the Fascist central government. They remained, however,
appointed positions, although this time by the President
through the Minister of the Interior. (See Figure 3.4).
On all city decisions requiring central approval,
the Prefect was the interim representative of the central
government. He also had powers over the City Council and
administrations similar to those held by the President
over the Houses of Parliament, that being to dismiss a
government, call new elections, and rule the jurisdiction
in the interim. During Fascism, for instance, the direct
central control of cities was not achieved by a govern-
mental reorganization,but rather by the dismissal of the
elected mayors and their permanent replacement by Prefects.
Before the 1942 Legge Urbanistica, Master Plans were
entirely optional and discretionary devices. When drawn
by a city administration, they then needed to be approved
by the King, his local representative, the Prefect, and
the Ministry of Public Works. The 1942 law provided a more
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grounded legal basis for Master Planning to occur and pro-
vided for a five tier hierarchy of plans, to be prepared
and approved as follows:
Tier 1. The State Ministry of Public Works, through
its regional offices, is responsible for the prepara-
tion of regional plans to deal with large-scale issues--
agriculture, water, land reclamation, etc.
Tier 2. The State Ministry of Public Works, again through
its regional offices, is responsible for the preparation
of intercommunal plans when neighboring city jurisdic-
tions face mutual problems and jointly request such a
plan.
Tier 3. Each city is responsible for preparing a
general Master Plan to extend to the full geographic
limits of its political jurisdiction. This Master Plan
is the Italian equivalent of a U.S. zoning plan. It
is the basis of city growth policy and regulates land
uses, sets limits for building regulations, and includes
powers of eminent domain (expropriation) for virtually
any purpose, including land subdivision and resale.
The Master Plan--the "Piano Regolatore Generale"--must
be prepared by the City administration, approved by
the City Council (the "Giunta"), and forwarded to the
President of the Republic for his approval, through the
Minister of the Interior and the Prefect. The PRG
contains no capital facilities or financial plan compo-
nents. The Plan must also be approved by the State
Terratorial
Jurisdiction
State
Representative
Elected
Representative
Assemblv
Collective
Executive Body
Lines of authority until the establishment of the Regional governments in 1973
especially as pertaining to City Planning process.
(adapted from Fried, 1973, p137)
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Executive
H-
C0
102
Public Works Ministry and both houses of Parliament
before it becomes law.
Tier 4. The city administration must file and have
approved a set of building regulations. The Planning
Department of the city Public Works Department is respon-
sible for approving all building permit applications
on the basis of their adherence to the Master Plan and
the building regulations. Usually building regulations
are announced three years after the Master Plan is
approved.
Tier 5. For each area of town designated for expansion
and for each proposed public construction of urban
infrastructure, the Planning Department is responsible
for preparing a local area plan which details buildable
volumes and uses in specific areas--the "Piano Parti-
colareggiato."
This planning organization suited the new governmental
structure designed by the writers of the Constitution, with
a few changes. The President replaced the King as the
supreme authority in the country and a new political juris-
diction was established corresponding to the first tier of
planning, the regions. Their non-implementation until the
1970s is discussed later. The organization of the city
Master Planning process remained much as had been intended
in the 1942 law, however.
There were three sets of pressures in the reconstruction
period which had severe impacts on the implementation of the
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city planning process: market forces, organizational con-
ditions, and enforcement procedures and responsibility.
Each contributed to the non-enforcement of the current 1931
Master Plan, as well as to the problems which developed
in producing a new plan. An understanding of this situation
completes the picture of what the odds were against regula-
tory planning at the technical or operational level.
Enforcement of the Master Plan provisions is the respon-
sibility of the city Planning Department, Building Inspec-
tor's division; the local city police force, the "Corpo dei
Villigi Urbani"; and the courts. In a clause uncommon for
Fascism, the 1942 law prohibited the state police forces,
including the "Carabinieri,"from exercising any power in
the enforcement of building and land use regulation. In
the early 1950s, the State Constitutional Court had yet to
be established, there were only three Building Inspectors
(and one Jeep) for the entire 603 square miles of Roman
territory, and the local police force was inadequately
staffed to devote any energy to building code violations.
"The Corpo dei Vigili Urbani, with fewer than 2,500
villigi, can spare relatively few men for building regu-
lation since it is responsible for enforcing all city
codes, including and primarily the traffic code, as well
as for delivering official notices, catching stray dogs,
inspecting markets,and the like."(Fried, 1973, p. 155).
Enforcement of the regulations was difficult at best, with
few resources available. As Rome began to enter the building
boom of the fifties, the problem was compounded, not simpli-
fied, as thousands of applications poured into the office
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of the Building Inspector each week. Delays of several
years were not uncommon. In 1966, for instance, there were
only 487 people working in the department and over 400,000
applications to review. Developers and individuals reacted
to the delay in the approval process in three ways. The
first was to put political pressure on the new government
not to apply or increase any new regulations. It was these
pressures, among others, which contributed to the delay in
acceptance of the next Master Plan. Second were the devel-
opers and individuals with political contacts and "friends
above" who would use these contacts or bribes to speed the
approval process.
The third reaction, including both individuals and
developers, was to ignore the procedure entirely and proceed
to subdivide land, build houses or apartment buildings, or
add to existing buildings. The following table from
Berlinguer and Della Seta and map from Casabella summarize
the quantity and location of rooms and land which were
developed in this manner--"abusivamente," as the Italians
label it. Developments of this type included additions to
buildings for which no permit was ever applied for, houses and
land subdivisions for which no permit(s) were ever applied for,
as well as buildings for which permits were applied for but
construction began before approvals were granted. In this
sense, the force of the private market demand for housing
overwhelmed the archaic and understaffed bureaucracy, with
its own inertia shaping the post-War growth.
Year
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HOUSING GROWTH
Rooms for which
Rooms for which no permits were
building permits issued
were issued (Abusivamente)
1946 14,309
1947 24,442
1948 36.664
1949 64,958
1950 59,011
1951 79,489
1952 94,286
1953 151,350
1954 184,289
1955 172,387,
1956 156,230
1957 138,303
1958 145,915
1959 207,580
Total 1,529,213
(14 years)
4,705
4,436
7,854
10,070
24,044
31,325
37,620
53,891
70,464
105,368
111,651
117,658
118,785
131,143
829,014
Increase in
population
(registered)
54,948
40,348
35,472
23,049
28,890
33,183
26,174
36,786
34,025
39,199
43,872
48,106
48,489
66,562
559,193
Source: Berlinguer and Della Seta, p. 98.
Another aspect of market activities which proved stronger
than the regulatory capability of the planning staff was land
speculation, which quickly became one of the most profitable,
lucrative, and savage activities in Rome. The market was
still controlled by a relatively few large landholders. In
the aftermath of the War, these people or real estate soci-
eties began to offer cheap land to IACP and INA-Cas a for
their developments, and in compensation would benefit from
the increase in value on adjacent land, made more developable
by the increase in services and infrastructure which would
come with the housing.
35
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Also, the larger number of residents in an area, as in
the cases of Cinnecitta and Tuscolana, would be able to form
critical masses necessary for private commercial services.
The Gerini family--Alessandro and Isabella--were involved
in Tuscolano and the Cinecitta area. The Prince Lancellotti
was involved similarly with Villa Gordiani and Prenestina
(Insolera, p. 196). In other areas, the Societa Generale
Immobiliare was involved and, in still others, individuals
profited greatly from the subdivision and development of
former villas which had been surrounded by growth. Such was
the case for the Villa Carpegna property, in which Della
Seta has recorded a tenfold increase in sales price between
1941 and 1973.*
The effects of the inability to regulate building and
land subdivision can be seen in the shape that Rome took in
the 16-year period until 1962. Favoring non-regulation had
extended to the planning process as well as the town. The
failure to reach agreement on a Master Plan for 16 years, as
will be seen, had a direct relationship to the profit that
these people were able to capture in this period of non-
regulation.
The organizational or bureaucratic behavior of the vari-
ous governmental departments and agencies, combined with
their legal status, are the third aspect of the context of
governmental planning in the period. One aspect of planning
*Della Seta has reproduced records of 13 separate tran-
sactions, each progressively smaller and smaller, between
1898 and 1973. From "Paese Sera," 21 December 1975 (Della
Seta, p. 211).
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in cities is the programming and locating of new public
facilities, services and infrastructure to accomodate growth.
The Planning Department has always been an office in the
municipal Public Works Department, which controls the con-
struction of most city infrastructure. Neither the planning
office nor the Master Plan allocate funds or budget Public
Works funds for these purposes. Other facilities--schools,
health centers, etc.--are managed through other departments.
There was not any direct coordination of these activities.
Theoretically, this should not have been a problem because
of the existence of both a Master Plan as well as the loca-
tion of the Planning Department inside Public Works--however,
with the planning staff completely overworked with permit
applications, and one-third of all the residential construc-
tion occurring without permits or controls, coordination
became an increasingly difficult proposition.
Another aspect of Italian planning law was that
State ministries and agencies are not formally obligated
to follow the city Master Plan conditions. Both the Ministry
of Defense and the Ministry for State Participation (in
Industry, the Ministero per le Partecipazioni Statali) are
both completely exempted--the former for all actions on
grounds of defense and security, the latter only for pur-
poses of locating industries (Fried, 1973). All other mini-
stries and agencies, although also legally unbound by the
city Master Plan, are required to submit their planned pro-
jects to the (State) Ministry of Piblic Works for their
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review and determination of the degree of compliance with
the plan. In theory, this should be a workable system,
as the Ministry of Public Works must approve the plan before
it becomes law so presumably they are informed and in agree-
ment with th, plan. In practice, they care very little to
control other ministries and agencies, and a virtual carte
blanche is given. Projects built in Rome in this manner
include all the UNRRA-Casas, INA-Casa, IACP and INCIS hou-
sing, as well as the Fiumicino Airport built by the Mini-
stries of Defense and Public Works, opened in 1957, and the
office headquarters of all the branches and affiliates of
the state holding company, IRI. Also falling into this
category of building activities not under the control of
city planners has been the motorway system and loop around
Rome, the Gran Raccordo Anulare, and the 436 hectare
development of E.U.R.
In conclusion, the regulatory structure of what in the
United States is considered city planning was not organized
or inclined to engage in the activity on a comparable basis.
There was neither a history of regulatory planning nor an
inclination after Fascism to desire much regulation) Land
speculation and intense development of the periphery con-
tinued through the 1950s unimpeded by planning regulations.
Neither the massive population increase in Rome nor
the politics of regulatory planning were isolated events.
They can be considered as the day to day activities that
engulfed Rome and its bureaucracies of government. They
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were distinctly separated from the special activities such
as the planning for the 1960 Olympics, the generation of a
new Master Plan for the City, and problems such as deciding
what to do with the carcass of the EUR development to the
southwest, begun for the International Exposition of 1942
that never materialized. There were 436 hectares which were
autonomous from Rome and potentially prime real estate.
There were also the national economic development
programs and institutions such as Cassa per il Mezzogiorno,
a program to fund industry and industrial infrastructure in
the South, IRI, the national companies, gas and oil (ENI),
steel, banks, and shipping. There was the distribution of
the U.S. aid, mostly designed to support industrial develop-
ment and even 6ut Italy's dollar deficit (their balance
of trade deficit to the U.S.). These programs were not
controlled through Rome or its government, but nationally.
They had more of a role in shaping the form of the city in
the 16 years than did the regulators or city planners, who
struggled to design an acceptable and operational plan.
There was also the nationwide power struggle between the
Christian-Democrats, who were attempting at all costs to
retain their political and economic hegemony, supported by
the United States, and the parties of the Left, the
Partito Comunista Italiano and the Partito Socialista
Italiano, who were handed an "out of government, opposition
party" status before the first national elections.
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The next section, The Larger Picture, describes these
political battles--between parties, between governments and
agencies, between interests, and above all, to establish
a new mandate for governing the country, based upon
democratic principles, both capitalist and socialist, all
set forth in the new Constitution. Without this background,
one will never know
"Why things that in principle ought to go in a certain
direction go in actual fact the opposite way."
(Ceccarelli, p. 109).
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The Larger Picture
"We must therefore begin by not overstating the demo-
cratic force present inthe country at the time of
liberation, but rather consider the virulence of the
conservative forces, disorganized by the military defeat,
the end of Fascism and the fall of the Monarchy, but
still very much present in the country, not only in
the dominant groups determined to preserve their privi-
leges but also in the orientations, habits, and
fears of the broad popular strata." (Amendola, pp. 7&8).
The other Tide of the post-War recovery was the feeling
of the people and its embodiment in arts and literature by
what was to be called "neo-realism." The source of neo-
realism can be best expressed as a new awakening of the
possibilities that anyone could and should lead an ordinary
life, full of ordinary events, such as sleeping, eating,
travelling the length of Italy in a train, drinking wine,
getting married, having children, having a home, or even
fighting. It was not a romanticist, idealist, or material-
ist ideology, just an ordinary one which grew out of 20
years of political and social suppression and five years of
war, for three of which the country had been severed into
two regions, each occupied by foreign armed forces. For
Italians returning from prisoner of war camps, people such
as architect Ludovico Quaroni, who spent five years as a
prisoner in India, it also meant returning to a normal
life and having an appreciation for that kind of ordinary-
ness that few of us can comprehend, not having gone through
the privations.
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While this appreciation is called traditionally Italian,
it is more a reaction to experiences than a genetic trait.
The novels of Vittorini, Silone and Moravia--as well as the
early films of Fellini, Pasolini, Rossellini, and others--
present the images, those of before, after and during the
occupations. But most of these books, plays, and films
have a common thread which is also more than neo-realism
or the expression of a society living under the Fascist
weight. This theme is closely related to themes which were
spoken of openly in the first two decades of the 20th cen-
tury; it is the dominance over a majority of Italians through
political, religious and economic orders by a small minority.
Aside from being authoritarian, the Fascist system of
governance relied upon a blind belief in hierarchy, each
person receiving orders, following them, and giving orders
to those under him in the hierarchy. This new order brought
the middle classes into the governmental structure for the
first time and gave a new pride to local officials, to small
bureaucrats, as well as a series of symbols for the common
man to look to. Previous to that, the governance of Italy
was in the hands of the wealthy, the nobility and the Church.
It was not in the hands of the railway workers, the pea-
sants of the South, or the industrial masses of the North.
It was in the same hands as were controlling the factories,
the land, and the regulation of capital.
In both Vittorini's "Women of Messina" (1949) and
Fellini's "Variety Lights" (1950) there are portrayed the
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efforts of small groups of people to put together new lives
after the disruption and to guide the development of these
lives, not by ideological principles but rather by the prag-
matic necessities of getting by and sharing resources that
are available. Land and buildings are some of these
resources. Pervading this spirit is the concept, in prac-
tice, of common property -land, theaters, found materials,
or group dynamics. There is, however, always another agent
who appears on the scene after the group has successfully
put together a mode of production--someone who claims ground
rent or the equivalent. The owner of capital always re-
appears to share what has been produced, whether that be the
profits of a theater troup, wheat or, in the case of the
nation, the new constitutional government.
The Church, after issuing in Fascism and making little
contribution to its demise (save harboring a number of
former members of the Partito Popolare) the predecessor of
the DC party, including President DeGaspari), came back
to claim the Government for the Christian-Democrats. After
the North had been rid of the Nazis, the DC-Church-Allied
forces combined to control the new government. After the
Communists and Socialists contributed 9 of the 12 million
who voted to overthrow the Monarchy (Amendola, p. 6) and
expel the House of Savoy, the Christian-Democrats moved
in to become equal if not dominant partners in the writing
of the new constitution. In the following 1948 elections,
Church gifts of food and threats of excommunication,
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American government and AFL-CIO support all combined with
the Italian voters' acceptance of the promised middle-class
ideals to give the Christian-Democrats an absolute majority
in the new parliament, a position which has remained
hegemonic through today.
Post-War politics, policy setting and reconstruction
efforts must be seen in this light. The struggles in the
following thirty years are all inexorably derivative of this
situation and cannot be properly understood otherwise.
This section explores four of the aspects of this situation
which have had particularly important impacts on city plan-
ning, the growth of Rome and the development of the 1962
Master Plan for Rome: the continuity of laws, the continuity
of State corporations, and the implementation of the new
Constitution.
The Continuity of Laws
In the transition from the Monarchy to a Constitutional
Republic, the body of Italian Law was maintained, including
a number of laws which were in direct conflict with the
principles and specifics of the new Constitution. Five
of these laws were to have impacts on the post-War develop-
ment of Rome:
The Legge Urbanistica of 1942
The Local Finance Act of 1931
The Provincial and Communal Act of 1934
The Anti-Urbanization Laws of 1931 and 1939.
These laws were maintained under a number of circum-
stances: as useful methods for the DC government to consoli-
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date and maintain their centralized control over the poli-
tical and economic structure of the country, particularly
in relation to the Communists and Socialists; as oversights
and minor issues which the new government, once operating,
could deal with as they presented themselves; and through
inertia resulting from the desire to insure an orderly
transition of governments and legal structure not requiring
the entire set of laws and codes of the country to be
re-written in the short period in which the Constitution
was written.
The five laws considered in this section all maintained
a high degree of centralized authority not envisioned in
the Constitution. The basis of their maintenance after 1948
was the DC desire of the Christian-Democrat Party to retain
and consolidate their position of authority and control of
the country vis-a-vis the PCI and PSI. In many cases, as
with the anti-Urbanization laws, the PCI and PSI made little
effort to demand the removal of these laws until they were
assured that they would not hurt their own electoral posi-
tion. By and large, political motives were the strongest in
the acceptance of the laws. This was not the case of the
Legge Urbanistica of 1942, which was a major advancement
in the establishment of a field of urbanism and city planning.
As already mentioned, the Legge Urbanistica has provided
the basis for the activities of city planning through
today. There have been major revisions to the law, but it
remains nevertheless. It was passed at a time when the
117
failures of the 1931 plan had become evident as more than
the failures of the plan, but as failures of the entire
planning process. In many ways, it was the Italian equi-
valent of the British Town and Country Planning act of 1902,
which also set the basis for modern town planning in that
country.
The ideology behind the law was to return the city to
a functioning economic entity with regulations and land
use designations to be based on the doctrines of highest
and best uses of land. The DC government found this concept
not contradictory to their own ideology and hence the law
was easily considered for maintenance. In addition, the
first tier of planning that the law required--regional
planning--was ideally suited to the new Constitutional
entities, the Regions. For these and other reasons, the
law was retained.
The parts of the law which were contradictory to the
operations of the new gcvernment and its supporters, such
as the expropriation and public use zoning aspects, were
quickly nullified or later overturned as unconstitutional
when the Constitutional Court was established in 1957. Such
was the case with one particular clause which prohibited
private building on land which had been designated "for
future use in the public interests (parks, sports, grounds,
or schools)."(Vercellone, p. 132). Although a powerful
planning tool, this clause would eliminate all value from
private land so designated while it was waiting to be expro-
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priated. Until 1957, the clause was ignored as development
continued on the property regardless of its designation.
After the Court was established, the provision was declared
unconstitutional as it was an unjust taking without compen-
sation, and the Constitution guaranteed indemnity for expro-
priated land. This issue was to return to haunt the imple-
mentation of the 1962 Housing Act, discussed in the next
chapter.
Another provision of the law which was to prove not
only useful but imperative in the post-War period was the
provision that the city Master Plan extend to the full
boundary of the City. The Master Plan of 1931 only regula-
ted building on 17 per cent of the 603 square mile terri-
tory of the City of Rome. With the city continually growing
outside its Master Plan boundaries, the extension of planning
powers to the entire city limits became imperative.
Only in the 1970s was a revision to the law approved
which corresponded with the emergence of the Regions as a
real governmental units. At this time, the Prefect and
President of the Republic were eliminated as the ultimate
approvals necessary for the plan and replaced by the
regional government.
The Local Finance Act and the Provincal and Communal
Act were passed in the earlier days of Fascism and described
the processes by which minicipal budgets were to be prepared
and approved. The laws set out a hierarchical authority
structure with "practically unlimited" national authority,
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although in practice the post-War exercise of that authority
has been "circumspect, unsystematic, and politic" '(Fried,
1971, p. 1016).
"Once adopted by the city council, the budget of an
Italian city must be approved by one or more agencies
of the national government, either in the local pre-
fecture or in the Ministry of the Interior in Rome. In
theory, the budget is subject to the complete discretion
of the national government, which may alter a city's
budget practically as it wishes. The central government
or its agents may compel expenditure on a range of
compulsory objects and forbid expenditure on others.
It may compel or forbid the raising of revenues through
taxation or borrowing. It must approve all important
financial transactions, tax rates, loans, property sales
and purchases."(Fried, 1971, pp. 1015 & 1016)
This structure is still in effect, although some of the
provisions were modified following the establishment of
the Regions as semi-autonomous units. Its maintenance cer-
tainly has part of the Christian-Democrats policy of retain-
ing central control over major-aspects of the Italian economy,
especially in light of the local strength which the PCI and/
or PSI have maintained.
The last two laws, the Anti-Urbanization laws of 1931
and 1939, prohibited internal migration without permits.
Their intention was to slow the massive immigration to
Rome, Milan, Turin, and other cities curing the 30s, which
was making orderly city growth and population control
almost impossible, They were perhaps most typical of the
Fascist approach to social problems and issues--direct
social control.
In the 20s, Fascism and the United States began to
limit the possible emigration from Italy. New places for
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immigration were necessary to absorb the exodus from the
poverty-stricken South. The African colonies proved not very
acceptable, as standards of living were no better than in
Italy and security was always a problem, given that they were
in continual states of war. The North was still industri-
alizing and Rome was at least a stopping place on the way
north. Those that stayed in Rome, often without jobs and
not able to afford the fancy new developments in the center
of town, began to move into self-built barracche on the
fringe of town. Because of their illegal status, these immi-
grants were frequently left off of census records as a
result of their not listing Rome as their permanent address.
The laws met with the approval of planners who believed in
urban decentralization and were appalled at growth they could
not control. Between 1921 and 1931 Rome's population grew
from 663,848 to 937,177, and by 1938 the official census
recorded 1,290,000 people.
"These laws restored a lopsided version of serfdom to
Italy, forbidding rural workers to leave the land for
cities or towns which were either provincial capitals,
over 25,000 in population, or of 'noteworthy industrial
importance,' unless already assured of steady employment.
Those who left the mountains and villages without govern-
ment permission, however, were not allowed to register
and secure residence permits in the city and were conse-
quently unable to rent housing or obtain relief. Nor
were they able to work legally because they were not
allowed, without official permission, to register at the
unemployment office. Farm workers who left the land
'without justifiable reason' were prohibited from regi-
stering for another job even at the unemployment bureau
of their own town." (Fried, 1967, p. 509, quoting from
Ernesto Rossi, "I padroni del vapore," Bari, Laterza,
1955,'p. 109)
Cantril, in an interview with a Matera family, describes
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a first-hand account of how these laws were enforced in the
rural district of Matera (also the place of exile of Carlo
Levi):
"'My father has had the experience of being cudgeled.
The police placed the workers who were seeking employment
with their faces to the wall and beat them. Is this what
you wanted to know? On another occasion my father had
gone out to work--a five hour walk. We did not even have
a piece of bread. On reaching the place he found the
police waiting with machine guns! Here in Matera that is
what they do!' Then the father proceeded. 'Then all
the workers whose names were not written down on the
register were denounced as criminals, because theirs
was illegal work!'" (Cantril, p. 96)
But my purpose is not so much to describe the injustice
and inequity of two Fascist laws as to point out that,
although the 1948 Constitution of Italy guaranteed freedom
of movement to all Italians, these laws were not repealed
until 1961. Like the previous laws, they were not enforced
with any rigor in the post-War period, but nonetheless they
remained. What were the post-War effects of these laws?
And why were they not repealed until 1961?
The continuation of the laws had two major effects:
1. They created a "caste of pariahs," completely at the
mercy of their employers with no recourse if employers
violated social security laws, wage contracts, etc.
There could be no legal action by the employee, as
there was always the "fear of being escorted by two
Carabinieri back to the village" (Fried, 1967, p.
510) or being imprisoned for a month.
2. They created a large population (estimated by
Fried to be over one million between 1950 and 1960)
who would not register to vote, on the census , or
on any official documents for fear of being "depor-
ted." And yet, these people, genuinely living and
working in cities such as Rome, often in the borgate
or barracche at the fringes of town placed the grea-
test demand on public social and health servies.
Planning could not adequately take these people into
account.
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These laws allowed the government to maintain a dual work
force--the "legitimate" registered employees who paid taxes
and received social benefits, and another mobile, lower-paid
work force useful for maintaining competitive production in
industries otherwise inefficient. Fried mentions two reasons
for the continuation of the laws. One is the protection by
the government of the northern industrial workers from the
cheaper southern migrants, both as employment competition
and as a financial demand on their city services, supported
by their tax dollars. The maintenance of these two work
forces could be interpreted as an attempt to continue the
"purchase" of the legitimate, unionized workers in order to
achieve their integration into the middle classes and prevent
a solid working class base from developing. His other point
is political. The Church (and the DC party) had a fear of
excessive urbanization. The roots of this fear were that
high social interaction of poor would only favor the
Communists (Fried, 1967, p. 511, quoted from Musatti,
"Citta e Compagna"). The rural South had long been a strong-
hold of Church and Christian-Democrat power. The majority
of the 10 million who voted agains t the Republic--FOR the
retention of the Monarchy--came from the South (see ff.,
the discussion on land reform), and it was in the interests
of both the Church and the DC to maintain regions of poli-
tical support.
There were others who initially favored the maintenance
of these laws only insofar as they did not object to them.
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Professional planners of Rome and other cities were still
in a decentralization mode of thinking, particularly as it
related to the rapid growth which was causing consternation
in the planning regulatory agencies as well as social service
agencies. Those who preferred a more planned, rational
growth of cities, particularly Rome, were not implicitly
opposed to forms of growth control: like the Legge
Urbanistica, the Anti-Urbanization laws seemed to be useful.
The PCI was also not opposed to the maintenance of the
laws until 1957, when it became clear that they were not in
their own interests. Their nine-year support of the laws
reflected their belief that allowing the probably-DC-voting
peasants into the working classes of the cities would dilute
their electoral power. It was also consistent with their
earlier demands that the first policies of the post-War
government be land reform, followed by a moderate and con-
trolled urbanization. This policy clearly mirrors those of
the already Communist countries--the USSR in particular,
which maintained close ties with the Italian PCI. Their
shift was an admission not only of the inequity of the laws
but a realization of the "extent and implications of the
mass migratory movements" (Fried, 1967, p. 525).
Togliatti, leader of the party, reported to the central
committee that "internal migration, still not yet massive
in proportions, was about to alter the geographical, occupa-
tional, and political balance of power of the country"(ibid).
The shift of position is a premonition of the general shift
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of the PCI to a more moderate position, committed to equali-
zation and the elimination of class and political oppression
enforced through the laws of the state. The growing "illegal"
masses in the urban areas were the targets of the greatest
inequities in the system, usually living in the barracche
and unable to rely upon any form of legal recourse. They
also proved to be easily converted to the Left, as the
DC and the Church had feared.
By 1961, the population of Rome had reached 2.1 millions,
with over 300,000 living in illegal settlements of various
sorts. The problem of the illegal, or "abusivamente,"
developments was multiple and included not only the conven-
tional developments in contradiction to the existing (1931)
Master Plan--illegally subdivided land, single families
housed in the agro romana, rich and poor alike--but the
people who were classed as illegal residents and not eligible
for services. The problem was at the same time political
and technical, at least for the planners, who had been
laboring to have a new plan approved but saw whole areas of
planned open space developed. It was also financial, as the
City was confronted with demands that it provide services
and infrastructure to all its residents. When the plan was
finally approved in 1962, the periphery of Rome was in a
chaotic state, ill-served by required services and already
in non-conformity with the plan. At the same time, the
Socialist party--the PSI--joined into a Center-Left coalition
national government which would be committed to the provision
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of adequate services.
The Maintenance of State Cororations and Agencies
Like the Fascist laws, a number of Fascist-originated
State corporations and agencies were retained by the new
government, both by the Constitution and, later, by deci-
sions of the DC government. Among those which were to have
a direct impact upon the shape of Rome's growth and the pro-
cess of city planning were the IRI--Istituto per la Rico-
struzione Industriale--and the two housing agencies--INCIS
and IACP.
The IRI was established by Mussolini in the wake of the
1930 world depression as a measure to maintain industrial
investment, increase the State control of that investment,
and to prevent the possible failure of three major Italian
banks--the Banca Commerciale, the Credito Italiano, and the
Banca di Roma. These banks had been major investors in
Italian industry and as the Milan stock market threatened
collapse, they intervened massively, supporting prices, but
at the expense of printing vast quantities of money and
purchasing enormous quantities of overvalued securities.
Italy was perhaps lucky that most of her industrial
investment at that time was internal, which made this sort
of action possible. In 1931, an institution--the IMI--
was formed to replace the banks as a source of medium-term
credit to industry, but this task was taken over in 1933
by the IRI, which absorbed the industrial securities held
by the IMI and the three banks, becoming the de facto owner
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of not only the banks but also the industries. At the same
time, the obligation of printing money for the Italian na-
tion was centralized in the Banca d'Italia.
As IRI became a workable entity for achieving Fascist
industrial expansion policies, it was given more State capi-
tal and power, allowing its takeover of another bank and,
in 1934, of the major industrial sectors: steel, mechanical-
engineering firms, chemicals, textiles, electricity and
ship building. In 1937, it was given permanent status by
the Fascist legislature.
In the aftermath of the war, the IRI was maintained in
much the same spirit as it was instigated in order to
control the reconstruction of industry. The control of the
IRI by formal government was tenuous and remains so.
Although its directors are appointed, the closest relation-
is that between the DC party and the individuals who head
the IRI and its subsidiary corpoartions (see figure
most of whom are noted for their large political contribu-
tions. In the provisional government, the IRI was supported
by the Left and Center parties as a compromise.
The parties of the Left wanted the government of Italy
to own the means of industrial production in the country
and the DC party believed in a degree of national economic
planning and saw the private control of the IRI as a non-
governmental means to achieve these ends. Only the far-
Right believers inlaissez-faire economics favored the sale
of IRI companies to the private sector.
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As part of the compromise that was reached, in 1946 the
Interministerial Committee for Reconstruction (CIR) was
established to both rule on IRI policy and distribute the
Marshall Plan funds to be available from the United States.
A stipulation of the Marshall Plan was that there be some
plan for economic reconstruction. The CIR was ideally
suited to this task. It was not, however, an authority of
great power, as directing ministries and giant corporations
is an impossible task when there is not general agreement
on the goals or methods of a society's development. In
1949, Ernesto Rossi, an advocate of rational planning
and administration, commented:
"A real plan for reconstruction can only be elaborated
from a single central point.. .Today all ministries go
their own ways as if their activities were taking place
in different states; they remember that they belong to
the same country only when the find they must seek funds
from the same treasure...How can one seriously think of
a unified policy of economic reconstruction if one does
not begin to reconstruct the public administration that
must execute it?"(#15, quoted in LaPalombara, p. 23)
Nevertheless, the CIR continued its formal existence
while the ministries continued their policies and the IRI
continued to expand into sectors of gas and public utilities
construction and management, particularly telecommunications,
(telephone service), passenger and freight shipping, the
automotive industry, electricity production, air transporta-
tion, and motorways (50 per cent of the concession to build
these was given to the IRI; the other 50 per cent held by
the Ministry of Public Works). The Italian national gas
corporation (ENI) was not part-of the IRI group, although
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much the same could be said of its direction. Notably absent
from the IRI group of companies are any building construction
firms or housing companies. These activities were cleanly
divided between public construction (IACP, INC-Casa, etc.) and
strictly private development.
In 1956, the CIR was replaced by the new Ministry for
State Participation (no relation to Mussolini's Ministry
for Corporations) which officially centralized the control
of the various state corporations such as ENI, IMI, and IRI,
although in fact it gave them a greater autonomy and flexi-
bility in their budget and financial dealings by separating
them from the general governmental budget (LaPalombara,
p. 33). The political implications of this act and the main-
tenance of the 'IRI cannot be understated.
By 1956, the DC party had been in power for eight years
and had the clear support of the United States, the AFL-CIO
and all the others who were on the Western side of the Cold
War. They had used their hegemony in government to increase
their economic control of the country. The economic boom--
the miracle, as it was called--was producing vast profits
and increases in the Italian standard of living, as docu-
mented in all gross, total and average statistics. The con-
sumption of meat rose over 300 per cent (by 1973), possession
of automobiles increased (four times as many in 1960 as in
1947), and the motorways stretched across Italy. The GNP
rose at three times the inflation rate, national incomes
were skyrocketing, and thousands of new housing units--
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modern ones with heat, running hot and cold water, baths, and
plumbing--were being built all over.
The residents previously confined to cave dwellings in
Matera were now living in modern flats in the new town on
the top of the hill or in a new development--La Matella--
out near the fields where they worked. They might even
own land as a result of the land reclamation and land reform
programs being instituted in the South and Po Valley.
The average statistics were misleading, however. They
did not take into account the illegal internal migrants,
people living in barracche, or the migrant workers travelling
to Germany, Switzerland or France to work and sending home
foreign currency (which helped the national balance of pay-
ments), and they didn't reflect the real consequences of the
high unemployment which kept labor rates artificially low,
often too low to afford new housing with its rapidly esca-
lating prices.
This economic growth was being financed and controlled
by the Christian-Democrats. One spinoff effect--the escala-
tion of land value--was being used by the Church and the
older landholders to increase their wealth, party contribu-
tions and local hegemony in shaping city growth. At the same
time, the PCI and PSI were making electoral gains, particu-
larly in cities. The Communist revolutions in Eastern
Europe, Poland (1952), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslavakia
(1948, 1967) were driving the PSI and PCI to more moderate
positions, advocating not a revolutionary takeover but the
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Rome City Council Elections (2 of 2)
1960 1962 1966 1971
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National Election Results- Chamber of Deputies
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PCI 25.3% 166 23% 26.9% 177 28% 27.2% 179 28%
PSIUP 4.5% 23 4% 1.9% - -
PSI 13.8% 87 14% L4.5% 91 14% 9.6% 61% 10%
PSLIPSU,
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PLI 7.0% 39 6% 5.8% 31 5% 3.9% 21 4%
Monarch. 1.7% 8 1% 1.3% 6 1% 8.7% 56 9%
UQ
MSI 5.1% 27 4% 4.4% 24 4% (included with Monarchists)
Indep 1.3% 4 1% 1.5% 3 1% 1.5% 3 1%
Totals 30.8 630 31.8 630 33.4 630
National Election Results- Senate
1963 1968 1972
% Votes Seats % Seats % Votes Seats % Seats .% Votes Seats % Seats % Votes Seats % Seats
PCI 25.2% 84 27% 30.0% 101 32% 27.6% 91 29%
PSIUP (included in PCI) (Included in PCI) 0.8% 3 1%
PSI 14% 44 14% 15.2% 46 15% 10.7% 33 10%
PSLI,PSU,
PSDI 6.4% 14 4% (included in PSI) 5.4% 11 4%
PRI 0.7% 4 1% 2.1% 2 1% 3.0% 5 2%
DC 36.5% 129 41% 38.3% 135 43% 38.1% 135 43%
PLI 7.4% 18 6% 6.8% 16 5% 4.4% 8 3%
Monarch. 1.6% 2 1% 1.1% 2 1% 9.2% 26 8%
UQ
MSI 5.3% 14 4% 4.6% 11 4% (included in Monarch ts)
Indep. 2.9% 6 2% 1.9% 2 1% 0.8% 3 1%
Totals 26.2 315 .28.6 315 30.1 315
3 7b Election Results
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gradual redistribution of political power and increased con-
trol over means of production. Their electoral gains, as
can be seen particularly at the municipal levels of govern-
ment as well as in national electoral returns (see figure
3.9) posed a threat to the DC government. The DC response
was to consolidate their control of capital nationally and
outside the government.
By transferring this control to the corporations, they
could safely give up a degree of control in the political
arena; for instance, allowing the formation of the Ministry
for State Participation. This magnanimous gesture, in the
best intents of the 18th century liberal tradition, has, in
fact, given more independence to the corporations, although
its image presents a significant shift of power into the
political government.
The IRI has had major impacts upon Rome resulting from
the outputs of the subsidiary corporations and their loca-
tion of new corporate headquarters buildings in central
Rome. The location of offices in Rome--a sensible gesture,
as that is where control of the corporations was located--was
a policy begun under Fascism, which used it to support the
massive rebuilding of the city after the new streets had
been cleared. The area around the Tomb of Augustus is a
particularly visual example of this, as are many of the
(now) major streets such as Via Veneto, Via Barberini, Via
del Tritone, and Via Arenula. Until then, financial control
had been in cities like Milan and Turin, where the Left
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was gaining power. Gramsci pointed out the relationship
in 1920.
"But the fact is that the Italian State has to be
beheaded at Milan, not Rome; for the country's real
capitalist governing apparatus is located not in Rome,
but in Milan. Rome is the bureaucratic capital.. .As
a city, Rome has no role whatsoever in Italian social
intercourse; it represents nothing...."(Gramsci, 1920,
p. 153)
This situation had been changed by both the Fascists
and later the Christian-Democrats, both of whom engaged in
the movement of capital and capitalistic control to Rome.
Whether this action was designed to forestall and prevent
the possibility of revolution beginning in Milan as Gramsci
had envisioned, or it just seemed a logical movement and
centralization of power is difficult to tell. Its effects,
however, have certainly contributed to the maintenance of
non-Communist control of the country.
The direct actions of the IRI companies include the con-
struction of the motorway network around Rome (and, of
course, the country), the location of public telephone
offices, industrial plants, airports, shipping ports, etc.
The motorway network was designed and implemented by the
IRI company "Autostrade" on contract to the Ministry of
Public Works. Construction began on the Motorways in 1952,
following (albeit somewhat slowly) the directive of the 1950
Geneva Convention which set general European standards.
Around Rome was built the loop road, the Gran Raccordo
Anulare, 'and connections to Milan and Florence in the
North, and later to Naples and Reggio Calabria in the South.
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The "Autostrada del Sole," as it was called, and the GAR
were neither under the direction of Rome's Planning Depart-
ment nor the planning groups commissioned to draw the new
Master Plan for Rome. In fact, the roads were fait-accomplis
by the time the new Master Plan was approved in 1962. The road
network was unforeseen in the 1931 Plan and its construction
before a new plan had been devised was made legally possible
by the immunity that State governmental agencies have from
local planning regulations.
Another set of agencies which were maintained after the
War were the two housing agencies, IACP and INCIS. Until the
1960s, IACP's activities were to be limited to the recon-
struction of properties which had been developed under and
before Fascism, which has led to a perception of IACP as the
lowest status public housing agency, somewhat akin to the
American local housing authorities. In Rome, their projects
were generally the worst--the social conditions poorest,
usually overcrowded, and in poor repair since their near
destruction during the War. In examining places such as
San Basilio and Tiburtino III, it would also appear that the
design standards of the IACP projects has been the lowest
possible, although with time and trees some of the lower
density areas are not altogether unpleasant (King, Poodry
et al., observations).
On the other-hand, INCIS--the agency responsible for
housing government employees--has continued to build new
projects of somewhat ordinary character. In Rome the
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INCIS projects account for only 18 per cent of the public
construction in the post-War period. Before the War,
INCIS had developed some of the prime real estate in Rome
with quite high standards and provision of facilities and
services. The Piazza Verbona development is a good example
(King, Poodry et al.; Insolera, Urbanistica 28/29).
Although both INCIS and IACP both continued to operate
after the War, their mandate on public housing construction
was taken over by a new agency, INA-Casa, which has already
been briefly described. Their impacts on Rome as a group
continued to be strong, as their selection of locations
and building types was outside the control of the Rome
Planning Department. San Basilio was rebuilt by IACP begin-
ning in 1950, although it had been designated as outside the
buildable limits of the City. INA-Casa projects of
Tiburtino IV and Tuscolana were to have major impacts on the
directions of growth in the private sector, resulting from
their provision of city infrastructure--i.e., roads, bus
lines, water and sewer facilities. In terms of services
such as schools and health facilities, however, the Fascist
borgate which IACP were rebuilding were all seemingly for-
gotten. This was a cause which the PCI and PSI parties were
to take on. There is hardly a borgata now which doesn't
have a party cell headquarters in it, called out by a clear
storefront-type sign.
The Implementation of the Constitution
A number of the creations and stipulations of the
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1948 Constitution, were not implemented until years later.
There are many reasons for the delays, including administra-
tive problems and processes, items which were in conflict
with long-standing Italian customs and institutions, poli-
tical maneuvering, and technical difficulties. The intent
of this section is not to completely analyze the delays and
reasons for the delays, but to point out the ones which have
had direct and indirect influences on the growth of Rome and
the preparation of the 1962 Master Plan. Already I have
discussed the problem of bringing the penal code and body
of laws into a state of non-conflict with the Constitution
through the case of the Anti-Urbanization laws. The two
constitutional provisions still to discuss are the failure
to institute the Constitutional Court as a supreme judicial
body until 1955 and the failure to establish the regional
governments, proclaimed in the Constitution but realized
only after 1970. In other cases, new provisions and agen-
cies such as land reform, Cassa per i-l Mezzorgiorno, and
INA-Casa were established quickly but often, as with the two
former, provisions were carried out with great lethargy or
ineffectiveness. INA-Casa remains an exception, as it was
one of the new agencies which was effective in both its
operation and the achievement of its stated purposes--
housing and employment. The Tiburtino IV project for 4,000
residents has been particularly successful and is well docu-
mented in a thesis by Deborah Poodry (Poodry, 1979).
According to Vercellone, the task of the preparers of
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the Constitution was to "construct the outer apparatus of a
republican state.. .the rest was still there or already estab-
lished." This task was carried out by a coalition of all
anti-Fascist parties between June 2, 1946, when the country
voted to expell the Monarchy and December 22, 1947, when the
Constitution was approved by the Constituent Assembly. There
were eight parties with over half a million votes each and
another million and a half votes for other minor parties
represented in the Coalition.
"Because of the need to complete its work by the end of
1947, the Constituent Assembly was unable to lay down
specific provisions for the creation of organs mentioned
in the Constitution. In consequence, although the
Constitution became the basic law of the Italian Republic
from 1 January 1948, many of its clauses could only be
rendered effective after Parliament [which was given the
responsiblity of implementing the law] finally set up
the Constitutional Court in 1955." (Vercellone, p. 121)
Without the court, there was no supreme authority above the
Parliament which could order the Constitutions' provisions
carried out. This aspect of the reconstruction of the
Italian government made possible the maintenance of such
items as the Anti-Urbanization laws, the failure of the land
reform measures in the South, and the delay in establishing
the regional governments until 1970. Some consideration
must be given to the political sources of these provisions
and the existence, after May 31, 1947, of the Christian-
Democrat "Court" party, with effective hegemony in govern-
ment.*
*On that date, Premier DeGaspari expelled the PCI and
PSI ministers from the Coalition Cabinet.
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In the case of the establishment of the Regions, the
political interpretations are more complicated, as the pre-
1948 supporters of regional governments became their adver-
saries and the PCI, who in the writing of the Constitution
had been against the concept of autonomous regional govern-
ments, became their staunch advocates in the 1950s and 60s.
The institution of the regions would replace many of the
provisions of the Local Finance Act of 1931 and the Provin-
cial and Communal Act of 1934. The Regions were designed
to be fiscally and legally autonomous from the central
government, with full responsibility for the following
items:
* the organization of regional offices and administra-
tive bodies
- the establishment of city boundaries
- urban and rural police (the full enforcement of city
ordinances, in which the State Police had aided)
- fairs and markets
- public charities, medical and hospital assistance
- handicrafts, vocational education, and educational
assistance
* town planning
tourism and the hotal industry-
trolley and bus lines of regional interest
highways, aquaducts, and public works of regional
interest
- lake navigation and ports
- minerals and thermal waters
- quarries and bogs
- hunting
- freshwater fishing
- agriculture and forestry
- other matters evantually decentralized in constitu-
tional laws.
In addition, the items of financial autonomy "within the
limits of national laws coordinating State, Regional, and
local finance. They were to be given their own taxes as
well as shares in State taxes" (Fried, 1963, pp. 231-233).
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A glance over this list reveals the degree to which
items of even marginal importance had been placed within
the State's jurisdiction under the Fascist epoch. When
elected, the Regional government was to replace the Prefect
with respect to these items as the highest authority so
that, for instance, the regional government would be respon-
sible for the final approval of town Master Plans, fishing
regulations and the funding of such items as medical and
educational assistance. By the late fifties, the financial
burdens these responsibilities would place upon regions
were quite significant. The specific issues of housing and
financial autonomy are touched on again in the next chapter,
when they were key issues in the implementation of the 167
and 865 Housing Acts.
Title V of the Constitution divided the country into
19 Regions--the five special Regions of Sicily, Sardignia,
Trentino-Alto Adige, Aosta Valley and Friuli-Venetia
Julia, and 14 regular regions. The special Regions had
either been historically more autonomous, as with Sicily
and Sardignia, or had particular administrative problems,
such as the Trentino-Alto Adige, which was primarily
German speaking, or Friuli-Venetia Julia, which included the
territory disputed with Yugoslavia. The regular regions
were to be established and their boundaries decided upon by
the Parliament.
In the writing of the Constitution, the Christian-
Democrats had seen the Regions as but another aspect of the
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democratization of the State and a further protection
against a future Fascist-type government which would operate
from a position of strong central control. According to both
Fried (1963) and Mario Einaudi (1952),* the regions were not
given the wholehearted support of the Constitution. Many of
the more important aspects of government were kept out of
regional control, notably: industry, commerce, mining, cre-
dit controls, public education, and public health.
Fried attributes these omissions to the Liberal (PLI)
and Communist (PCI-PSI) coalition which developed in the
writing of the Constitution. The Liberals believed in a
strong, central "liberal" government, while the Left opposed
the designation of Regions or the giving to them of signifi-
cant powers because of their aspirations of using a strong
national government to achieve wide-ranging social and
economic reforms, based upon a socialist political model.
They "were opposed to any derogation to the sovereignty
of the parliamentary majority" (Fried', 1963, p. 228).
After the elections, however, the tables were entirely
turned. The PCI/PSI block which had expected a parliamen-
tary majority found themselves as opposition, excluded at
the national level, and with an irreparable internal split
between themselves. The regions and cities were to become
their base of power and support. Their national campaign
became the implementation of the Constitution, particularly
the Regions. On the other hand, the DC became the first
party in the 50-year history of Parliamentary Italy to have
*Son of the first president, Luigi Einaudi.
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had an absolute majority elected into the National Assembly
and Senate. They saw the Regions as a potential threat not
only their hegemony, but to their ability to plan an economic
recovery for the country.
"It is an ironical paradox that Christian Democracy,
the most fervent propounder of regionalism, should,
once in power, shy away from its fulfillment...In such
regions of central Italy as Tuscany and Emilia...the
Communists are in a majority. If the regional govern-
ments were to be set up, the Communist Party would con-
trol them. The chance that such Communist regional
governments might proclaim their accession to the
Soviet Union of Socialism Republics [sic] is one that
the government is not ready to take." (Einaudi, 1952,
p. 61)
In 1963, Fried called the Regions the "victims of the
political struggle," referring to the post-1948 election
about-face by the Left and Center, and the fact that had
yet to be implemented. Any policies advocated by the PCI
or PSI in the 1950s, the height of the Cold War and the
period of Western fear of Communism, were doomed to failure.
This was notwithstanding the fact that in Italy, the demands
of the PCI were generally for the implementation of the pro-
visions of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, the
Regions, and land reform. Establishment of the Regions
began in 1968 with the Electoral Law 108; in 1970, the elec-
tions were funded by the Finance Law 281. Elections were
held in 1971. In 1977, while recounting a history of the
first thirty years of the Republic, Amendola comments:
"We must always keep our sights on what must be done
to implement the Constitution, but, in the heat of
battle, we must not forget the positions already won.
A lot remains to be done, but, we must recognize, a
lot has been done." (Amendola, p. 26)
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The last area of the Constitution with which this chapter
is concerned is land, a foundation of city planning and
growth and a continual thorn in the side of the Italian
development. Currently, expropriation regulations date back
to the 1800s. The problems of the lack of control that the
government could, should, or was able to exert over private
ownership rights is evident not only in cities--with prob-
lems of the implementation of the Master Plans--but also
evident with clearer political relationships in the battle
to implement the promised land reform in the South.
Land reform was targeted for the South, and proposed by
and advocated for by the parties of the Left. Explicitly
it was to be a policy in line with the agrarian reform
that the Soviet Union had undergone and was fundamental to
Marxism. It was designed to replace the Southern "latifon-
do," the large absentee-owned estates on which peasants
worked either for wages or shares of crops. Either way,
life on the farm was a life of poverty, constant unprotected
debt to local merchants and land owners, and unquestionable
exploitation of the farmer-peasants. The illiteracy rate
was the highest in Italy, the living standard the lowest,
and the reliance upon myths of the Church was perhaps the
strongest belief structure.
The first attempts at land reform came with the unifi-
cation of Italy in 160. The House of Savoy upon the defeat
or conquest of the South confiscated all the Church holdings
and thought about their redistribution. Before much could
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be accomplished, however, the fall of the Paris Bourse in
1867 demanded that the State raise capital internally to
repay the holders of Italian Bonds. The State proceeded with
the sale of their Southern confiscations. Those who could
afford to purchase the lands for cash, which was what the
State needed, were not the peasants but another class of
wealthy, this time secular. The latifondo system was thus
continued into Fascism, with brief consolidations occurring
each time there was an economic crisis forcing smaller
landlords to sell or mortgage their land, eventually to
be foreclosed upon (Bertolucci; Seton-Watson; Levi;
Vittorini).
The PCI supported the land reform policy for two dis-
tinct reasons--the ideological committment to redistribu-
tion of means of production on the one hand and a political
reason on the other. In the post-War interim, their strength
was in the North in the industrial cities of Milan, Turin,
Genoa, Bologna, etc. These were the regions where the Par-
tisans had fought the hardest, were the best organized, and
had in fact driven out the Germans and established local
and regional governments before the arrival of Allied
troops. Their base of power was what placed them into the
series of provisional governments between 1945 and 1947,
and gave the PCI and PSI equivalent status to the DC in
the writing of the Constitution.
The South, on the other hand, was the battleground of
the American and British troops and the seat of Badoglio's
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government in exile. It was a mixed up place after the War,
dominated by Monarchists, Centrists, and believers in the
Church (Lewis). In the 1947 referendum, the largest pro-
portion of the 10,000,000 who voted to retain the Monarchy
were from the South.
A fear of the PCI and PSI was that their potential and
real voting strength in the North would be eroded by the
rapid influx of religious Christian-Democrats into the wor-
king classes of the northern industrial cities. Also,
because of the relative poverty of the South, wage
demands would be lower, potentially undercutting the eco-
nomic positions of their constituency and splitting the
working classes. This fear resulted in a carrot and stick
approach, advocating on the one hand land reform and on
the other tacitly agreeing to the maintenance of the Fascist
Anti-Urbanization laws.
The Christian-Democrats, on the other hand, were caught
in another paradcx of their position. They believed (as
mentioned) in the continued ruralization of the poor, but
had to weigh this against the demands of their other consti-
tuents, the landholders and industrialists. When empowered
by the 1948 elections to deal with the issue, non-action
became the resultant policy. What land reform was carried
out had two characteristics. Land that was acquired by the
government was done so by negotiation, not expropriation
(as expropriation laws were not yet resolved). The land
was purchased from those landholders with DC contacts who
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wished to rid themselves of non-profitable land. Here Mario
Einaudi again comments:
"Equally sound, even if excessively slow, has been the
approach to land reform. Christian-Democracy has re-
fused to narrow the issue to one of a mere formal and
precipitate redistribution of land. The redistribution of
mostly arid and unproductive land is not a step forward.
(There is no really good land that can be redistributed.
When an 'agrarian problem' exists in such fertile areas
as the lower Po Valley, the task must chiefly be called
that of establishment of cooperative techniques.) What
the landless and impoverished Italian farmer wants is
not to acquire a property title to an acre of desert
land, but to establish a fruitful relationship (which
often could be other than a property relationship) to
an acre of watered and green land on which some decent
shelter has been built." (Einaudi, 1952, op. 64 & 65)
(emphasis added)
Land reform was a target of DC patronage, combined with
what must be considered as a classic Liberal interpretation
of circumstances. Peasant-farmers (and I use the word
peasant not in a derogatory sense, but only to connote the
realities of the situation) were offered land, acre by acre,
with terms of 5 per cent, 30-year mortgages to the govern-
ment, an amount that was probably too high for most to keep
up with and significantly change their standard of living.
The slow implementation of the program was also encour-
aged by the lack of the Constitutional Court and the unre-
solved expropriation issue. Expropriation and zoning land
for public purposes (implying zero value and the necessity
of expropriation) were legal issues which were in abeyance
until the Constitutional Court convened. Even after that,
as the implementation of the 167 program will show, it has
remained less than resolved. Because of the inability of
the government to easily take title to land and their unwil-
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lingness to antagonize their supporters, little was done.
In fact, by 1959 less than 35 per cent of the funds put
aside for land reform had been expended ( After
1957 and the PCI shift of position, the issue and the pro-
gram were laid to rest. In this period, the PCI began to
favor the northern migration of peasant farmers; they
quietly dropped their concern with the land reform program.
Since there was no great committment by the DC party to its
implementation, nothing more was done (Fried, 1967; Einaudi;
Amendola; et al.).
It was in the cultural moment of the dopoguerra, the
context of governmental organization, of the establishment
of the basis of regulation and of mass migration, that
planners in Rome began the preparation of a new Master Plan
for Rome, a process that was to minimally take 12 years
while the parties and governments were concerned with their
own struggles for power. The town planning of Rome was the
major issue of planners and architects of the decade but,
as Amendola points out in 1977, it was not a major party
issue or success.
"I have purposely not included [in my 30-year history]
the various laws concerning agriculture, the schools and
city planning, because these laws have been partial
measures, at times going in the right direction, but
not yet such as to permit us to speak of agrarian reform,
school reform, and urban reform, thus offering a more
consistent picture of democratic development."
(Amendola, p. 27)
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The Making of the 1962 Plan
After the Liberation in 1944, the National Institute of
Urbanism (INU) offered their services to the CLN (Comitato
di Liberazione Nazionale) provisions government and esta-
blished a special planning commission of the government
staffed by three anti-Fascist members--Piccinato, Della
Rocca and Tedeschi. The commission began looking into op-
tions for a new planning process and Master Plan for Rome.
On October 26, 1946, the commission presented their propo-
sals for revision to the 1931 Master Plan to the CLN
(Benevolo, 1959). Their position was that a new plan was
necessary in order to manage the growth expected of Rome in
a manner consistent with the new governing of the City
(at that time still uncertain) and to rectify the problems
which had occurred before and during the War. The end of
the proposal offers the services of the INU to the City
Government.*
In the city elections of November 10, the governing of
Rome took a turn for the worse. The following members were
*Benevolo implies that the proposal was prepared by the
INU outside the government; Fried and Piccinato infer that
at that time the INU were staffing the City Planning office.
Since the government was provisional and a coalition of all
anti-Fascist parties, it seems likely that in fact both
could be true. A change occurred several days after the
election, placing the INU definitely outside of the Planning
Department.
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elected to the City Council:
310
1946 ROME CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS
% of
Party Seats Seats
PCI and PSI 30 37.5
PRI (anticlericals) 6 7.5
DC 17 21.3
PLI (conservatives) 4 5.0
Qualunquisti 17 21.3
Monarchists 5 6.3
Local 1 1.1
Total 80 100.0%
Left without a majority, the DC party refused to cooper-
ate with the PSI and PCI, creating a stalemate in the coun-
cil. To resolve the situation, the Council was dissolved
and a Prefectorial Commissioner--dottore Mario De Cesare--
was pppointed by the State. De Cesare was to serve until
November 4th, 1947, when another election was held which
gave the DC party 32.8 per cent of the vote (against 20
per cent previously), or enough for them to form a Center
coalition, avoiding cooperation with the Left. The coali-
tion included the Social Democrats (PSDI--a splinter of the
PSI), the Liberals (PLI), the Qualunquisti, and three
neo-Fascists (MSI). An engineer, dottore Salvatore
Rebecchini,*was elected by the Council to the position of
Mayor. He was to hold this position until 1956.
The rejection of the Left's right to participate in the
government caused the INU members who had been staffing the
*Rebecchini was the son of Gaetano Rebecchini, an archi-
tect. He thus entered office with strong contacts in both
professions, architecture and engineering.
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Planning Department* to leave, precipitating the reversion
of city planning "by inertia...to the policies, personnel,
and practices in vogue before the fall of Fascism" (Fried,
1973, p. 251). The INU was left to act on its own behalf
and for the next five years to continually advocate for a
new Master Plan. In a journal, "Metron" (No. 23-24 of
1948), there was a long unsigned article Benevolo attri-
butes to Piccinato (an eminent architect/planner), together
with a proposal for a new Master Plan prepared by Della
Rocca, Guidi, Sterbini, Malpeli, Piccinato, DeRenzi and
Ridolfi. The plan has much in common with the later plan
put forward by the CET, although it leaves off elements such
as the Gran Raccordo Anulare. The article begins with the
following statement:
"It's enough to look at the tragedy in the borgate,
misery, death, morbidity, the lack of housing already
before the dark courtyards, destructed green zone,
insufficient schools, hospitals, inadequate transit,
etc.; but in compensation, monumental palaces, fori,
collosal stations, etc...."
It goes on to discuss the following issues and major prob-
lem areas:
- the structure of the existing plan is inadequate for
current circumstances;
- the Piano Particoloreggiati already approved have
changed the nature of the plan itself;
- the building regulations are inadequate;
- the new plan could provide distinct advantages for a
new democratic government;
- the severe problem of the people living in the
barracche, and others in caves;
- the problem of planning for an administrative city--
*Actions such as this give clues to the political affili-
ations of the INU and its members. It is likely that
Piccinato, Della Rocca and Tedeschi were in agreement with
the Left, PCI or PSI.
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residential, touristic, and a little industrial (in
that order);
- The problem of auto transportation and the preserva-
tion of the historic center; and
- The problem of finishing the Metro.
Little occurred as a result of these demands and the
offer by INU until 1951, when the City Council passed a
resolution outlining a few goals for the development of the
City, primarily noting their commitment to preservation
of the historic center.* The resolution followed the third
regional conference of the INU, which outlined not only the
growing need for a new Master Plan, but the steps necessary
to prepare a plan. These included the establishment of a
special office outside the planning department which would
be governed by representatives of interest groups, State
Ministries, Rome officials, and a number of planners
appointed by the INU.
The special office, USNPR (Ufficio Speciale per il
Nuovo Piano Regolatore), was not established for two years,
and great credit must be given to Leone Cattani. Cattani,
a lawyer and former president of the INU, was elected from
the PLI to the City Council in the elections of May 1952.
He was then appointed "assessore" of planning, the politi-
cal head of the Planning Department.** In the following
*In the same month, they approved a major project, the
Via Vittorio Tunnel, to be constructed near the Piazza di
Spagna, in direct conflict with the earlier resolution. The
project was later stopped by the State Minister of Public
Works, acting as a reaction to outcries from the public,
press, and INU.
**Every government department has a councillor "asses-
sore" as their chief officer. The structure of City Govern-
ment is similar to the parliamentary State Government, where
each department is headed by a Minister.
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year, he secured the approval of the City Council to appoint
an independent body, formed along the lines that the INU
had suggested, to prepare the new Master Plan.* By March of
1953, he had used his position in Council to attack the
rash of illegal and disorganized land subdivision and
building that had been occurring and to secure the establish-
ment of the USNPR.
Starting the USNPR was aided by an action of the
Province Qf Rome--the establishment of a regional planning
commission. The regional commission was chaired by Presi-
dent Sotgiu and included councillors Cattani, Bruno, and
Salinari, as well as "technicians"--Piccinato, Zevi, Quaroni,
Ridolfi (all architects) and an engineer, Ferrari. Although
the program of the commission was not approved by the -
regional council in December of that year, their existence,
it coild be speculated, put enough pressure on the City
for them to form their own commission, lest the Province
exercise its constitutional right to dissolve the city
administration and impose its own plan (Benevolo, 1959,
p. 107).
In the process, which would mean considerably more regu-
*A law of 1952 had extended the validity of the 1931
plan until 1955, as it had been about to expire. Master
Plans, by the 1942 law, have limited lives, although they
are the only land use controls which exist. Even though a
city may be in the process of preparing a plan, the old
plan may in fact expire. In practice, governments do not
like to allow this to occur, as the anarchy which would pre-
sumably result is generally feared. Governments thus extend
plans, at least to maintain the jobs of the planning regu-
lators, who would be out of work should a plan expire. The
Rome plan was extended four times--1952, 55, 58, & 61.
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lation of subdivision and building in the City. Cattani
incurred the wrath of many land speculators and housing
developers including, no doubt, the Vatican through their
landholding subsidiary, SGI, who were the supporters of
the DC government. The resultant political pressure, cha-
nelled through the DC government of Rebecchini, forced
Cattani's resignation as planning assessore in June 1953
(Fried, 1973, p. 306 & 251). Cattani was replaced in
November by another Liberal, Enzo Storoni, who, although
not a former INU member, was close friends with the INU
leadership. Also, in December the Council was to begin the
debate of principles (or of goals) for the new plan. The
issues included residential density limitations, decentra-
lization, and preservation in the historic center.
Storoni, with the INU, set up a voluntary commission
consisting of Baldo de Rossi, Anversa, Baccin, Benevolo,
Giorgio Calza-Bini, Carbonara, Della Rocca, Fiorintino,
Lenti, Muratori, and Quaroni (Benevolo, 1959, p. 109)
to discuss the task at hand and prepare directions for the
USNPR. In a memo from the group, Quaroni calls for a new
and culturally based methodology, including two activities:
- A long term planning exercise to examine in detail the
necessary provisions of the Master Plan; and
- A short term plan, to be more general, but to replace
the 1931 plan as soon as possible.
These items--process and content--were becoming major
press items, resulting from current high density residen-
tial developments, built often illegally and without ade-
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quate planning at the edge of the old city, continuing the
"macchia d'olio" (oil splotch) pattern of city growth,
a horror to planners and even worse to live in. There was
already a significant private redevelopment occurring
within the historic center and increasing auto ownership
compounding traffic problems, destroying some of the visual
qualities and changing its "traditional" artisan and small
shop character. This redevelopment was responding to the
already rapid influx of tourists, particularly from the
United States.* The habit of center city redevelopment began
under Fascism, where it was encouraged by the massive cut-
ting of streets and associated need to rebuild the blocks
partially or totally destroyed in the process (Fried, 1973;
Benevolo, 1959; Insolera).
The INU-USNPR special commission also proposed that the
Council create a two-tier hierarchy of committees--a Grand
Commission (GC) which would have representatives of State,
Provincial, and Local governments, as well as profession-
als; and that a technical support group be created, separate
from USNPR. By May, the City Council decided upon a mandate
for the new plan, and in July they voted to establish the
Grand Commission, named the Consiglio Generale (it will be
referred to as the Grand Commission or the GC hereinafter),
as well as a technical committee, the CET (Comitato di
Elaborazione Tecnica).
*The devaluations of the lira made Italy a cheap place
to visit. Dollars could buy much more they had been able
to previously.
The Grand Council
a) Prcsideite: il Siidaco di Roma;
b) per 1la, Giunta Municipalc:
I'Assessore all'Urbanistica;
l'Assessore alle Antichith e Belle Arti;
l'Assessore ai Lavori Pubblici;
l'Assessore all'Avvocatura;
I'Assessore al Tecnologico;
l'Assessore all'Igiene e Sanita.
Gli altri Assessori parteciperanno, su invito del Sindaco, per le (uestioiii
di loro competenza;
c) per il Consiglio Comunitale: 14 Consiglieri Coiunili (S di Maggioranzam
e 6 di Minoranza);
d) per gli Uffici Comunali:
il Segretario Generale del Comune;
il Direttore di Ripartizione Capo dell'Ufficio Tciiico;
il Direttore Capo di Ripartizione preposto all'Ufficio Speciale de P.l1.;
il Capo dell'Avvocatura;
l'Ufficiale Sanitario;
il Vice Direttore preposto all'Urbanistica (lHipartizione ');
it Capo della Divisione Urbanistica (IIipartizione V);
'Architetto Dirigente addetto all'Uficio Speciale (deli inovo 1'.I.;
it Dirigente Tecnico del Servizio Statistica del Coimune;
e) per i Ministeri, Enti e Istituti vari:
un rappresentante dlel Ministero dei 1L.PP. (Dir. Gen. dell'Urban j):
un rappresentante del Ministero delle Finnanze (Dir. Gen. dl iDemiaiio);
un rappresentante dele Mlinistero delle Finanze (Dir. Gen. del Catasto);
uin rappresentante del Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia;
in rappresentante del Ministero della Pbblien Istruzioine;
un rappresentante del Ministero della Difesa (Esercito);
un rappresentante del Ministero della Difesa (Aeroiatica);
un rappresentante del Ministero Industria e Comiercio;
un rappresentante del Ministero della Marina Mercantile;
un rappresentante del Ministero delle Poste e Teleconinicazioni;
un rappresentante dell'Alto Commissariato di Igiene e Sanith;
un rappresentante designato dal Consiglio Provinciale di Roia;
un rappresentante del Vicariato di Roma;
un rappresentante del Consiglio di Stato;
il Presidente del C.O.N.I.;
il Presidente della Sezione Urbanistica del Consiglio Superiore dei
LL.PP.;
il Provveditore alle Opere Pubbliche per il Lazio;
ii Sovraintendente alle Antichithi e Belle Arti;
il Sovraintendente ai Monumenti del Lazio;
un rappresentante dell'Ispettorato Agrario Provimciale;
3.12
n'Ingegnere -Uapo d'ell'Uflicio del Genio Civile per i Tcvcre e l'Agro
Romano;
l'Ingegnere Capo dell'Ufficio del Genio Civile delle Opere Edilizie della
Capitale;
il Capo Compartiicnto dell'A.N.A.S. per il Lazio;
it Irovvcditore agli Studi;
ii Direttore Coiipartimientale dclle Ferrovie dtello Stato;
l'Ispettore Compartinientale delta Mlotorizzazione Civile;
un rappreseitante della Camera di Commercio;
un rappresent.an,te dell'Ente Provinciale per ii Turisio;
il Commissario Straordinario dell'E.U.R.;
il Presidente dell'Istituto Case Popolari;
un rappresentante tecnico dell'I.N.C.I.S.;
il Capo dell'Ufficio Teenico dell'Amministrazione Provinciale;
in rappresentante dell'Accademia di S. Lucia;
in rapprescntante del Centro di Studi di Storia dell'Architettura;
un rappresentante dell'Istituto di Sindi Itomani;
(li.. raippresenhitnt i delaII Stampait1i citadit, di cii 1111o scelto dal Coi-
siglio C(omuniioale su terina I orv(Iispo)t i1 41111 1 1('Il I ' te ell'A40ciazione
.e11a Sn i1111n11 Ibmliaaii o 1111o demigiiato da1 ca ergoria lti eroiisti;
Sei N embri eser mi efetivi della Comiiiiissioie Urmimimica oinmiiale;i iove Mleimibri esternii effeulivi della Comisiisi.4ioie Fdilizia Comiiiiiiale.
11 Dircu. orc Capo lIipartizione, preposio all'Jllicio Speciale del i nutovo
Piaio Regolatlore, assolverai le fiuinzionmi (i Segreltario della Coninissioic.
L'on. Sindaco, Presidente della Conmissione, avra facolth di invitare,
per esprimere pareri su speciali questioni, rappresentanti di altri Enti
non specificatamente indicati.
The CET
Assessore all Urbaiistica: Delegato del Simdaco, Presidente;
- Nuimero 8 esperti urbainisti da nominarsi dal Consiglio Coimunale
iel 111odo che segie:
-- numcro 2 scelti st die terne di tre nominativi predisposte dalla
UniversitO di Roma, rispettivamnte, l'una dalla FacoltA d'Ingegneria
e l'altra dalla Facolta di Architettura;
- numero 2 scelti da una rosa di sei nominativi predisposta dall'Or-
dine degli Ingegneri di Roma e Provincia;
- numero 2 scelti da una rosa di sei nominativi predisposta dall'Or-
dine degli Architetti di Roma e del Lazio;
- numero 2 scelti da una rosa di sei nominativi predisposta dall'Isti-
tuto Nazionale di Urbanistica;
Direttore di Ripartizione Capo dell'Ufficio Teciico: Segretario;
Architetto Dirigente dell'Ufficio Speciale del nuovo Piano Regolatore:
Vice Segretario.
GC/ICET0
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A full membership of the Grand Council (Valori, p.
129-130) included a total of 82 members: 6 assessores,
14 councillors, 9 city "functionaries," 38 representatives
of State Ministries and ppublc corporations, and 9 non-
bureaucratic members of the City Planning Commission. The
councillors selected were to include 6 opposition party
representatives [6 out of 14, or 43 per cent, is less than
the current opposition represented in the City Council
(55 per cent)]. The CET was composed of 8 professional city
planners,* the city engineer, and the technical director of
the USNPR, Enzo Storoni. (also assessore). Of the 8 members
of the CET, one is closely identified with the Left, another
with the Neo-Fascists" (Fried, 1973, p. 157 & 307).
The charge ofl the City Council, voted unanimously in
May, was that the Master Plan take the following nine posi-
tions:
1. Conservation of the historic center and its
'validity';
2. 'Gradual decentralization of 'certain' activities;
3. A maximum density of 750 inhabitants per hectare in
the new residential districts;**
*Enrico Lenti
Roberto Marino Ordine degli Ingegneri
Luigi Piccinato Ordine degli ArchitettiVincenzo Monaco
Ludovico Quaroni Istituto di Urbanistica (INU)Saverio Muratori
Giuseppi Nicolosi Facolta di Ingegneria
Enrico del Debbio Facolta di Architettura
(Valori, p. 132)
From current knowledge, Quaroni and Piccinato have both
been associated with the Left. Muratori, del Debbio and
Nicolosi Were all prominent professionals under Fascism.
**Equivalent: 300 persons per acre. Compares with the
English maximum density
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4. Promotion of industrial development;
5. Provision of 'adequate' green zones in and around
the city;
6. Prosecution of illegal subdividers and regulariza-
tion of existing illegal subdivisions;
7. Elimination of tax-exempt status for unauthorized
(illegal) residential construction;
8. Continued expansion of the City through conventions
with private subdividers and possibly through city
land condemnation; and
9. Promotion in Parliament of a tax on capital gains
from land. (Fried, 1973, pp. 306 & 307)
In October, the Grand Commission and the CET began their
work on the preparation of the new Master Plan. In the eight
years since the INU first demanded the plan, Rome had con-
tinued to be developed publically, privately, and illegally.
The Planning Department, understaffed and unhappy with the
attention and resources committed for the USNPR and CET,
made little effort to regulate or draw new Piano Particolo-
reggiati which were consistent with any of the goals of
either the plan or the planning process. The City was, for
all practical purposes, without a Master Plan. Although the
first proposal of the CET was proposed by 1955, it is neces-
sary to review what had been happening in Rome since 1946
to understand the problems which developed and led even-
tually to the rejection of the CET plan.
Sabotage: The Continuation of the Macchia d'Olio
An estimated half a million people are recorded as
moving to or being born in the City between 1939 and 1954,*
bringing the total to 1.8 millions (d'Arrigo/Fried, 1973).
Rebecchini, an engineer by trade, had been actively pur-
*The estimate is conservative, as the Fascist Anti-
Urbanization laws were still in effect.
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suing a policy of intense activity in public works, inclu-
ding an aquaduct, 111 schools with 2020 classrooms,* the
completion of Via Conciliazione (1950), the Stazione Termini
(1951), with the first Metro station connecting to EUR
and Ostia (1955), the rebuilding of EUR as a residential and
governmental office center, as well as the reorganization
of the public utilities services of sewer, water, lights,
roads, and public transport.
The period of growth that Rebecchini was reacting to by
his emphasis on infrastructure was supported by both public
and private housing development. In 1952, the public housing
sector reached the peak level of its construction rate, with
most of the INA-Casa developments underway. These projects
listed in the table below were built on land chosen, accor-
ding to one of the architects, Ludovico Quaroni, somewhat
arbitrarily, based upon where the lowest acquistion cost
was to be found. Arrangements similar to those made by the
Gerini family at Tuscolano are not confirmed for the other
sites--however, they are suspected (Quaroni,
Pineschi, Insolera). It is clear from looking at a map
that neither were the INA-Casa sites rationally laid out
across the city, nor do they conform to the 1931 or new
Master Plan principles.
As the periphery of Rome was being developed with
these public projects, more often than not of a quality as
good if not better than the conventional private development
*More than half the number currently in Boston.
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MAJOR POST-WAR HOUSING PROJECTS
Project/Architects Developer Population Source(s)
Villa Gordiani/
IACP
San Basilio
Fiorintino/IACP
Tiburtino IV/
Quaroni,
Ridolfi,
Fiorintino, et al.
Tuscolano, incl.
Cinnecitta/
DiRenzi,
Muratori
Libera
Valco San Paolo/
DiRenzi,
Muratori
Torre Spaccata/
Marconi
Ponte Mamminolo/
Vaccaro,
Vagnetti
Centocelle
IACP
UNRRA-
Casas/
IACP
INA-Casa
INA-Casa/
private
INA-Casa
INA-Casa
INA-Casa
Private
5-10,000
10,000-IACP
1,000-UNRRA-
Casas
4,000
50,000
5-10,000
5-10,000
1-2,000
10-20,000
Urbanistica
28/29
INO (1956),
Site Visit
Quaroni
Files,
Site Visit
Urbanistica
28/29
Urbanistica
28/29
Urbanistica
28/29
Urbanistica
28/29
Urbanistica
28/29
TOTAL 117,000
(max)
of the time, there was beginning an exodus of persons from
the historic center. These people were leaving either
willfully, looking for a more modern flat--private most
likely--or because forces of the tourist industry and rede-
veloping center city had removed their livelihood and hence
their ability to remain (Ronchi). These middle- and lower-
314 a
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middle-classes were to become the dominate population of the
developing periphery. The infrastructure programs of
Rebecchini were still not enough to keep up with the fast
growing areas, particularly in light of the fact that little
control over the location of the new developments was exer-
cised.
Private developments clustered along the major roads or
near the new INA-Casa developments as a result of the access
and infrastructure. If the INA-Casa developments could have
been controlled, it might have been possible to more effec-
tively plan even the location of new infrastructure, but its
national agency status gave INA-Case legal immunity from any
planning regulations Rome might have had. It is only coin-
cidental and paradoxical that their architects were many of
the same people who were preparing the new Master Plan.
Another event which appeared in Rome commencing in 1952
was the Gran Raccordo Anulare, the ring road, approximately
13 miles in diameter (cf. Boston, Houston). The GRA was
planned by the State Ministry of Public Works; constructed
and managed by an IRI subsidiary, ANAS. Both of these agen-
cies had at the top of their list of priorities not the
health of Rome (Piccinato, p. 189), but the industrial lo-
cation pattern they were creating in the country, the neces-
sary connections between the concentration of industrial
development just South of Rome, and the industrial and
consumption centers in the North--the Milan-Turin region and
Europe, which was the first major market for Italian goods
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after the War. Although the GRA shows up in the early
(1953 and 1954) Master Plan sketch proposals, it was a
given, not a variable. The eventual proposal of the Asse
Attrezzattowas to made essentially redundant before it
reached the drawing boards.
These actions, but a few of the events which were occur-
ring in Rome in the early 50s, were to make the preparation
of the Master Plan more rather than less difficult, as they
pitted the interests of one agency against another and one
group of interests against another. To further complicate
the issue, the creation of two additional planning agencies,
the CET and the USNPR, generated a degree of tension and
competitiveness between them and the planning department
which resulted in forms of non-cooperation. For instance,
the planning department, with the hopeless task of regula-
ting the private development of Rome and planning new infra-
structure, was not at all sympathetic with new types of
planning processes which would increase their burden and
reacted by not actively prohibiting new development on
areas which the USNPR or CET planners were reserving for
intensive building or open space. The Planning Department
and USNPR, agencies of Rome's government, were dominated by
DC forces, while the CET, supported by the INU, was mixed,
including several members of Left parties.
The political events of the eight years were similarly
not disconnected from the planning and growth events which
were occurring. The DC party, with a minority government in
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the City Council, were closely allied with the landholding
interests, which included seven persons and/or
firms and the Vatican, which in all held 5,100 hectares of
buidlable land (5% of the area inside the 1931 plan; now
15% of the buildable area). Less planning and less restric-
tion were in the short term interests of these people and
their supporting party. As such, any techniques which would
stall the commencement of a new plan were looked upon favor-
ably. While it is not possible to point directly to events
caused by such sabotage, the general slowness of action, the
resignation of Cattani, and the making of major decisions
outside the planning process are ample evidence of these
forces at work. The forces become more clearly aligned in
the discussions about the content of the Master Plan pro-
posals, a discussion which was to range from 1954, when the
CET presented thier first proposal, to 1962, when a final
plan was approved. There were at least 11 different propo-
sals in the interim--6 by the CET, 3 by the City Council
through the USNPR, one by an independent architect, Cafiero,
and one by INU. The next section looks at the'development
of these plans.
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LAND OWNERSHIP IN ROME, 1953-54
Family/Company
1
Gerini (Alessandro
and Isabella)
Romolo Vaselli
Fratelli Lancellotti
Antonio Scalera
Lanza Family
Talenti Family
Societa Generale
Immobiliare
City of Rome
850
242
700
883
675
500
Hectares
2
850
1,045
720
883
662
270
675
(- Not listed)
1. Benevolo, 1959, p. 118, from
City Council (buildable land
testimony of Storoni
only).
2. Insolera, pp. 182 & 183, from Councillor Aldo Natoli,
"Il Sacco di Roma," Roma, 1954 (figures from 1953).
3. Fried, 1973, p. 116, from Comune di Roma, "Decisioni del
Consiglio Comunale in Ordine alla Urbanistica Cittadina
e al Nouvo Piano Regolatore," Rome, 1955, pp. 84-85.
Calculated by the author into hectares from acres
@ .4047 ha/ac.
Area inside 1883 Master Plan Boundary
Area inside 1909 Master Plan Boundary
Area inside 1931 Master Plan Boundary
Area inside 1962 Master Plan Boundary
1,350 hectares
0.8% total
2,700 hectares
1.7% total
26,550 hectares
17.0% total
156,177 hectares
100.0% total
3.15
3
860
245
708
894
682
506
in
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The Plan Proposals 1955 -62
The struggle to have a Master Plan for the city approved
can be characterized as two struggles--one to reintroduce
into the actions of the City Planning Department the concept
of governmental intervention and the second to introduce
for the first time effective land use regulation. For both
intentions, voiced by the CET, there were political objec-
tions and organizational hindrances. Intervention had never
been the terrain of the City Planning Department, but rather
the Public Works Department and the National Government,
which invariably was the provider of funds. Intervention
had been used by the Fascists for political purposes and to
propose a new style of intervention based upon democratic
principles seemed a contradiction that the Center was unwil-
ling to support, leaving as advocates for the concept the
Left and the professional planners.
Similarly, regulation--although agreed by all as neces-
sary--was not supported by the private sector, for whom it
would mean restriction on the potential income from land.
Since the regulations in effect in the early 1950s were
minimal, if followed at all, any increase in regulation or
the enforcement of regulation would mean effective downzoning
of many areas. It can be assumed that those for whom greater
regulation would mean a loss of income let this be known to
their political representatives, usually the DC party or
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far right Monarchists or Neo-Fascists (MSI). The concept
of city planning and the potential roles of public city
planners thus became an increasingly political struggle, at
least by association, if not by affiliation.
Spatially, this struggle represented itself as a con-
flict between two concepts of city growth, a continuation
of the macchia d'olio, and a change to a pattern of isolated
growth in certain areas, potentially decentralized. These
two patterns were to be represented by the 1959 plan propo-
sal prepared by the USNPR on behalf of the city, and the
CET plans of 1957. The CET plans offered an alternative to
the outward-spreading macchia d'olio, which had been the
predominate form which the City had taken since the 1870s.
Their position was that the only method of change was the
institution of severe development of restrictions in certain
areas (the West, Via Appia Antica, for instance) and in
conjunction with the massive intervention in other areas
creating a catalyst for new development controlled by the
public sector through their ownership of land.
This two-prong policy would eliminate the harmful
effects of land speculation in the new development areas
by virtue of their public ownership and severely limit
profits in other areas by the land use restrictions. With
few exceptions, this policy was successfully obstructed--
at least through 1972--by the conservative, landed forces
in the City, and the City and State bureaucracies who were
not favorably inclined either to step on the toes of their
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supporters or support a new system which proposed a new type
of work for them involving much greater effort. It was only
when the Socialist party joined the City government in 1962
and the National Cabinet in 1963 that the obstruction was
partially removed.
The only other Western city which has successfully
overcome this type of opposition in an effective manner has
been London, with the establishment of the Green Belt and
associated New Towns circumventing the city. Effective
regulation and national, or at least regional,growth con-
trol seems a necessary factor, however.
The work of the CET in the first year was dominated by
the debate about the location of allowed growth for the city
There were two opposing factions--the Left, who wanted to
see the city continue to grow to the East, preventing any
other directions, and the Conservatives, who wanted to see
any direction but East. The CET almost unanimously opposed
any plan which would continue to allow Rome to grow in an
uncontrolled manner in all directions, and the Grand Commis-
sion supported this contention.
By November 1955, the GC had reviewed two sets of reso-
lutions prepared by the CET, one in January and one in the
summer. A unanimous vote was taken (nevertheless, there
were only 55 of the original 812 who voted) on the direction
of growth issue, which established the following growth
targets per sector:
40% of the city's growth would be directed South;
30% to the East;
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15% to the North; and
15% to the West, in sectors shown on the attached map.*
This decision underscores the political nature of the
plan-making process more closely and clearly than any other
of its aspects, such as the preservation of the historic
center, to which there was general agreement. The East of
Rome has been labeled by Fried as the slum direction. In
fact, it was the area of the city isolated or separated by
a series of institutions--the Pol clinico, the Campo Verano
Cemetery,-the Citta Universitaria, and the rail lines.
In this district, seen on the following map, the lower
and middle classes had been moving in great numbers since the
end of the War. The area also includes the Fascist Borgate
of San Basilio, Prenestino, Pietralata, Tiburtino III, San
Giordiano, and others stretching to the South. The area
was the least well served by city infrastructure, by trans-
portation, and by city services. It was (and still is)
dominated by a political commitment to the parties of the
Left, the PCI and PSI and other minor parties. There is
hardly a neighborhood one can walk into today without seeing
a PCI or PSI storefront local headquarters.
The commitment by planners and Left politicians towards
an eastern growth was intended to be a means to develop the
urban infrastructure necessary in the area to prevent its
continuation as an area deprived of even adequate services.
Growth in any other direction would divert resources away
*The Left had 34% of the vote in the City Council at the
time, roughly equivalent to the 30% East that was agreed
upon.
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from the area which would then only accelerate the differen-
tial between those classes already living in the area and
those living in the other "new" areas.* Additionally, since
over 60 per cent of the recent growth of the city had been
in the East, they felt it was the direction of "natural"
growth and should be supported by further encouragement and
services construction. There was a large industrial area
designated on the outer edge of the eastern Tiburtino quar-
ter (planied initially under Fascism) which would be drawing
on the new residents as potential employees.
The Center, however, didn't entirely agree. Their con-
cerns, as usually befits the Liberal mind, were for more
choice and less constrictive policies, while still claiming
to favor selective growth over an allowance of the continued
seeping of the macchia d'olio. They also saw the prohibi-
tion of the use of EUR as a residential area as being con-
trary to good sense. It was a desirable area, there was
already considerable public infrastructure, there had been
some growth in that direction already, and the subway and
government offices were moving in. As well, it was an area
where there had been little development to date and, as
such, to promote development in that direction would afford
not only opportunities for private interests, but would allow
a new planning policy to start "from scratch."
*The area is unmistakably lower class in inhabitation,
but in no way can be considered as a slum in the American
connotations of the term. There is no lack of investment
in the area nor is there a lack of personal care by residents
over the spaces, public and private (GBK observations,
November 1978).
A. The conservative planning coalition in Rome (1957-62)
1. Professional planning groups
uRIA (Union of Roman Engineers and Architects)
2. Conservative press
It Tempo ("independent" Liberal-Fascist)
11 Giornale d'Italia ("independent" Liberal-Fascist)
11 Secolo (Neofascist party)
L'Osservatore Romano (semiofficial Vatican)
11 Quotidiano (Catholic Action)
Momento Sera (Catholic "independent")
Il Popolo (Dc party)
11 Globo (Confederation of Industry)
3. Conservative business groups
Landowners (unorganized)
ACER (Rome Building Contractors Association)
APER (Rome Property Owners Association)
Union of Roman Industry (Confindustria)
Provincial Agrarian Union
Provincial Federation of Small Farmers (Coltivatori Diretti)
Union of Roman Merchants
sGi and other real estate corporations
4. Religious groups
Vicariate
Catholic Action
Most religious orders
(also Catholic interest groups such as Coltivatori Diretti and sG[)
5. Conservative parties and factions
Christian Democratic party (Dc)
"Primavera" faction
Liberal party (PLI)
Monarchist parties
Neofascist party (MsI)
6. Institutional interest groups
Ministry of Public Works: Urban Planning Bureau and Section; ANAS (State
Highway Corp.)
Ministry of the Interior
Ministry of Defense: Civil Aviation Bureau
Ministry of Agriculture: Provincial Agrarian Inspectorate
Ministry of Merchant Marine: Maritime Domain
CONI: Italian Olympic Committee
INCIS (State Employees Housing Agency)
EUR
B. The progressive planning coalition
1. Professional planning groups
Union of Catholic Technicians (uciT)
Italia Nostra preservation society
IN/arch (progressive architects)
INU (National Planning Institute) and its Lazio section
SAU (interideological architect and planner society, 1960)
UIA (International Union of Architects)
2. Leftist and moderate press organs
L'Uniti (Communist party)
Paese and Paese Sera (paracommunist)
Avanti! (Socialist)
La Giustizia (Social Democrat)
11 Mondo (Radical weekly)
L'Espresso (Radical weekly)
Il Messaggero (moderate-conservative)
3. Leftist parties
Communists
Socialists
Social Democrats (in theory)
Republicans
Radicals
4. Left factions in the Christian Democratic party
Fanfani faction
Base faction
5. Progressive interest groups
UoI (Union of Italian Women, Communist)
Building workers union (Communist)
UGC (Union of Catholic Jurists)
ACLI (Catholic workers association)
Rome Chamber of Labor (Communist)
Planning Coalitions
Un
3.18
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not so much in favor of growth only to the south as they
were against forcing growth to the east only.
The Conservatives, on the other hand (which has inclu-
ded a branch of the DC party, as well as the MSI and
Monarchists), were adamantly against favoring growth to the
East and favored, as did the Center, less regulation* and
more dispersion. According to Fried (1973, p. 145), they
"could reasonably argue that people came to live in the
eastern sections because they could not afford to live
elsewhere -[and] could not see why middle-class groups should
be forced to build and live across the tracks."
The compromise solution, the proportional system which
promised the Left a percentage of the city's growth in their
deisred direction, was a de facto decision to continue the
general outward growth of the city. Stopping the macchia
d'olio was now a task which had to be addressed by other
means--the detailed zoning of certain areas, the reservation
of land as open space, ahd prohibitions against the inten-
sive development of the agricultural Agro Romano. These
measures took form in the following resolutions of the CET,
discussed and approved by the GC:
*"Conservatives considered these proposals to be an
illegitimate construction of and interference with property
rights and legitimate vested interests" (Fried, p. 48).
This was particularly true, as there was no convention for
compensating owners of land zoned down to low density or low
intensity uses, particularly park/open land. This was a
particular problem for Alessandro Gerini, a State Senator
who had already made quite a fortune in the east at
Cinecitta/Tuscolano and was now interested in developing the
area along the Via Appia Antica, most of which he owned.
He was to be prevented from developing the historic area,
however, not without a long fight. It was him and others
similar who were even against the CET planning from the
start. See section on expropriation in Chapter 5.
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1. The Historic Center was to be preserved. In 1954, the
City Council had passed an ordinance prohibiting the
demolition of old buildings for new construction
without special permits and local plans for the neigh-
borhood. Unfortunately, the Planning Department has
approved every such application in its office
(Argotli).
2. The Master Plan would down-zone certain areas close
to the edge of the built-up area which had been zoned
for intensive building in the 1931 Plan and partially
developed.
3. The Plan would be against the allowance of building
in the Agro Romano, other than farm houses.
4. The proposals would include a new axis of activity
centers to be based along a major highway with intense
building proposed along its length, to run from the
Autostrada del Sole in the North to EUR and then
South.
5. That along this axis would be cettain new activity
centers of housing and office developments--Pietralata
and Centocelle in the East, EUR in the South.
Wonking on these premises, the CET was to prepare four
plans in 1956. Three of these were general land use and
growth studies, while one was a proposal including traffic
control and regional planning. In the middle of the year,
however, was the fourthRoman Mayoral and Council election
since the War. This election gave the DC only 27 instead of
39 councillors out of the total of 80, again f6rcing a
broader coalition between them, the PSDI, the PRI and the
MSI. The Council elected Senator Tupini as Mayor. He was
to remain until January of 1958, when he resigned in order
to keep his seat in the Senate.
The four plans are essentially slight variations on the
thematic decisions presented above, with the last two dif-
fering more in graphics than in content. After a year and
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half of stormy discussion, the Grand Council approved a
draft plan and asked the CET to prepare a final draft plan,
which was presented to the GC in December 1957. The struc-
ture of the 1957 plan is presented on the following map and
includes the following items:
1. The designation of four activity centers--at EUR,
along Via Cristoforo Colombo, Pietralata, and
Centocelle.
2. The linear Motorway link between the Autostrada del
Sole, Pietralata, Centocelle, and EUR.
3. The designation of the Via Appia Antica region as
open space.
4. The entire Gran Raccordo Anulare as completed.
5. sThe redesignation of many areas zoned for intensive
use in the 1931 Plan as "conservation of actualized
building volume areas" (they had mostly been already
built up).
6. Limited, specified zones in the Agro Romano as desig-
nated for residential construction, usually discon-
nected from the built-up area.
7. The designation of the circumferential forts built in
the 1970s as open space.
8. A major road grid over the eastern section of the city
of approximately 1 kilometer square (the same as
Milton Keynes).
The opposition of the Conservatives to land controls
congealed at the final presentation of the draft Master Plan
1957 CET Proposa
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to the Grand Council. A representative of the Ministry of
Defense, Lt. Col. Giuseppe Amici, presented a motion to
reject the plan. He was also in charge of the just completed
Fiumicino Airport (near the sea) and owner of five real
estate companies. His motion was supported by conservative
planners, right wing politicians, the DC and the representa-
tive of the Ministry of Public Works (Fried, 1973, pp. 309
and 183) which was now under the direction of Signor Giuseppe
Togni, a right wing Christian-Democrat. The vote echoed
the national and Roman electoral move to the Right. There
was at this time in Rome a DC-MSI coalition in the Council
and a change of government at the national level in February
which removed the PSDI (moderate-left) from the governing
coalition. The new DC-only government was to last until
1962, when the PSDI was to be readmitted in the beginning
of the movement to the Left.
The implications of the Amici motion were severe. Accor-
ding to various sources (Urbanistica; Fried, 1973; Insolera),
the Grand Commission found itself (all 82 members) unable to
come to a decision as to the future of the plan, which
attempted compromises on the direction of growth allowed,
density limitations, and the programming of new facilities
despdrately needed in the East but wanted in the West.
Instead of accepting the compromise or demanding a higher
level of funding to provide adequate services in the entire
city, the commission rejected the plan through non-action.
"The Conservative majority . on the Grand
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Commission considered the CET plan not a compromise at all
but an attempt by the CET to impose a unilateral solution"
(Fried, 1903, p. 48).
Without reaching an agreement or proposing further
study, they forwarded the plan to the City Council for a
decision. Between December and March various influence
groups in Rome consulted and considered the Plan; the DC
Rome Committee, for instance, approved the plan with reser-
vations, while contractor associations and others denounced
it. In March, the new Mayor, Cioccetti, appointed a commit-
tee of nine experts (mostly state bureaucrats) (Fried, 1973,
p. 10) to review the plan and its congruence with the
directives of the Grand Council.
In April, the Committee of nine reported to the Council
against approval of the plan; in reaction, the GC and CET
agreed to dissolve themselves. Two months later, the City
Council voted 39-27 (DC, PLI, MIS, Monarchists; majority)
to reject the plan and requested the City government--the
Giunta--to prepare a new plan, despite the imminent expira-
tion of the existing regulations. The City government dele-
gated this authority to the USNPR. In the mean time, the
Ministry of Public Works, still under Togni, authorized the
region to begin preparation of an intercommunal plan
(Piano Intercomunale). On the governing committee of this
plan are two members of the former GC--Lt. Col. Amici
representing the Ministry of Defense; and another signer of
his motion, Gilberto Ortensi, representing ANAS, the state
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highway corporation (Urbanistica 26, p. 79). The instiga-
tion of this process can only be considered as yet another
means used by the State to assert its control over Rome,
as well as a move by the Conservative Ministries of Public
Works and Defense to usurp the Roman planning process and
insure that the new plan prepared by USNPR reflect their
conservative views. (One fear of the right and the State
DPW was that all planners were, in fact, leftists. Although
likely, at least because the Left had continually supported
the concepts of both regulatory planning and intervention,
it was not necessarily the case. More likely, anyone who
wanted to restrict private property rights was considered
as a communist or socialist, much as in the United States
at the same time.)
The presentation of the USNPR plan to the City Council
in February 1959 was somewhat of a non-event. Six months
later, the Council had approved the plan and forwarded it to
the Ministry of Public Works, where it was put on public
display for review and comment purposes by the general pub-
lic. The plan was a grave disappointment to the Left, to
professional planners,to the INU and to those who were
advocates of preservation of the historic center. The
redevelopment of buildings in the center had already become
evident. Between 1936 and 1961, over 150,000 people had
left the historic center for the periphery. Certainly, a
large portion of these had left by 1959 (Montanari, p. 121).
The USNPR plan negated most of the goals and provisions of
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the CET plan and the compromises achieved in its redevelop-
ment. This was done without explicitly changing the goals
of the plan, but by the way it was designed. It points
include the following:
1. It defined the historic center with a designation
called conservation and renewal, making possible the
continued redevelopment.
2. It introduced the possibility of indiscriminate buil-
ding in almost all of the Agro Romana, at a density
of 5,000 square meter lots, 1.2 acres, instead of
grouping possible building and reserving much of the
area as agriculture or open space.
3. It allowed building in the areas designated in the
1931 Master Plan to near their previous buildable
limit (they had mostly been built up already).
4. It eliminated all new construction of activity cen-
ters in the East in favor of a single development at
EUR.
5. By allowing the concentric growth to continue in
all directions, it allowed the macchia d'olio to
continue to spread, placing virtually no constraints
on private development.
6. It did not change the vocabulary of regulation exis-
tent in the city, thus allowing current bureaucratic
practices of the planning department to continue
unchanged. The plan contained only 15 land use
designations, one less than used in the 1931 plan.
7. It continued the Autostrada del Sole through the
periphery, but plans no extensive development near it.
8. It does not suggest that the City begin a policy of
construction of facilities as a method of directing
growth, but relies solely upon minimal building regu-
lations, thus continuing the current pattern of the
city public infrastructure construction, following,
not guiding new development.
Although this plan was approved by the DC City Council,
it was replaced in 1962 by another plan drawn by Luigi
Piccinato, Mario Fiorentino, Piero Lugli, Michele Valori,
and Vincenzo Passarelli, which in turn was based on the
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1957 CET Plan. The reasons for this turnaround are prima-
rily related to the political changes which were occurring
at the national level. The plan was now in the custody of
the national government, the Ministry of Public Works. In
1960, the political modd in parliament had begun to shift
to one of a Left-Center conciliation, resulting from factors
previously described.
As part of this warming to the Left, Aldo Moro, in a
cabinet position, prohibited any DC-MSI coalitions from
developing in any major cities, including Rome, and Togni
was removed as Minister of Public Works. With the movement
back to the center of that department, enthusiasm about the
1959 plan began to cool. This change, obviously related to
pressure from INU which was adamantly opposed to the plan.
(They produced the 3-volume series of Urbanisticas--27, 28,
and 29--exclusively on -the growth of Rome and the Master
Plan process in August-October 1969.) The departmental
strategy (or non-strategy) for dealing with the conflict
and intense political crossfire that the plan brought was to
do nothing, as slowly as possible.
Luigi Piccinato, in his article in the 1959 volumes of
Urbanistica, makes the point that so far in the process
there was been a "progressive" plan (1957) supported by
the Left and Center, and a "conservative" plan (1959) sup-
ported by the Right and Center. The Ministry of Public
Works, responding to the uncertain political winds of 1959,
which seemed to be blowing cold for any movement to the
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Right, were (rightfully) hesitant to take any action based
upon the previous Center-Right ideology (Piccinato, pp.
197 & 208). The spirit of the times seemed to be compromise
and they responded to this by looking for compromise in
the Master Plan process, which they found in the CET plan
proposals. In 1962, with the issuing in of the Center-Left
cooperation in national government (it was not until 1963
that the PSI were actually given ministerial positions) a
new pressure from the Socialists demanded that the CET plan
be brought forward. The Ministry of Public Works commis-
sioned Piccinato et al. and the Committee of Five to
reexamine the CET plan and prepare another version for their
approval.
The actual approval of the plan by the City Council was
a complicated process involving much political manuevering
between the City and State Ministry of Public Works. In
brief, the plan was prepared for and approved by the
Minsitry, and forwarded to the city government in June
1962, when the government was under the control of a
Prefectoral Commissioner, Diana. On the eve of a city
election, Diana refused to approve the plan in the name of
the city, although he was entitled to do so. A DC-PSI
coaliation was established in the city government following
the election which approved the plan in December (voting in
favor; DC, PRI, PSDI, PSI, one Monarchist: against; PCI,
PLI, and MSI).
The plan was returned to the State Government, where it
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was officially signed into law in 1965. Because of the
Council approval, however, implementation of its regulatory
provisions were begun. In April, however, another national
bill had passed through parliament, with major implications
for cities and towns all over Italy. Law 167, as it was
called, authorized significant purchases of land by local
authorities for the development of public and private !
housing, and was designed to counteract the effects of land
speculation; illegal, uncontrolled and disorganized housing
development; all items which were forcing cities into the
expenditure of huge sums of money to provide barely adequate
services and facilities. Since the budgets of cities were
still effectively forwarded directly to the State, the
rising expense of urbanization was a major issue of national
as well as local concern.
Another factor, often overlooked, is the location of the
national government in Rome. The problems Rome had been
having preparing a Master Plan were not directly control-
lable by the State, although their actions in 1962 emerged
as decisive. The costs and problems of urbanization which
were visible, however, were influential on the State Govern-
ment, as were the numerous protests, organized often by the
PCI and PSI at the grassroots level. These protests were
designed to achieve goals, large and small. The targets
of the protests were not limited to one government or
agency, as a memo would be, but they were designed to attract
attention at all levels. The struggles of people and the
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struggles of the parties of the Left which had been disen-
franchised from participating in all levels of government
in 1948 were simultaneously directed at the city and state.
The location of the Holy See of the Vatican in Rome
also brought special consideration. Although it is not
explicitly documented, it is clear that an alliance between
the Vatican and the State DC government in 1948 prohibited
the PCI or PSI from participating in any majority government
in Rome until 1963. The first years of the 1960s have
brought about major changes not only in urban policy but
in the entire organization and ideology of Italian governing.
These changes must be attributed to the incorporation of
the Left--in particular the PSI--into the machine of
government. The urban results of this revolution/transi-
tion are the main themes of the next chapter.
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Introduction
This chapter traces the history, not yet complete, of a
major housing and urban development act in terms of five issues
with which it has been involved, not in a historical method, as
in the last chapters. Each of the issues is intricately connec-
ted to the political and economic circumstances of the 16 year
period, and-as well the social structure of Rome. Time and
space do not permit the detailed analysis of the politics of
the 60's and 70's or the changing social moods which have occu-
pied the period. Rather, the discussion of the housing and
planning programs afford preliminary conclusions to be drawn.
They ask questions related to other issues, such as whether the
the obvious political intentions of the acts have been thwarted
by the implementation of the acts, and how?
In these decades, the participants include not only poli-
ticians, bureaucrats and administrators, but also architects,
planners and designers. Personal contradictions arise as many
who claim alliegence to the Left, and to principles of greater
equality, support actions which encourage more than ever before
of the industrialist-capitalist society propagated by the
Christian-Democrats. A final evaluation of the actions can only
be accomplished after the development areas have been inhabited
and the residents are once again a part of the urban process.
For this reason, the conclusions are provisional, and will be
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re-examined in the concluding chapter, which adds a historical
perspective to the current era.
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1962 marked a number of changes for Italy, for Rome, and
for urbanism in Italy. The most important political transition,
for Italy since the unification, was characterized by the accept-
ance that the left, at least the PSI, could contribute to the
governing of the country, and were not "revolutionary commun-
ists" in the Stalinist tradition. In the same year the struggle
for a new Master Plan for Rome was ended with the approval by
the new DC-PSI coalition City Government of Piccinato's final
compromise plan.
For Italy, the national law 167, passed in April, gave sub-
stantial powers of expropriation of land to cities for the pub-
lic construction of housing, and associated public and commercial
services, thus opening the door to a new interventionary role
for planners in the control and formation of future city growth.
The movement toward a more moderate socialist position by
the parties of the Left had begun in 1950* when Saragat separ-
ated from the PSI to form the PSDI, a moderate left party, or in
other words, a left oriented center party. The second round of
transitions occurred in the late 50's following the Soviet-
sponsored revolutions in Eastern Europe. Both the PSI and PCI
gradually took positions advocating implementation of provisions
of the Constitutions. As the local power of the Left increased,
*Or perhaps in 1945 when both the PCI and PSI compromised their
demands for a socialist' state and agreed to work with the DC
in writing a new constitution.
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resulting in the formation of several PCI/PSI with governments,
the DC began to recognize the transition. The election of
'Pope John XXIII in 1958 brought with it a warming of the Papal
position to the practical position of the Left. The election
of the Social Democrat, Saragat as President in 1964 helped, as
did the appointment of Moro as Minister of the Interior in 1960.
One of his first actions was the forbidding of the DC local
governments without majorities to form coalition governments
with the Neo-Fascist or Monarchist parties. The "warming to the
Left" reached its first national culmination in December 1963,
when the first government of Aldo Moro formally introduced the
PSI into the National Cabinet. (Since 1962, the PSI had sup-
ported the DC governments by witholding their opposing votes.)
The other major event of the decade was the formal institu-
tion of the Regions as governmental units, beginning with the
1968 Electoral law allowing Regional elections to occur, and
continuing with the 1970 Finance Act which provided funds for
the elections, and subsequent acts providing for the orderly
transfer of certain powers from the Provincial Prefects and
National Ministries to the Regional Governments. A major point
of this transfer was that the Regional Governments were to
become the highest authority necessary for approval of city
Master Plans, eliminating the authority of the President and
Ministers of Public Works and Interior. The national housing
and planning acts of the 1960's radically changed the face of
Rome, as well as the activities and power of the public planning
agencies. The origins of the acts come from National pressures,
194
combined with the obvious problems emerging in Rome. Being the
seat of the State Government where every one of the 945 members
of Parliament must live or commute to for most of the year,
brings an immediate concern. These are different from the under-
standing of conditions in Naples, Milan, Turin or other provin-
cial cities.* The 1962 Master Plan was the first since Fascism,
and the first plan in the history of the city which extended to
the full 603 square mile geographic limit of the city. It was
the first plan which considered the surrounding country and
had more designations (44) than the previous four plans com-
bined (2,8,4,16). 1962 also began a time of writing about Rome by
those architects, planners and others who had followed the fit-
full Master Plan process. Insolera first published "Roma
Moderna" in 1962, Quaroni published "Imagine di Roma"
several years later in 1969, and was followed two years later
with Benevolo's "Roma, da Ieri a Domani." It was a time of
great looking foward for the city, for the country, and for all
who cared about either or both.
*The national electoral system is based upon a combination of
local districts, party affiliations, and "preference votes"
allowing everyone in the country to vote for any representative.
Non-local voters thus are a part of each representative's con-
stituency.
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The 167 Act
The 167 housing and planning act radically changed the
frame of reference in which planning and public intervention
was to occur. The law gave wide-ranging powers to cities to
expropriate land, to develop infrastructure, to build public
and private housing, as well as associated commercial and public
services; and to do all this on a massive scale. Understand-
ably, the private sector was to take provisions of the act to
Court at every possible chance. Italian bureaucracy helped the
implementation of the law, as did the economic recession of the
60's, to get off to an understandably slow start. Today many
projects are nearing completion in and around Rome. They are
clearly visable on the skyline as one enters the city from the
east, and southeast primarily.
The last Fanfani cabinet, formed in February 1962, included
for the first time in three years the PSDI as one of the coali-
tion partners, as well as an agreement with the PSI for support,
although they were not yet formally in the government. A price
of this support was an agreement to pass the 167 Housing act.
Part of the background to the act* was the doldrums in which the
*The 167 Law was actualy a compromise itself. Several years
earlier, as negotiations were beginning between the DC and the PSI,
there had been a bill proposed to the Italian Parliament by the
Minister of Public Works, Fiorentino Sullo, which gave extensive
powers of land expropriatioi to municipal authorities, for al-
most any purpose, including land banking. The Bill had been
worked out by Sullo, a Christian-Democrat, in close conjunction
with the PSI. The PSI, 'in turn had gathered together in Rome,
many eminent planners to discuss the matter and advise them on
its provisions. These included Piccinato, Detti, Astengo (editor
of Urbanistica), Ceccarelli, and others. The political backlash
caused by fighting opposition to the bill not only forced Sullo's
resignation, but was a factor in the governmental crisis of Fan-
fani. The 167 act was a smaller scale version of this act, which
limited the use of expropriation to public and mixed housing
developments. (Ceccarelli, Sullo)
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public housing sector had been floating since the fifties; com-
bined, the various authorities were only contributing 7% of the
annual housing stock, down from 1952 when public housing accoun-
ted for 25% of new construction. INA-Casa built little after
1958, IACP was still acting more as a building contractor for
other agencies, and a property manager than builders. The only
agency which steadily continued was INCIS, supplying housing for
the growing government bureaucracies and military personnel, all
over the country, with housingwhich for all practical purposes
could have been private.
167 was mainly a response to the structural problems which
were scarring the faces of every Italian city: land specula-
tion, disregard of planning provisions, housing shortages (al-
though worse in Milan and Turin than Rome), declining central
city populations, and poor levels of services in the newly
developing peripheral areas. All of these conditions were found
in Rome, as well as the problem of the families living in the
baracche, caves, and other "below standard" dwellings. The ide-
ology behind the act had three sources:
1. Politics. As mentioned, passage of the act has a
political price paid by the Christian-Democrats in
order to have the PSI support necessary for a majority
government. .
2. Scale. A feeling that BIGGER actions could solve
bigger, but structural problems inherent in the in-
born development process.
3. A modified, aged, matured, and camouflaged form of
-3
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Neo-realism; belief in neighborhoods, neighborhood
planning, and packages of well serviced communities
thought of as units.
The act was intended to rationalize and re-order patterns
of disorderly growth in the periphery of cities by allowing the
expropriation of land, in between and among the private develop-
ments, thus "filling in" the growth areas. The removal of these
quantities of land from the private market, combined with the
city regulated provision of public and private housing, was also
supposed to eliminate or reduce the impact of the rampant land
speculation on excalating housing prices and diminished acces-
sibility to housing by the working classes. The disorderly
growth had become a financial burden for most cities, especially
Rome, as cities were obligated, either by law, practice, or pub-
lic pressure, to provide infrastructure services such as schools,
hospitals, and transit. The more spread out and disorganized
the developments, the more expensive and difficult was the bur-
den of provision. The problems of housing cost and accessibility
had become a major political issue, and the content of many
demonstrations.
The same act provided for rationalization of the provision
of public housing, by requiring the IACP and other authorities
to work within a housing needs plan prepared by the local plan-
ning department. For the first time, there was now a relation-
ship between the national public housing authorities and the
local planning authorities. This plan was called a PEEP,
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1 Casal de 'Pazzi
2 Nomentano
3 Rebibbia
4 Pietralata
5 Tiburtino Nord
6 Tiburtino Sud
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(Piano Edilizia Economica e Popolare) and was to include not
only housing, but also public and commercial services.
These are serious and extensive goals and intentions.
In reading and understanding them, it must be remembered that
each of the supporters of the act claimed that it would address
different issues, and respond to different constituencies. The
act was also a compromise, drawn and passed by a Christian-
Democrat dominated Parliament, and as such, built in unworka-
bility and conflicts which would prevent the rapid accomplish-
ment of all the intentions mentioned above were, no doubt
intentional. But these items are difficult, if not impossible
to pin down. The PSI had only 14% of the national vote in the
(most recent) 1957 elections, and now had a chance to become
part of the Majority government. They needed to boast to their
constitutency that the participation in a coalition with the
DC was workable, not a sell-out, and in fact would enable some
of their goals to be met. For the PSI, the passage of the
act did exactly this. 10 years later with only one 167 project
under construction in Rome, their constitutency had left them
for the PCI, who were demanding from the outside of the govern-
ment that the act be implemented. The only way to evaluate the
effects of this law is to look, now 16 years later, at what it
has produced. The comparison of its explicit goals to accomp-
lishments is not particularly insightful. This analysis exam-
ines five issues:
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1. Coordination of public housing. The use of the PEEP
and the institutional reorganization of IACP and INA-
Casa.
2. Neighborhood planning. The planning of large hous-
ing developments, including services, by the city
planning authorities and IACP.
3. Interventionary planning. The increase of planning
power including land expropriation, subdivision,
development, sale and/or leasing.
4. Expropriation. A clarification of the legal basis
for expropriation of land, as well as extension of
possible purposes of expropriated land. Also the
legal basis of zoning for public purposes.
5. Decentralization. The establishment of the Regions
and donation of power to cities and the Regions, par-
ticularly in the area of building and land use
regulation.
In the analysis, it will become evident that the powers
of the 167 act were not adequate to achieve all the intentions
of the act, at least as stated on the previous pages. Where
deficiencies became evident and there was adequate political
pressure to remedy them, new laws were passed. This was the
case for the expropriation measures, the financing of the acts,
provisionsand issues connected to decentralization. Many of
these court decisions, subsequent acts, directives (similar to
executive orders in the U.S.) and departmental regulations
served other pusposes than the implementation of the 167 law,
alone, and their support came in turn from other pressures.
Coordination of Public Programs
In 1957, while finishing the revisions for the last CET
Master Plan proposal, Ludovico Quaroni commented on the need
for district planning as well as the coordination of private
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and public housing authorities:
"In the third place a unified group of laws is necessary
for subsidized building [housing construction] which can
solve the problems of State aid for housing abolishing
the present situation of 'caste' building, and including
in the same picture, the so-called working class housing
schemes, those of cooperatives, and private building."
(Quaroni, 1957)
Several years prior, in 1954, the Ministry of Public Works
had established a committee to consider the consolidation of
the public housing programs. In 1957, Comitato di Coordina-
mento dell'Edilizia Populare, (CEP) described the roles of the
various housing authroties, INCIS, IACP, INA-Casa, UNRRA-Casa%
and others. Their intention was to organize,all the authorities
under one Ministry in the State Government. This was
attempted in 1959, by the Minister of Public Works, Togni, who
tried to incorporate INA-Casa into IACP, and put both under the
control of the Ministry of Public Works. Togni was unsuccess-
ful, partly as a result of his involvement in scandals sur-
rounding the Fiumicin6 Airport. The 167 Law, passed a few
years later coordinated some control, through the PEEP, into
the jurisdiction of the municipalities. Later, in 1964, the
Ministry of Employment formed GESCAL to take over the work of
INA-Casa (previously under the Ministry of Employment), and
work with cities on thePEEP's projects. It was, however,
incapable of absorbing the independent IACP and INCIS, although
it did gain control of the Tupini Law giving iself authority to
grant interest subsidies to cooperative building. Under GESCAL
INA-Casa building was discontinued leaving IACP as the major
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bui-lding of public housing.
With the national IACP organization in charge of approx-
imately 80% of the public housing construction in the country,
the issue of rationalization of the provision of housing with-
in cities, became a struggle between the national agency and
cities, and therefore connected with the ongoing struggle for
decentralization (discussed ff.). Although, by the pro-
visions of the act, cities were not empowered to force any
construction, their PEEP would specify the need for housing in
the city, and identify where and when the IACP should build.
The 167 act allowed the city to expropriate (or assume control
of) all unbuilt IACP land in its jurisdiction, as part of the
167 process. In 1971, with the passage of the national 865
law, GESCAL was eliminated, and "all other public housing agencies"
were put under the control of IACP. (Angotti, 19) The GESCAL
funds which had been accruing were rolled into the 865 pro-
gram for disbursement.
With the implementation of the Regions, came the creation
of regional IACP authorities, each enjoying a degree of auton-
omy from the central IACP, but also held within certain con-
trols. The regional IACP was able to work closer on the devel-
opment of the PEEP, and become a coordinating developer of
projects. This has come to be quite important and signifi-
cant with the massive implementation of the 167 act in the late
1970's.
Discussed in the late 70's by such authors as Stefanelli
(1976, 1978) a Left Wing housing analyst, the decentralization
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of IACP has had two effects. Regional offices were given
freedom to choose projects, and proceed in coordination with
'cities in their construction and management. On the other
hand, the central IACP still holds the purse strings, allo-
cating funds which originate in Parliament, to its regional
offices. In addition, there have been recent movements to
design, in the central office, a series of standards for IACP
housing, both in rent levels and unit sizes. These would be
regionally adjusted by the central IACP probably in the same
manner as their funds are alloated, implying a maintenance of
political control over the provision of housing by the central
government, despite decentralization. It cannot be forgotten
that at this point there is still the DC control of the central
government and the Left-PCI and PSI/DC control of most of
Italy's major cities and regions. The splitting of power be-
tween regional and central IACP offices must be seen in the
light of this power division and struggle.
An increased control over the location of public housing
projects by city planners has been seen. Both the consolida-
tion of the housing authorities into one (IACP) and the Plan-
ning control over project size, density and location (through
the PEEP) have changed the nature of public housing develop-
ment. Locational decisions are no longer explicitly real
estate oriented, but now used as planning tools by cities.
The IACP has expanded its role, becoming the major coordinat-
ing developer of housing services and infurstructure in the
167/865 project areas.
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Neighborhood Planning
The birth of neighborhood planning in Rome dates back as
far as DeMerode, and includes many of the larger private devel-
opments of the pre WWII period as well as public projects such
as Monte Sacro, (IACP), Piazza Verbona (INCIS), and even to an
extent, the borgate of Fascism. Applications of neighborhood
planning in post-war private development are few and far be-
tween. The greatest provision of non-residential uses in apart-
ment buildings or complexes has been the use of the ground
floor for commercial services. During the reconstruction,
neighborhood planning emerged in the ideology of neo-realism,
espoused so well in the Tiburtino IV INA-Casa development by
Quaroni, Fiorentino, Aymonino, Ridolfi, and others. In the
development for 4,000 people, community facilities and shared
spaces are designed and provided in such a manner so as to
encourage the growth of a sense of communtiy.
Throughout the 1950's INA-Casa maintained a substantial
research commitment in housing, which continually advocated
neighborhood planning, which in turn was reflected in most INA-
Casa projects in Rome (Valco S. Paolo, Tuscolano, Ponte Mammo-
lo, Tiburtino IV). This theory was related to the organic
theories of Wright, brought to Italy after the war by Bruno Zevi,
The proponents and supporters of neighborhood planning were
Foschini, an architect and director of INA-Casa, Quaroni, and
Florentino.
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Community or neighborhood life was one of the aspects of
Neo-realism with its imagery of the village life of rural
'Italy, and its applications designed to mediate between the
village and the city. It was thought that since the residents
were moving from one to the other, an intermediary step was
not altogether inappropriate. (See Quaroni's "Il paese dei
Barocchi".) As Muratori and Villa comment (1978, pp. 16-62.)
"We are at the beginning of the 50's and the theory on
districts meets wide approval, intersecting with the
widest sociological questions primarily placed by the
new-found role of the community. The architects who
are the interpreters of the widespread intellectual
unease which matured from the rationalistic realism of
Mittel European ascendency, see the alternative path to
quantitative objectivity in the shape of a new region-
alist realism. The Tiburtino [IV] experience, even in
all of its lack of method and prospective, is an example
of the ideological, political, and cultural attitude
which was probably one of the richest and most sympto-
matic of those years."
This position was also the dominant ideology prevading
the Master Plan process, which involved many of the same
people. The concept was, however, frustrated at every turn
by politics and bureaucracy. A restriction of the intial
USNPR, for instance, forbade the agency from engaging in any
form of sociological work, afraid perhaps, as Fried suspects,
that those interested in sociology were in fact interested in
people and therefore socialists in nature. The concept of
activity centers, as has been seen, incorporating a larger
scale concept of community was all but eliminated from the
Master Plan, and has yet to be fully implemented.
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Neighborhood theory was to be reborn into the 167 law,
a retarded form of Neo-realism, although the time of Neo-
realism has passed. Perhaps as some would contend (Mark
Issacs) it was not Neo-realism at all, but a response to new
neighborhood theory, which began to be proposed in the late
50's, and gained acceptance in the 60's and 70's. Perhaps
it was just a logical return to a planning form of romanti-
cism. These, I contend, are both true, but to follow Institu-
tions like INA-Casa, and people like Quaroni through the pro-
cess, noting his Tiburtino IV project, his work on the Master
Plan, and his later work on various 167 projects, one can
hardly say that there was no connection to Neo-realism.
The 167 law provided for comprehensive planning and con-
struction by the local municipality of a wide range of servi-
ces and provisions, public and private, housing, schools,
churches, shops, markets, offices, community places, recrea-
tion, and health centers. It allowed municipalities to
expropriate large tracts of land, and while retaining at least
60% under municipal ownership, to resell or lease the remain-
ing portions to builders, developers for construction of the
services, or private housing. In this manner, the law pro-
vided for the possibility that full service neighborhoods
or communities could be.planned for. Although the legal prob-
lems associated with expropriation, and the lack of funds
available to cities, following the recession of 1963 slowed
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the implementation of 167 projects, Rome emerges as a special
case. Preventing the implementation of the concept of neigh-
-borhoods or communities was a particular relationship with
the organization and working of the Italian government. A
quick look at Spinaceto, the only 167 project begun in Rome,
by 1972, reveals the siutation clearly. Other projects now
under construction all include space, specifically designated
as commercial, service or office. The problem of finding
clients remains, but at least the space shells are there.
Spinacetto was selected in 1964, when Rome's planners
had designated 5,100 hectares in the city as potential pro-
jects. Its 187 hectares already owned by the city, were
designed to house 26,000 people: 60% in eight story IACP
housing, the remaining 40% in 70 independent building coop-
eratives, each building 3 stories tall. There was to be a
spine of services, shops, schools, etc., around which the
housing clustered, retaining as open land approximately half
the total area. The problem in its implementation, began
after the City Council approval in 1967, are summarized as
follows:
1. The city itself (through the Planning Department)
was acting as coordinating developer, a new role
for that agency.
2. The City Council failed to convince its service
agencies to provide the services designed as part
of the plan.
3. The private commercial services were not built by
the city or marketed to private interests.
4. The private cooperatives didn't start construction
until years later, because of the lack of services.
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5. Adequate bus service has not been provided to the
development, at least partially because the slow-
ness in its development has not generated suffic-
ient population to support frequent service; there
are only 12,000 persons living there as of 1978,
with still only schools constructed.
What this points to was a failure in the drafting of the
167 law to give the developers of the project, in this case,
a public entity, power to force the construction of services
by other departments, or power to build them themselvers.
This has been changed in the more recent projects, where the
IACP has taken on the role of coordinating developer, and
builder of shell space for lease to public and commercial
services. This reflects a legal modification in the allowable
activities of IACP, and corresponds to the regionalization of
IACP. (Angotti, pp. 39-41; Urbanistica 44, pp. 85-94; Mario
Fiorentino.)
The failures of Spinaceto, can be attributed to three
types of causes, political pressure against the project from
the Right, (Angotti), bureaucratic and administrative proceed-
ures (Angotti), and the more general lack of workability of
the 167 law (GBK). The most relevant to examine in this analy-
sis are those evolving from the built-in malfunctions of the
law. The formation of the regional IACP's with their expanded
scope of activities was a coup for the agency, as well as a
necessary action for the implementaiton of the neighborhood
planning concept of the 167 law. No amendment to the 167 law
was made, and yet a goal was reached, (or is closer to being
reached).
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In addition, the passage of the 865 law (discussed more
fully in the next sub-section) provided cities with state and GES-
CAL funds for the implementation of 167 projects, and gave the
167 developer the legal right and financial means to build the
service infrastructure, instead of relying upon the other City
departments for this provision. This act, passed in 1971 as
the result of a great deal of pressure from the public and the
Left (including protests on 167 designated land), provided
funds for the implementation of 167 projects. Pressure had
been building in Rome particularly, where 700,000 people had
been promised homes by the initial 1964 167 PEEP, and by 1970,
less than 12,000 rooms had been constructed; all of those in
Spinaceto, which was an area by then known for its lack of
services and isolation in the South of Rome.
With the administrative and legal provisions of neighbor-
hood planning cleared by 1972, what has happened? While it is
still too early to remark on how residents have acted in the
new developments, or how they have "inhabited" (see definition
by Poodry), it is possible to look at the designs and the pro-
posals, and draw some preliminary conclusions.
The first wave of 167 projects were designed, in the words
of Ginsepp Rebecchini (son of the ex-Mayor), to be more or
less open or closed circles. In this group of projects are
included Quaroni's project for Barene di S. Giuliano, near
Venice, Carlo Aymonino's plan for Tor de' Cenci in Rome,
Dall'Olio, Berarducci, Rebecchini and Passarelli's project at
0I
aarene di S Giuliano, Mestre (Quaroni, 1959) 4Casal de'Pazzi, Rome
4 72Roma-Mare, Fiumincino, (Fiorintino) (Rebecchini,Passarelli, Pr *ects
3Tor di Cenci, Rome (Aymonino, 1965) Dall'Olio, et al, 1965) 01
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Casal de' Pazzi-Nomentana, and parts of Tiburtino Sud. These
projects share a common theme, the use of major circular
forms, whose root is no doubt, in the presumption that where
there are a collection of people looking into a common space,
there is a degree of equality introduced because no-one is
closer to the center than anyone else. This also builds a
sense of community. Usually the areas inside the circle, or
between two, if there are more than one in a project, are re-
served for the provision of services.
The second wave of these projects under construction
around Rome today have moved from the circular form to a var-
iety of rectalinear forms, varying from a kilometer long, 11
story megastructure by Mario Fiorentino, to a series of
'normal' apartment buildings. This transition has been assoc-
iated with an IACP decision furthering the position of another
form of neighborhood planning; the neighborhood unit, "ser-
vizio residenziale," of 250 units, or approximately 1,250 per-
sons. This size was accepted by the IACP several years ago as
not only the ideal planning unit, but an ideal size for neigh-
borhood council, which would take charge of routine decisions
of management in the common spaces in the project, none of
which are clearly explained, beyond their routine character.
Common spaces include common rooms, music listening areas,
social and health services. Mario Fiorentino, however, in de-
scribing his Corviale project talks of how its design is based
upon this concept. The building, a kilometer long is divided
into five sections, each with its own articulated entrance
Vigne Nouve (Passarelli, Fausto, Corviale (Fiorintino, Gorio,
DeRossi, et al) Lugli, et al) Projects48
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way, a major sculptural element. Each of the entrances sym-
bolizes the one of the five 250 dwelling neighborhood units in
the building, each of which has its own council rooms, and
management function. Because of this social construction, he
was able to simplify the construction of the entire project,
and thus neither considers it a megastructure nor too long.
(Interview, November 1978)
Both Corviale and Vigne Nuove by Passarelli, et al, re-
flect this attiutde. The projects of Tiburtino Sud, Ferra-
tella, Roma-Laurentino, and Torrevecchia all reflect a more
traditional approach with no clear ideological position reflec-
ted in the form or physical relationship to the issue of neigh-
borhood planning.
The provision of other services and activities in con-
junction with housing--for instanceoffices, shops, markets--
have also expanded in this wave of projects. In Corviale, 20%
of the entire built volume will be occupied by non-housing
activities, including a major grocery store, local government
administrative offices, two theatres, schools, and a semi-
enclosed market place. The fifth floor of the building is
dedicated in its entirety to local professional offices. The
following table summarizes the planning of non-housing activi-
ties in six projects under construction.
N)
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4 11 167 SELECTED PROJECTS
Project Cubic Meters Cubic Meters Square Meters
of Residen- of Services of Public
tial Space Open Space
Vigne Nuove* 264,700 6,522 950
Tiburtino Sud 2,961,000 1,040,000 689,000
Tiburtino III 419,370 150,000 est 104,980
Laurentino 2,478,338 1,200,000 est 287,250
Corviale* 680,000 160,000 225,000
Torrevecchia 300,000 150,000 est 52,000
(Casabella, 438)
Neighborhood planning has become an aspect of the construc-
tion and thinking behind these recent 167 projects. Whether
it will be successful is difficult to say. A superficial
glance at Corviale, for instance, leads one to doubt the pos-
sible success of the servizio residenziale, although the ser-
vices are under construction. The inside of the building, and
the intervening spaces between the units and the vast open
space surrounding the development are designed with a great
sensitivity to issues of semi-public and semi-private space.
Only the inhabitation of the building will tell.
Neighborhood planning was certainly a cornerstone of the
original 167 act., but at the time of its passage there was
no legal mechanism for its accomplishment. The experience of
*Services in these projects are integrated -into the actual
building structure and under construction. (Source Casabella
438)
ICorviale 4Tibur tino Su,
2Vigne Nuove 5Spinaceto
3Casal de'Pazzi 6Tor di Cenci
8Laurintino
9Torre Vecchia
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decentrailzed local government in Bologna (under the PCI) was
a precedent which seemed to have moderate success, at least in
the late 60's and early 70's (Angotti, Cervellati and Scanna-
vini,Nannetti and Leonardi). In addition, the IACP's decen-
tralization and acceptance of neighborhood councils was a de-
ciding factor in certain cases, and is perhaps the most prom-
ising of all. There were also the funds provided by the 865
law, which made the construction of full-service areas possi-
ble. Additionally, there has been the gradual expansion of
legitimate causes for land expropriation without which, the
projects would not have been possible. The conjunction of
these events and trends have generated the projects under con-
struction today. 167 may have been the first of the acts and
decisions, but it cannot be considered the cause of its follow-
ing actions. It must be considered as one of a series of acts,
reflective of a trend in Italian politics which proposes decen-
tralized control, and greater community and city power in urban
decisions, combined with a trend toward greater holistic con-
trol of urban events by special commissions, agencies, or
corporations rather than competitive line agencies. In Rome,
it has always been easier to establish another commission than
re-direct an old one.
Planning Power and Public Intervention
The 167 law re-introduced into the roles of the official
city planners of Rome the notion that planning could and
should include some direct intervention. It was the first
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time since Fascism that this notion had been considered inside
the city planning bureaucracy, although it was implied by the
CET in their Master Plan proposals. The only mode of planning
employed by the city had been regulatory. In this sense, while
the 167 law was declared as the great leap forward by the plan-
ning profession, it could be considered as an attempt to re-
turn to the planning norm of Rome: a combination of regula-
tion and intervention.
The passage of the 865 law did not instantaneously cause
the construction of the unfunded 167 projects, but it began
the process which was to result in the construciton of almost
60,000 dwellings by 1978. In addition to those items men-
tioned, the 865 law specifically allowed the use of its funds
for "secondary infrastructure," that is, schools, shops, parks,
health centers, and major connecting roads, as well as streets,
sewers, lights, itc. This would at least prevent the Spline-
ceto experience from reoccurring.
The changes in organization and power of the IACP
resulting from the regional entities, was sympathetic to
the new expanded role the city was to play in the construction
of 167 areas. In allowing the IACP to engage in the construc-
tion of commercial space for rent, the possibility of the con-
struction of megastructures, containing all forms of services
within a single building unit was expressly allowed. The for-
mal change can be seen not only by comparing Spinaceto with
Corinale, but also in the purposes for the Asse Attrezzato
which was to be a continuous building-infastructure connecting
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the proposed activity centers of Pietralata and Centocelle.
Although traditionally urban intervention by the public
sector, even if only the placement of a monument (such as
Vittorio-Emanuele II), has had the purpose and effect of re-
structuring a portion of the city. The early public works--
bridges, streets, housing projects, ministries, and the rail
stations certainly had these impacts. The 167 areas are not
apart from this tradition, although in these cases housing
has become the tool of intervention rather than infrastruc-
ture of government ministries. One of the purposes of the
act had been to restructure areas of the periphery which were
particularly ill served by public infrastructure, and to re-
duce the cost of provision of urban services (the costs of
urbanism), which had become an almost unbearable burden
resulting from the lack of control over the direction of
growth. In Rome, for instance, where the bulk of these funds
had come from borrowing, the city debt had risen astronom-
ically.
167 areas were selected, so as to fill in undeveloped
areas in between ill-served borgate, and seemingly random
private development. They were to become local centers of
services, not only for their own populations, but the sur-
rounding population as well. For this reason, the 865 fund-
ing also included provisions for funding external connec-
tions to adjoining areas. Again, although none of the areas
are fully occupied, it is possible to identify certain
successes and failures.
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Fiorintino's Corviale is successful in this respect.
The local government offices of the district (a political
subdivision of the Rome City Government) has leased enough
space in the building for their entire staff, thus making
the project the administrative center of the district. The
development will therefore become a center of activity for
surrounding communities and their residents. In education
policy however, indications are that the schools built in
conjunction with the housing are to serve only the new resi-
dents, encouraging a segregation of new and old residents.
This is the case in Spinaceto, Corviale, and Vigne Nuove.
Another aspect of the hardship which is going to result in
connecting the projects to surrounding areas is the design
ideology behind their forms. Many of the projects are large
buildings conceived of in the image of Corbusier or the
French New Towns of the 1950's which protect large areas of
open space by the construction of high density buildings.
The connections between these buildings and other com-
munities must traverse not inextensive open spaces or cross
rivers (in the case of Vigne Nuove), or span motorways
(Tiburtino Sud). These problems must be addressed in the
future, by the provision of adequate public transport, and
the allowance or encouragement of inbetween development
(Corviale).
The combination of the 167 and 865 laws, the reform
and reorganization of the IACP, and the establishment of the
regions, as well as the periodic revisions to the 1942 Legge
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Urbanistica, (which I haven't discussed), are all events
which have been critical in the re-establishment of an effec-
tive role for City Planning in Rome. There can be no ques-
tion today about the political basis and nature of that role.
The difficulties in establishing a Master Plan, as well
as achieving the implementation of the 167 laws were part
of the more general problem of redefining a role for the
profession in a political and economic structure about which
there has been substantial ideological disagreement. The
gradual movement toward a genuine Center-Left compromise,
involving the PCI as well as the PSI is helping not only in
the stabilization of a democratically based government, but
in re-accepting a role for public city planning which
includes the control over certain rights of private property
by the city, by the people, and also the right of the city
to intervene in the ongoing development trends, for pur-
poses of maintaining an order, achieving a redistribution of
wealth, and reducing its own costs. The concept that there
was a Roman landscape, or tracts of land, formerly in Villa's
which belong to the people of Rome, and not to the owner in
fee, was an idea which had not been successfully articulated
since the beginning of the century, when a zona archeologica
was defined, and the Villa Doria-Pamphili was purchased by
the city. It is only a part of the redefinition of a society
where ownership of forms of capital no longer guarantee abso-
lute rights of use of that resource.
228
It is unfortunate, however, that the final form of
the 167 and 865 provisions have resulted in a situation
where the act and its later modifications do not guarantee
an ongoing form of land use control. It has been more of a
one-time intervention, and there are not likely to be re-
peats, more declared projects or areas, at least until there
is a new Master Plan, or PCI national government, or an im-
provement in the country's economic position*.
Land Expropriation
One of the major problems of city planning in the post-
war era has been the expropriation of land. Still in force
is the 1885 Legge di Napoli which allows expropriation
sets the levels of compensation required to be paid to the
land owner(s) at the average of the Market value and the sum
of the last 10 years rent, usually near 60% of market value.
This was an acceptable procedure in the 19th and early 20th
centuries, when there was little expropriation, and what
there was was related to the construction of infrastructure
which enhanced surrounding land vlaues. With most of Italy's
land in the hands of large landholders, rarely would an en-
tire holding be expropriated, and thus an informal system
operating in eras of cooperation between government and
private enterprise was workable.
*This section based upon Fried, 1973, Angotti, Pineschi,
LaPalombara, 1966, Wiskmann 1970, Casabella 437,438,
Insolera, Stefanelli, 1976, AmendolaFiorentino, 1978i,
and Quaroni, 1978i. Urbanistica 44, Economist, 1964, and
personal visits to the projects of Tiburtino III, Tibur-
tino Sud, Vigne Nuove, Corviale, and Spinaceto.
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With the increase in small land ownership patterns
around cities, and the increase of attempted expropriation
for purposes not directly related to infrastructure, such
as public housing or land reform (in the south), the system
began to fail, leaving many attempted expropriations in
court, and subject to long delays. In the cases of attemp-
ted land reform in the south, the general problem was circum-
vented by the payment of generous sums for farms of little
value, as a form of DC political patronage. In the case of
the attempted implementation of the 167 act, the problem was
to remain unsolved until a landmark court case and the 865
law was passed.
The 167 act attempted a resolution of this issue by
the declaration that areas designated as 167 areas could be
expropriated at any time at 1961 orices. This provision was
found unconstitutional in 1965. Parliament then passed a
law, 904, which modified the expropriation clauses to base
compensation on the 1885 Legge DiNanoli (FriJed,1973,p.317).
By 1968, most of the 5,100 hectares has been planned and
designated, but not expropriated nor built upon. Land own-
ers either continued to build on their land, or sued the city
for compensation, claiming illegal the zoning of their land
for public purposes without payment of expropriation. The
vectors in the battle were the landowners, (although it
could be said that the city won the war) who were upheld in
their contention that zoning land for public purposes is
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167 usage, without the payment of compensation, was an un-
just taking of property.* The City was given five years
to reach agreement on. a nrice and proceed with the
expropriation. (Vercellone 132, Pineschi, Stefanelli, Fried
1973 Angotti.) When the 865 law went into effect in 1971
it set the value for expropriation at a modification of the
agricultural value of the land, based upon proximity to the
city. (Pineschi) The deadline for actual completion of the
expropriation of the tracts of land was evidently extended
as well.
Decentralization
Perhaps the major achievement of the 1970's has been
the institution of the Regions as functional governmental
units in between the cities and the national state govern-
ment. Without their institution, or perhaps without the cul-
tural and political moment of their creation, the implementa-
tion of the provisions of the 167 and 865 laws would have
been impossible, or unlikely, at best. The creation of the
Regions was associated with a decentralization of decision-
making about urban affairs, and a new series of urban laws
which drastically reduced the roles of the Ministry of Public
Works and the Ministry of the Interior.
*After the court ruling, a stop-gap measure, the Legge Tam-
pone, #1187 of 1968 was passed to insure the continuation
of the Master Plan and 167 regulations until a new urban law
would be passed which would clarify the situation. There was
a general fear for all the open spaces such as the villas and
the areas around the Via Appia Antica would be immediately
developed.
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The elected Regional government has replaced the
President of the Republic (and Minister of Public Works) as
the ultimate authority needed to approve building permits,
PEEPS, and city Master Plans. The Regional governments have
also replaced the Prefect as the intermediary level of gov-
ernment between the State and the City. These changes have
given great powers of decision to cities for final
adjudication.
These forms of decentralization, including the creation
of regional autonomous IACP offices, have not occurred with-
out major costs in methods and ideologies of State resource
allocation. For instance, before the Regions, city finances
were obligations of the State, for debts incurred, special
capital expenses and operating costs. The cities were en-
couraged by the State to borrow freely throughout the 50's
and 60's, resulting in a total city debt of over $38 billion
in 1976. (Angotti) With the institution of the Regions as
autonomous entities responsible for their cities, the debt
of cities has become an obligation of Regions, independent
from the state, creating a potential urban fiscal crises.
Similarly, GESCAL, (INA-Casa), 865 and IACP capital
funds are allocated by the central government. INA-Casa was
formed under the Ministry of Employment and funded by small
contributions (similar to U.S. Social Security taxes) from
worker wages and salaries. The contributions are pooled
nationally, and spent on housing which was to be rented or
sold to workers under lease purchase arrangements. The
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national agency, either INA-Casa or GESCALis responsible for
the allocation of these funds directly into projects through-
out the country.
The allocation of 865 funds is managed by the Ministry
of Public Works, through the CER, Committee on Residental
Construction. Represented on the committee are local gov-
ernment agencies and developers, but not the housing agencies,
including IACP, or tenants. In order to establish an alloca-
tion at first each region presented a statement of need, all
of which had to be thrown out because of their incompatibil-
ity. After that, the CER invented a formula which;
"[favors] regions with high average room densities
(persons per room in 1971, corrected for overcrowding)
and large immigration between 1961 and 1971. The rest
of the funds are distributed according to a formula
favoring regions with large stocks of 'inadequate''
dwelling units (as defined, unfortunately, by the 1961
census), specific municipalities with large shantytown
populations (Rome, Messina, and Reggio Calabria), and
seismic areas. In effect, these formulas give the
lion's share of the money to southern, mostly DC-
controlled regions." (Angotti, p. 20)
While there has been a decentralization of the control
over how 865 funds are spent once they get to the region,
there has been an associated tightenting of central control
over the quantity of funds to be allocated to each region.
There are two conflicting interpretations of this situation.
One, proposed by LaPalombara (1966), claims that the PSI have
been advocating a stronger central government control over
the distribution of funds in order to maintain a greater
equality in the distribution of resources, an argument similar
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to the original Left demands of 1946 for a strong central
government. The other explanation puts the emphasis on the
Christian-Democrats' attempt to fix their control over the
distribution of resources through quasi-governmental agen-
cies, lest the Parliament move further toward the Left.
The decentralization of the IACP, and its corresponding
acquisition of the fringe housing authorities is a similar
condition, and permits similar conclusions to be drawn.
While the distribution of IACP funds allocated by the State
is not clearly discussed, it is obviously similar to the
distribution of 865 funds.* There is, as mentioned, a de-
sire expressed by Stefanelli (1978) to set national stan-
dards for rent and unit types in order to maintain (rather
create) a parity or equality across the country, thus re-
stricting the activities of the local authorities.
Decentralization has also been occurring at a smaller
scale, within the organization of the IACP. The creation of
the 250 dwelling unit servizio residenziale is a significant
step in the same direction. Questions must be posed as to
whether tenants in the older IACP housing, some of which is
in the process of begin renovated, will be offered the same
management responsibility as tenants in the new projects.
*The difference between IACP rents and market rents in Rome,
35,000 Lira vs. 250,000 Lira per month for similar apartments,
implies that a considerable capital investment or operating
subsidy necessary for IACP housing. Local authorities and
cities are in no financial position to support this level of
expenditure, especially given the magnitude of the 167
program.
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It is too early to tell whether these units will become
functional units with any real authority over the mainten-
ance, management or renovation of IACP housing, or just ten-
ants groups with minimal control over routine items. The
strength of the national and regional tenants unions, and
the political struggles are likely to have a significant
impact on the future efficiency of this sytem.
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Summary
The 1964 PEEP for Rome was not far off the mark when it
estimated a total 10 year housing need of 1,355,000 rooms,
although it was optimistic that the 167 program could pro-
vide 53% of this need. In 1976, Fraticelli reports that the
following housing has been constructed in Rome since 1964.
PLANNED AND ACTUAL HOUSING Planned,41 .IGROWTH - 1964-19786 Actual 1964
Areas of new growth 45,600 rooms 643,891
Private development 793,000 rooms
167 Projects (built or 190,927 rooms 711,909
under construction)
Illegal developments 225,000 rooms
Total development 1,253,600 1,355,000
What is different between the actual12 year figures and
the planned development is the share of development assumed
to be accomodated in the 167 program. The PEEP called for
711,909 rooms to be built in the 167 areas, with approxi-
mately 40% of this to be cooperative development in associa-
tion with GESCAL, or private housing. The current level of
provision is barely 27% of this goal, although quite a sig-
nificant number by itself, considering that most of the de-
velopment has been in the last several years, since the pas-
sage of 865 in 1971.
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Those 167 projects currently under construction do
include almost 40% of their contents as cooperative or pri-
vate housing. The greatest shortfall in the porgram is
therefore the provision of IACP housing which, if built as
planned, would have been 427,000 rooms, and now is reaching
only 117,617 rooms. The deficit of over 300,000 rooms, one
can assume is being accomodated not by the increase in con-
ventional housing, but in the illegal dwellings, and in a
continued overcrowding in areas of the periphery. Also,
according to Fraticelli, there are now plans to meet a re-
vised ten year housing goal of over 600,000 rooms (including
the 190,927 public and private, already under construction
or occupied in 167 areas) by the creation of 201,358 rooms
in the next three years. Since most of the three year goal
is already on the ground, one cannot help wondering whether
this new assessment is only designed to temproarily satisfy
statisticians, particularly in light of the fact that no new
865 funds seem to be forthcoming by the State. The figure
is, in fact a diminishment of the original 167 area designa-
tion, no doubt decreased by those areas which have been pri-
vately built on, in contradiction to the Master Plan and/or
the PEEP. These areas are listed and mapped following.
The increase in city ownership of land is quite signifi-
cant. In 1954, it was reported that the City of Rome owned
only 500 hectares of land, while the 1964 PEEP declared
that over 5,100 hectares would be necessary.
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The combined area of Spinaceto, which was already
city-owned and seven other projects now under construction,
(with a target population of 103,500 persons,) is larger
than 732 hectares, and represents only 50% of the 167 pro-
jects under way, and 14% of those planned in the city. Al-
though low in comparison to the 1964 targets, the increase
in ownership and achievements in housing are significant.
The policy questions which have been raised over the
16 year period are more wideranging, and are indeed diffi-
cult to summarize. There is no question that the field of
public city planning has returned to a conception of its role
as (to include) intervention as well as regulation. While
there is little hope that the regulatory nature of planning
will improve in effectiveness, there is the possibility'
that the mode of intervention in the provision
of housing, and the functions of the private market, will
continue to be used as a tool for achieving governmental,
political, and human goals. Those which stand the greatest
chances of implementation of course, are those goals which
are political, and have the support of one or more political
parties.
The unanswerable question is whether the 167/865
acts will continue to.be funded as the country enters a per-
iod of level or decreasing resources. The Left is likely to
advocate a policy of general austerity (see Berlinguer,
Block); while if the DC hedgemony remains, is not likely to
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push for the increase in public spending necessary to continue
the level of activity seen in the 1972-78 167/865 implementa-
tion. Although rationalization of construction methods and
economies of scale have lowered the per unit construction
cost of IACP housing below 1974 levels (Fraticelli), the
monthly subsidy of 190,000 Lira per unit, will cost the IACP
and/or Italian governments of 76 billion Lira annually just
to support the currently built 167/865 housing in Rome*.
The other policy issue which I have not discussed con-
cerns the attempt on the part of planners to achieve a pre-
servation of neighborhood gualitv in the historic center of
Rome. The Bologna experience (see Angotti, Cervellati and
Scannavini, Nanetti and Leonardi, and Ceccarelli) has re-
corded a mixed success, applauded by some of the Left, while
discredited by the Right. In Rome, the flagship project,
the renovation of a block along the Tiber, Tor di Nona, is
just commencing. Although begun in 1954, no funds were avail-
able for inner city provision of IACP housing because of a
clause in both the 167 and the Tupini Laws which required
funds to be spent only on land, and land without buildings,
which could acquire in fee. The modifications of the 865
law allowed funds to be used for renovation as well. Bologna
was the first, and for a time the only city which took
*An average of 1.4 million Lira per year per unit, equiva-
lent to an average current Roman salary or $1,750 per unit
per year, the debt on a $17,000 house.
239
advantage of this provision. The Tor di None-project is
being developed by the Rome Planning Office for preserva-
tion of the Historic Center (from its offices in EUR), but
so far is the only project of its kind. A member of their
staff, Architect Montanari has claimed that the project will
be repeated in the future, however the availability of funds
and ability of many government agencies to cooperate will
be a critical factor.
In many cases, the process of distribution of profes-
sional contracts, such as architectural commissions is
explicitly political. In the case of the 167/865 program
implementation, commissions for the projects were given out
to party affiliated architects in proportion to the party
make-up of the City Council. Knowing this, one might expect
to see political values reflected in the choice of forms and
the norms of each particular intervention. This expectation
is too simplistic and pedantic, and leaves out other ques-
tions of schooling, age, use of technology, scale, and per-
haps most important in Italy, the competition of schools of
thought and adherence to master figures. It does not negate
the principle used by the PSI and PCI, however, that party
members regularly donate to the party finances an amount of
money deducted from their salary or wages, probably in pro-
portion to their income. In the case of firms, the question
is more difficult, although the principle of returning to the
party a proportion of these political commissions is common.
This process places certain architects on the party's
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list for the distribution of political commissions; which are
these the government allocates to each party for their selec-
tion of architects
This process has surfaced in Parma in a recent scandal
involving the architect Berlandi. It has been said to be
the case for the allocation of architects to the various
167 projects in Rome. The following table lists some of
Rome's more prominent architects and planners, and their
political appearences:
4 14 POLITICAL AFFILICATIONS*
POSITION PERSON PROBABLE AFFILIATION
Left
Left-Center
Center
Aymonino
Sacripanti
Piccinato
de'Rossi
Moroni
Quaroni
Fiorintino
Gorio
Benevolo
Lucio
Fausto
Passarelli
Valori
Grassini
PCI
PCI
PSI
PSI
PSI
PSI- (DSDI)
PSI-PSDI-DC
PSI-PSDI-DC
PSDI-DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
Masters Quaroni
Samona
Portoghesi
Fasolo
*This information based upon interviews with Ceccarelli,
DiMambro, DiCarlo, Fiorentino, and Quaroni, Insolera's book,
and readings of the work of certain of the above mentioned.
It is reasonably accurate, although speculative. It is
known, however, that Quaroni has refused to engage in the sys-
tem of party contributions for political contracts, which may
explain why the others are more active in building.
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There is a great similarity between Vigne Nuove and
Corviale, although done by architects of opposite parties.
There is also a striking difference between those two pro-
jects and the others reported in Casabella 438. The ideo-
logical positions of the buildings seem to represent strong-
er positions on such issues as equality, the use of tech-
nology (industrialization vs. traditional methods of con-
struction and materials), and the issue of scale. The pre-
dominate position of the CET planners, which included Quaroni
and Piccinato, was that the new development should "speak to
the city," that is, the scale of the new building in the city
should be such that by its magnitude, and at one fell swoop,
it interrupts the macchiad'olio pattern of growth and super-
imposes a new, larger order over the city. The concept, of
activity centers, and its development in the 60's the Asse
Attrazzato as well as the building type selected for Corviale,
Vigne Nuove, project for Casal de'Pazzi, by Rebecchini,
Passarelli and others as well as Aymonino's project for Tor
de'Cenci all meet this criteria, voiced by Rebicchini,
(Casabella, 438), Fiorentino and Quaroni. -Aymonino's-book,
"Il Significato delle Citta" also reflects this opinion.
On the other hand,Avmonino and Fiorentino are philo-
sophically diametrically opposed to Quaroni in their current
positions on the use of materials and the role of partici-
pation and people in the design process. Corviale, coord-
inated by Fiorintino, was also worked on by a host of other
architects, including Gorio, and Einaudi and Valori.
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former Liberial Prident), and Valori. There has been much
joint work by Quaroni and Fiorentino, including the Asse
Attrezzato, which included as well, Bruno Zevi, and
Passarelli.
The use of new industrialized methods of construction
has aided the construction of monuments, large enough to
"spead" to the city, at least in scale, if not in sounds.
These attitudes have also supported and been supported by
a desire to create many housing units for which there is
little variation. In talking about Corviale, Fiorintino
mentioned both how the consistent units supported his be-
lief in a greater equality in the world, and yet in the same
breath, how in fact all the future tenants were not just
ordinary city people, bureaucrats or workers, whose needs
were no longer that different. It is not an inappropriate
question to ask whether the technology and concept that big-
ger forms are better has not clouded the real issue of equal-
ity, which in the end must deal with issues of control,
access, and powers of decision, not only artifacts.
The change in thinking between Tiburtino IV--which was
designed in 1950 by Quaroni, Aymonino, Fiorentino, and
others--and their current work is an issue which deserves a
close analysis, both i.n terms of the development of new tech-
nologieschanging economic climates, and changing political
positions of the Left. Tiburtino could be characterized by
its labor intensivity, mandated by both the economics of the
recovery, and the positions of INA-Casa and the designers.
NJ
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Corviale is quite the opposite, supporting not the crafts
and employment potential of the Italian worker, but rather the
large construction firms and the mass production of indus-
trial and consumer goods--certainly not the goals of the
Left, except that it produces more units for less monetary
cost. The funds entering the Left-controlled projects are
allowed to immediately leave their control, a policy quite
different from one which attempts to maintain the control of
funds for a longer time in a smaller constituency.
The types and quality of living environments offered to
the Roman people now and in the future must be seriously
examined, and the question of whether the building of large
projects, ranging from 8,500 residents in Corviale to over
40,000 in the Tiburtino development area achieves the goals
of a society, ideologically split. Egalitarianism without
choice must be compared to differentiation with control, not
with the current lack of choice and opportunity in a highly
differentiated environment, stratified by class structure.
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ummary
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In the last century there have been many changes in the
development patterns that the city has taken, but these have
been matched by a great deal of continuity, in methods of
planning, regulating, and developing. In the long run, the
continuities seem to outweigh the changes. The symbolic ef-
forts to contradict previous master plans, coming into
each change in governing ideology (in 1907, 1925, and again
in 1946 and 1962 have marked changes in proposed and allowed
development patterns), but have not stopped the macchia d'olio
from continuing. Similarly, each of the efforts to build
major housing developments outside the master plan boundaries,
Garbatella, Monte Sacro, the Fascist borgate, and the 167/865
projects, have all been intended as devices for the restructur-
ing of the cities social and organic growth. The city has
continually grown out around these developments, and-will
probably -continue out and around the 167/865 projects. This
is another continuity. It would be perhaps useful to dis
the continuities, in order to get an idea of where to
look for changes.
Continuities in the growth of Rome are particularly
apparent in the method of development, in styles and methods
of public intervention, and in the roles of city planning.
Methods of development.
Large institutions, developers, land holders, or govern-
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mental bodies have consistently been the instigators of growth.
In laying out and commencing the development of an area they
have had the necessary force to leverage public expenditures
to support significant additions to the city. These instances
have also been'instrumental in breaking the previous Master
Plans, not through bureaucratic condemnation, but by action.
Around these developments, are found smaller land developments
which cluster, taking advantage of the services provided
to the critical masses.
In the Liberal era, the DeMerode development, the Prati,
Monte Sacro and the Ghetto all followed this pattern. Also
the military developments of the 19th century were similar
events, stimulating the development of surrounding areas,
such as Piazza Mazzini and Castro Pretoria. In each of
these developments, the ownership or control of a large quan-
tity of land has given the developer more power to influence
public decisions, than the elected political body. During
Fascism, the development of Piazza Verbona by INCIS, Piazza
Bologna, the Parioli, the Gianicolo, and the Citta Universitaria
were similar large developments. Also related were the
historic center redevelopments, such as the Mausoleum of
Augustis; although public action was necessary to help
assemble the land from small owners into consolidated holdings.
In the post-war period, the influence of the Vatican and
such people as the Gerini' s and Lancellotti's had similar
effects. Each was instrumental in bringing INA-Casa or IACP
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developments of housing to areas, to create with their own
land, critical population masses necessary to support the in-
tensive development of city infrastructure and commercial
services and more profitable activities.
From 1870 until 1962, the pattern continued, with the
influences of these developers being not only limited to
shape and direction of growth, but also to public policy;
stricter land use controls were continually fought by these
interests. It was only in the implementation of the 167/865
acts that this process began to show signs of change, with
the political arm of government interfering with private
interests, at the insistance of the PSI.
Public Intervention and Regulation
The styles and methods of public city planning inter-
vention in the growth of the city remained constant as well,
except for a short respite in the 1950's when a laissez-faire
ideology became the strongest it had ever been. Regulation
of building both buildable areas and allowable volumes have
been modes of operation since 1871, although usually support-
ed by public intervention. The Master Plans have become more
complex and differentiated, but there have always been
Master Plans. Building regulations, passed internally in
the city government invariably followed Master Plans several
years behind. Until 1942, the Master Plan was an optional type
of regulation, dependent upon the King's approval for its
enforcement. After 1942, its situation was formally changed
249
although not in practice until the Regions were established,
when the Master Plan became (in practice) an ordinary form
of regulation designed and authorized more closely to the
area and people which it controlled. Abuse of Master Plan
regulations, as with the abuse of governmental law in general
has been a way of life in Italy.
The other mode of affecting city growth employed throughout
the history of Rome has been direct public intervention: in-
vestment for infrastructure, housing, public buildings and
monuments. The patterns of street clearance continued from
the 1870's (and of course before) through the Fascist period,
and even through the post war period, if the construction of
motorways is considered in the same light. The building of
new infrastructure for development, bridges, tunnels, rail-
roads, trams, bus routes, sewer, water and electricity
has similarly been used to support or impede development.
Although the infrastructure now provided by the city and other
public agencies is greater than in the 19th century (when
for instance, the public transportation system was still
private), its provision has always been a key to land value and
developability. Since the costs of infrastructure have been
borne by the state and its agencies, these have been subject
to political manipulatio.n by the central government, politic-
ians, parties and bureaucracies.
The construction of job producing buildings by the State
Government has had a strong impact on the patterns of residen-
250
tial location in the city and the distribution of land values.
In the first decades of the nation, this activity consisted
mainly of the construction of ministries--Justice, Finance,
etc. Under Fascism, the increased size of the government
bureaucracy and the increased state control of industry con-
tributed to this type of growth control through the construc-
tion of new ministries (Foreign Affairs), corporate head-
quarters, The Citta Universitataria and military training centers
(Piazza Bologna). In the postwar period, the placement of
governmental offices at EUR, or the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in the Fascist building near Monte Mario,has been
a continuation of the tradition.
The construction of public housing is a more complicated
event, due perhaps to the variety of housing agencies
acting, as well as the clearly redefined purpose of the housing
projects, which has changed from the charitable gesture of
the Liberal Ideology. A growing constituency considers housing
as a public service, (like infrastructure)and city planners
are using its development for the restructuring areas of-town
and the shaping of growth. This concept is similar to the
manner by which previous generations used street clearance
or the construction of ministries. Nevertheless, the geo-
graphic expression of the public housing projects has remained
remarkably consistant over the years, usually just a little
outside of the current perimeter of the city.
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By and large, the role that city planning has played
has changed little in the hundred years. City planning has
existed inside the bureaucracy of city government, responsible
to the elected and appointed politicians who manage the city,
and indirectly to the parties and ruling elite: in the 19th
century the nobility; under Fascism, the Fascist party; and
in the postwar period, the wealth. These classes have also
produced the majority of current architects and planners.
There has never been any direct responsibility of planning to
the people, ostensibly planned for. In the Liberal era,
planning was explicitly for everyone, or the benefit of
the government, the landed nobility and developers. And
of course, it was the responsibility of the educated and
powerful to define what was good for everyone and insure
that that goal was strived for. Under Fascism, the situation
changed little in practice or in theory. The educated and
landed nobility were replaced by the Facsist middle class,
the industrialists, and corporatists, and the landed nobility
who supported Fascism. In the Postwar era, political parties
have to a degree replaced some of the previous powerful
interests, the corporations and wealthy remain influential
of politicians, but the people remain essentially unrepresented
in the process, except by proxy at election time. The
ideology has shifted greatly such that at least one party is
advocating (and practicing a greater degree of direct control
over planning by people. In a complex society, even a city
of nearly 3 million, the orchestration of a process whereby
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people represented their own needs demands is enormously
difficult to work out. Neither democracy nor socialism
have yet succeeded. In response, the bureaucracy has continued,
diminishing its responsibility to political leaders and people,
and created a new breed of technocrats, self-perpetuating and
responsible only to themselves.
Professional ideologies have similarly developed in a
series of environments removed from both politics and people,
although the intentions of the current Socialist planners
do not confirm this contention. In the 19th century, the
discipline of planning and architecture was reserved for
the educated elite, an appendage of the ruling elite. The
close relationships between the two groups, as evidenced
by the DeMerode, Viviani and later Monte Sacro episodes
are ample evidence of this.
In the twenties, however, the growing middle classes
in positions of power in government, coupled by the influx
of Southerners into the growing State bureaucracies, posed
a threat to the intellectual hedgemony of the profession.
In this decade both architectural and planning professional
associations were formed. The impact of these associations
was substantial, they formed fori for professional debates,
often severe; and yet at the same time they presented a
united front to the government in power, whatever it may
have been. The INU was largely responsible for the writing
and passage of the 1942 Legge Urbanistica, as well as the
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initial staffing of the Rome City Planning Department in
1946, following the overthrow of Fascism.
These organizations controlled not only the urban advice
to the various levels of government, but also professional
education, particularly the Faculty of Architecture at the
University of Rome, where the majority of Rome's architects
and planners were trained (Aymonino, Benevolo, Fiorentino,
Insolera, Ridolfi, Tafuri, and others). The organizations
were a means of restraining the participants in the professional
debates to a selected group, defined by their educational
training, class status, and background. After the war, the
INA-Casa organization, headed by Foschini was added to the
professional organizations engaged in substantial housing
research. The subsequent influence of the INU in the 1962,
Master Plan, and INA-Casa in the formation of the background
ideology of the 167 housing projects is thus no surprise.
Appearance
There has been a remarkable consistancy in the appearance
of the development of Rome. While there is no doubt that
many changes have occurred which have altered the look of
the city, the appearance of growing, always on the outer
edges has not changed. The appearance of always redeveloping
the inner core, the historic center, has not changed that much
either, and neither has the habit of every so often seeing
one of the great villa's being subdivided and developed. In
this way, the appearance of growth and development, coupled
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with change has been a continuity which has bound Romans
together, at least since the twelfth century when Rome's
population had fallen to less than 30,000.
The changes are significant, and although they often
cannot be seen by appearance, they exist strongly in in-
tentions and attitudes, with strong connections to more
general politics.
Changes
The most significant changes in the legal status of
planning resulted from the 1942 act, the establishment of the
Provisional Government in 1946, the passage of the 167 act in
1962. Other than those events, changes have been in the in-
tentions behind actions, not in the types of actions themselves.
For instance, between 1870 and 1945 the intentions of street
clearance, public housing construction, and building regulations
shifted from a Liberal ideology to a protective and socially
controlling Fascist ideology. This transition was cloaked
behind the continuities in appearance and character of the
actions, and gave the appearance of not being responsive to
prevailing political ideology.
Government changed little between 1870 and 1943. It was
consistently working on behalf of the middle and upper classes
in a manner that was class repressive and capitalistic, and
maintained an effective hegemony of the ruling classes/owners
of capital and land. The actions of clearance, housing, the
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regulation of new construction, and the allocation of state
resources to new interventions were all designed to maintain
the existing distribution of power and status. The ideology
did change, however, from a Liberal tradition which reached
its peak in the Giolittian age, to the Fascist middle class
mentality, which peaked in the late 30's. Under the Liberals,
the contradictory belief that public urban investment could
benefit the rich and poor alike was the governing rule for
city planning. Perhaps it did in times of rapid economic
growth, like the 1880's, but the continued appearance of
the baracche on the periphery of town reached such proportions
by 1900 that the State was forced to enact a public housing
act to remedy the situation. In periods of economic stability
and decline (1890's, Fascism, 1960's), the contradictions of,
Liberalism were most apparent, showing visibly how the poor were
being penalized by the system.
The transition into Fascism changed neither land ownership
patterns, (although patterns of industrial ownership were
consolidated after the depression), nor the operation of
capitalism in the city's development. The biggest transition
was from individual action to corporate action, in the new
developments. This transition was in some ways not that
significant,as the holding of mortgages on land by banks and
lending institutions had already been firmly established by the
1870's.
The Fascist attempts at decentralization, proposed as
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and supported by the planning profession as a "solution" to the
urban growth of the decade were used by the political machine,
not for the general good of the city, but as a method of social
control. The borgate, the new towns, and the new cities in
the colonies (Libya and Ethiopia) were all used as places to
send the lower and classes and undesirable persons. The Anti-
Urbanization Laws were similarly used in attempts to control
the population and political pursuasion of city residents. The
continued outward growth of the city through that period,
supported by architects and planners, was consistently higher
quality, modern and well serviced upper middle class housing
and was financially supported by generous public allocations of
resources.
In the postwar period, again the intent of government phanged
little, although opennes was increased and activities were
altered. The ownership of land and capital still forced public
actions in its own interests, although the Fascist lack of
concern for the poor and working classes was replaced again
by a Liberal ideological view, espoused by the Christian-
Democrats. The ideology held that with economic growth there
would be benefits which could accrue to all. The contradictions
in the position again surfaced by the late fifties, but no
action to counteract them was brought forward until the sixties
and with the Center-Left Coalition and the 167 act and its
subsequent decisions which supported the social ownership of
resources, particularly urban land and buildings.
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The difference in politcal structure in the postwar period
which did not really become active until the Center-Left
coalition in the 60's was that the political hegenony of the
owners of society was dissolved. In the previous 90 years there
had been a synonymous hegemony of political power and economic
power. Today the economic hegemony remains, although the
political control has been split between cities and the State,
and between Communists, Socialists, and Christian-Democrats.
This political divergence has achieved the practice of social
control over some common resources, land, and city capital,
although the control over allocation of State capital is still
concentrated with the fC Party. This change has been brought
about through the electoral and party systems and by the
struggles of the PCI and PSI, not as in the Liberal period,
by the gifts of resources by the State and wealthy to the less
advantaged groups.
This transition has had its effect on the development of
Rome, through the political control over the 167 implementation
and by the institution of substantial land use controls by the
city government. The absorbing of much of what would otherwise
be scattered private growth into the 167 areas has taken the
wind out of the unrestrained private market. Public intervention
in urban growth has emerged, although the form of that inter-
vention is now interference in the market activities, rather
than by the straightforward support or replacement of the
private market system.
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This transition has been aided by the regularization of
city planning, instituted by the 1942 Legge Urbanistica
(passed under Fascism), by the final approval of the 1962
Master Plan for Rome (passed by a Center-Left government
coalition) and by the 167 and 865 acts, and their implementation.
The acts, despite their political basis have become trapped in
the Liberal Capitalist structure of society. Although their
implementation has succeeded in substantially interfering in
the market activities, of land speculation and housing con-
struction, they are not becoming a means of operation so much
as a one-time event. The resources which have been allocated
to them and into the projects have been channelled immediately
back into the capitalist, private industrialist economy, and
not for instance held in the public economy at all. The use
of high technologies to reduce costs are a savings to the'
government, not to the individual. Principles of attempting
to design project implementation so as to increase the flow
of funds within smaller groups have not been applied. The
non-ownership of any building industries by the IRI or IMI
has meant that there is no recapture of these expenditures by
any government agency, particularly the regional IACP or the
City government.
This situation suggests that despite the massiveness of
the intervention, the change in style of provision of public
housing has changed little since San Saba and Garbatella.
Costs are still born directly or indirectly by the central
government and rent levels are similarly set by central govern-
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ment policy. This has led to what is called in Italy, the
"political pricing" of housing, and not an increase in the
control over urban development by the people who inhabit that
housing or the adjacent private housing.
If it is assumed that the four changes in political structure
are significant,
The Liberal Monarchy
Fascism
Christian-Democracy
Center-Left
then a conclusion must be drawn that they have not substantially
changed the patterns of urban development. One must instead
look at the development of new technologies, at international
aesthetic movements, at the social class and context of architects,
planners and developers, and at the personal development of
ideological positions to account for the few changes which
have occurred. Political changes in the country have had little
effect in changing the patterns of development, or rather, all
four political governments have endeavored to maintain the status
quo growth. This conclusion is necessarily superficial, however.
The Center-Left, differing from the previous government
only by the addition of a small, Left party, the PSI to the
governing PC-PSDI coalition, has effected a substantial change
in the manner in which urban problems are viewed and dealt- with.
The non-implementation of the acts, or rather the dilution of
the 167 provisions must be seen as not a fialure of PSI, but
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rather a reflection of the forces of conservation against another
potential change. These forces have maintained their power in
the country through their acquisition control over governmental
resources, and belong to the Christian-Democrats. The struggle
to change this balance of power is an uphill battle and although
there have been several victories (the Regions, 167, 865, the
1962 Master Plan), these victories have entailed compromise,
not resolution. The PSI and PCI have lost voters after every
attempt at such compromise. The PSI, for instance, lost to
the PCI a substantial number of voters after their Center-
Left Coalition. Similarly, as the PCI has demanded a position
in government, in coalition with the DC, a position labeled
by Enrico Berlinguer, the current Party Head, as the "Historical
Compromise," some of their members have parted for more extreme
left positions, often into terrorism.
None of the changes in political structure in the century
observed are total or revolutionary. They all have been slow
changes, characterized by their constant acceptance of the
center position as a component. In England, for instance,
the Labor and Conservative parties represent different
ideologies and split the country essentially down the middle,
resulting in substantial policy changes which follow changes in
government. In Italy, on the other hand, the Center has remained
stable and in control of both government and resources throughout
the century, with the deviations only in direction, like the
variations in tilt of the earth in its orbit. The continuous
motion of inertia has predominated. For this reason, perhaps,
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skepticism is the controlling ideology of the city planning
profession, and the words of Walter of Chatillon are not
inappropriate:
"Nummus vincit, nummus regnat, nummus cunctis imperat."
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